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 ii 
Abstract 
This thesis analyses the application of rules of immunity and universal jurisdiction in 
respect of international crimes by adopting a constructivist approach to the interests of the 
international community and formation of customary international law. Accordingly, the study 
proposes an alternative understanding of customary international law in order to analyse the 
rules of immunity, universal jurisdiction and international crimes and their interrelated 
operations. The operation of the rules of immunity and universal jurisdiction regarding 
international crimes is conducted on the basis of a constructivist understanding of the interests 
of the international community to determine whether legitimate rules can be institutionalised 
in customary international law as well as rules based on the self-interests of States. This thesis 
also considers whether rules, based on their legitimacy, can comprise different legal 
implications in international law. In this context, the study considers how international crimes, 
which give rise to the dual responsibility for States and their nationals, are created by adopting 
a constructivist approach to customary law formation. This study further considers whether 
international crimes in international law are based on legitimacy rather than the self-interests 
of States, and whether they can give rise to different legal implications, specifically with regard 
to rules of universal jurisdiction and the immunity of officials. The development and 
application of the rules of jurisdiction and immunity are considered separately in international 
law on the basis of their development in customary international law. This study seeks to 
determine the appropriate general approach to the rules of jurisdiction by analysing both the 
permissive and prohibitive approaches to the rules of jurisdiction. In addition, it also explores 
whether functional immunity can be assimilated with the immunity of States and examines the 
role of the rules of attribution in the application of the functional immunity of officials. 
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 1 
Introduction  
Research Aims and Objectives 
Adopting a constructivist approach to the formation of customary international law and 
the interests of the international community, this thesis examines the development and 
operation of the rules of jurisdiction, immunity and international crimes independently and 
conjointly. In particular, the thesis delineates the circumstances in which States can exercise 
universal jurisdiction over foreign officials for violations of international crimes on the basis 
of international law. In embracing a constructivist approach to the formation of customary law, 
this research examines international crimes, rules of jurisdiction and immunity as an integrated 
study in light of the social construction of the interests of the international community.  
First, the consideration of customary international law is conducted on the basis that 
the operation of the rules of jurisdiction, immunity of officials, and international crimes are 
dependent on customary international law.1 The customary status of the rules of immunity is 
well established, and a permissive or prohibitive approach to customary international law is 
generally adopted to the rules of jurisdiction. However, in relation to international crimes, in 
spite of the fact that international law recognises crimes, there is disagreement over how 
international crimes are created.2 More generally, the difficulties in relation to the methods of 
identifying international crimes are attributed to the sources of international law and, more 
specifically, to customary international law.3 Hence, an understanding of customary 
international law impacts an understanding of the rules of immunity, jurisdiction and 
international crimes and their interrelated operation. This thesis analyses theories of custom 
                                                 
1 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 3 [58]; Case of SS ‘Lotus’ 
(France v Turkey) [1927] PCIJ Ser A No 10 18–22; Rosanne van Alebeek, ‘Domestic Courts as Agents 
of Development of International Immunity Rules’ (2013) 26 LJIL 559: that rules of immunity of 
officials have mainly developed in national courts; Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP 
2003) 23–25. 
2 Cassese (n 1) 23–25. 
3 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(CUP 2005) 400–5. 
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formation based on the bifurcation of acts as binding usus and opinio juris and approaches 
which place emphasis on the consent of States in the formation of customary law. 
Secondly, the thesis focuses on the social construction of States’ interests and the 
interests of the international community to determine whether the rules of customary 
international law can comprise only rules based on the self-interests of States or that customary 
rules can also include rules based on their legitimacy. In this context, it considers whether the 
legitimacy of the rule can affect its legal consequences in international law. This is done on the 
basis that the rules of immunity and jurisdiction and international crimes have been associated 
with the interests of the international community. International crimes have often been 
associated with non-legal lexical terms, which are intended to convey their perceived 
importance (eg hostis humanis generis,4 heinous acts,5 attacks on the international legal order,6 
and so on7). Further, the existence of a right or duty for States to exercise universal jurisdiction 
has also often been associated with the interests of the international community.8 In addition, 
rules of immunity as rules of customary international law have often been associated with their 
procedural function in determining their interaction with international crimes,9 rather than their 
customary status. 
Thirdly, this research seeks to identify whether international law can differentiate 
between customary laws based on the self-interests of States and those based on their 
legitimacy. The examination of the creation of the interests of States from a constructivist 
                                                 
4 Edwin D Dickinson, ‘Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?’ (1925) 38 HarvLRev 334, 351. 
5 Attorney General of the Government of Israel v Adolf Eichmann (District Court of Jerusalem) 
(1961) 39 ILR 5 [11(b), 12(a)]. 
6 Regina v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) (House of Lords) 
(24 March 1999) [2000] 1 AC 147, 119 ILR 136, Lord Millet 275. 
7 See also Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction’ (2003) 1 JICJ 596, 
598. 
8 Mary Robinson, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton University 
2001) 23. 
9 Arrest Warrant (n 1) [60]; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece 
Intervening) [2012] ICJ Rep 99 [58,93]; (2001) 34 EHHR 11 Joint Dissenting Opinion [3]. 
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perspective and the appraisal of the formation of customary international law can illustrate the 
distinctions and similarities between the legitimacy and legality of the rules. More specifically, 
it can clarify the legal status and operation of legitimate rules in international law and considers 
the criteria for the identification of legitimate rules which have developed in customary 
international law. Accordingly, this study probes the concepts of erga omnes obligation and 
jus cogens norms as they are also widely acknowledged to be linked to the interests of the 
international community and their operation vis-à-vis customary international law. With 
respect to erga omnes obligations, this thesis assesses whether the concept of erga omnes 
obligations embodies the legal criteria for the identification of some rules of customary 
international law which are perceived as legitimate (ie include the normative convictions of the 
international community). Against this background, the thesis deliberates whether international 
crimes could give rise to obligations erga omnes. 
Fourthly, this thesis considers the general application of customary international law to 
the rules of jurisdiction and places the rules of immunity and non-intervention in the context 
of the rules of jurisdiction. From this perspective, it reviews whether States can exercise 
universal jurisdiction on the basis of violations of international crimes and proposes the 
conditions accompanying the exercise of universal jurisdiction in international law. This is 
done by considering international crimes in the context of the interests of the international 
community, which are perceived as legitimate by States. Application of both the rules of 
jurisdiction and immunity of officials in relation to international crimes is conducted in light 
of the fact that States are the primary subjects of international law. This is taken into 
consideration in the following ways: first, the constructivist approach adopted in this thesis 
recognises States as the primary actors in the social structure of the State system.10 Secondly, 
the definition of international crimes adopted in this thesis recognises the obligations of States, 
                                                 
10 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (CUP 1999) 9. 
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as well as those of individuals. Finally, it studies the rules of immunity and jurisdiction in light 
of States' rights and obligations under international law. 
Fifthly, this thesis examines whether the functional immunity of officials and States can 
be distinguished from the perspective of customary international law, as well as the rules of 
personal immunity of high-ranking officials in respect of their status. This is done to understand 
the operation of the rules of the functional immunity of officials, and the personal immunity of 
high-ranking officials, in respect of international crimes. Thus, from the perspective of the 
interests of the international community and their link to customary rules, this thesis considers 
if a better explanation of the operation of rules of immunity of officials in respect of 
international crimes can be provided than the explanations based on jus cogens and the 
substantive or procedural nature of the rules of immunity. 
Sixthly, on the basis of a constructivist approach to customary international law and the 
interests of the international community, this thesis offers clear-cut answers to the rights and 
obligations of States in respect of the exercise of universal jurisdiction for violations of 
international crimes by foreign officials and individuals. This is done from both ends. It 
includes the rights and obligations of the State seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction for 
violations of international crime and the State whose officials or nationals will be implicated 
as a result of the exercise of jurisdiction by a foreign State. The study of the operation of the 
rules of jurisdiction and immunity is also significant in terms of understanding their 
development in respect of international crimes. 
Finally, the reference to international crimes which are generated in customary 
international law in this thesis is limited on the basis of a few criteria. First, the definition of 
international crimes is limited to the duty of States to prevent the commission of the crimes 
and prosecute the alleged offenders under international law. Secondly, the definition of 
international crimes is further limited to the existence of individual responsibility in the 
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domestic legal systems of States rather than only individual responsibility on the international 
level. Thirdly, the definition of crimes proposed here is not based on the gravity or 
systematicity of the offences. Finally, the creation of international crimes in customary law is 
considered in light of the binding usus proposed in this thesis on the basis of a constructivist 
understanding. Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, when a reference is made in this thesis to 
a crime as an international crime it is an international crime in customary international law 
based on the conditions above. 
Significance and Contribution of This Thesis 
This study makes an original contribution to the study of international crimes and the 
application of universal jurisdiction and rules of immunity in several perspectives. First, 
notwithstanding the fact that there is a plethora of references to the interests of the international 
community in the legal authorities in relation to international crimes, a social construction of 
the “interests approach” has not been applied to studying international crimes and their 
application to the rules of jurisdiction and immunity. The study of the construction of interests 
of the international community can clarify the legal consequences of these rules in international 
law, and thus provides a basis to understand the legitimacy of norms. This illuminates the 
differences between the legality and legitimacy of the rules, and whether there can be an 
overlap between the rules based on their legality and legitimacy. International crimes could, 
therefore, be examined from both legitimacy and legality perspectives and applied to the rules 
of jurisdiction and immunity on that basis.  
The appraisal of customary law from a constructivist perspective provides an 
alternative way of understanding how customary law is created in international law and, 
accordingly, institutes a framework by which to study the creation of international crimes. 
Moreover, probing the interaction between international crimes and the rules of immunity from 
the perspective that they both have the same status in international law as rules of customary 
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international law and their connection to interests of the international community, delivers an 
alternative interpretation to the following generally acknowledged assumptions. It questions 
the relevance of the procedural nature of the rules of immunity in the interaction of the rules 
of immunity with other rules of customary international law such as international crimes.11 
Further, it questions a reliance on jus cogens explanations to understand the relationship 
between international crimes and the rules of immunity.12 
Thirdly, despite the fact that the link between the rules of jurisdiction and immunity is 
widely acknowledged in the legal authorities,13 the study of international crimes in respect of 
the rules of jurisdiction and immunity are generally conducted in isolation of each other.14 This 
thesis seeks to overcome this shortcoming and examines both the rules of immunity and 
jurisdiction in relation to international crimes as an integrated study. The thesis considers the 
rules of jurisdiction in the context of the rules of immunity of officials and, in so doing, seeks 
to garner a deeper analysis of the rules of jurisdiction and immunity. Thus, this research defines 
how international crimes are created, and their application to the rules of jurisdiction and 
immunity.  
Fourthly, studies on universal jurisdiction and the immunity of officials for violations 
of international crimes have generally focused on the State vis-à-vis the individual and have 
not generally considered the consequences of officials' rights and obligations in the context of 
the obligations of the State with a closer link to the offence or the offender in international 
                                                 
11 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 9) [58, 93]; Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic 
of Germany (Distomo Massacre case) (Court of Cassation) (2000) 129 ILR 514. 
12 Pinochet (No 3) (n 6) Lord Hutton 261-64, Lord Hope 242-46, Lord Millet 275-78; Paola 
Gaeta, ‘Official Capacity and Immunities’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John RWD Jones (eds), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (OUP 2002) 982; Alberto-Luis 
Zuppi, ‘Immunity v Universal Jurisdiction: The Yerodia Ndombasi Decision of the International Court 
of Justice’ (2002) 63 LaLRev 309, 323; Curtis A Bradley and Laurence R Helfer, ‘International Law 
and the US Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity’ (2010) 2010 SupCtRev 213, 238. 
13 ILC, ‘Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: Memorandum by the 
Secretariat’ (31 March 2008) A/CN.4/596 para 14; Arrest Warrant (n 1) [46]. 
14 See generally Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (OUP 2008); Luc Reydams, 
Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (OUP 2003). 
 7 
law.15 This concerns whether the obligations of States under international law affect the 
immunity of their officials or the legality of the existence of universal jurisdiction by foreign 
States. The assertion that States are primary subjects of international law is uncontroversial, 
but this assertion should be viewed in light of the fact that some scholars writing on 
international crimes and universal jurisdiction or the immunity of officials generally only refer 
to individual responsibility in respect of international crimes, and overlook the fact that, first 
and foremost, the legal obligations and rights of States vis-à-vis other States should be 
considered in relation to both the rules of jurisdiction and immunity.16 
Structure of the Research 
This thesis comprises five chapters and adopts the following structure. Chapter One 
argues that there is an international community based on shared interests and obligations owed 
to all members of the community. This chapter contends that the interests of the States are 
socially constructed and that the interests of the community of States, from a legal perspective, 
are those which have been internalised by most States and have also been institutionalised in 
international law. These include interests which are either based on the self-interests of States 
or are perceived as legitimate. The legitimacy of norms is considered from the internalisation 
aspect of norms in the social structure of the State system, rather than their legal status. The 
level of internalisation of a norm does not necessarily affect its legal consequences once it is 
institutionalised in international law. On that basis, it is suggested that, one cannot differentiate 
between norms which are institutionalised in international law on the basis of self-interests or 
legitimacy (for example, the rules of jurisdiction, immunities and international crimes) 
provided that they have the same legal status in international law (eg customary international 
                                                 
15 Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal 
Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2008) 243; Zachary Douglas, ‘State Immunity for the 
Acts of State Officials’ (2012) 82 BYBIL 281, 324; Mitsue Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern 
International Law (Intersentia 2005); Reydams (n 14). 
16 Alebeek (n 15) 243; Douglas (n 15) 324. 
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law).  
Chapter 2 identifies international crimes by analysing the formation of custom in 
international law. This chapter also determines whether the rules of customary international 
law can enshrine community interests based on the legitimacy of norms as well as the rules on 
the self-interests of States. This is relevant in terms of the interaction of international crimes 
with the rules of jurisdiction and immunities in international law. In adopting a constructivist 
approach, the chapter maintains that custom could be created on the basis of binding usus 
provided that there is consensus in the international community and binding usus is determined 
through a process of socialisation. This chapter also uncovers whether customary international 
law could give rise to rules which represent the self-interests of States, as well as rules which 
are perceived as legitimate. It proposes that international crimes are those which give rise to 
the dual responsibility of States and individuals. It examines whether the rules of customary 
international law, which are also perceived as legitimate (ie international crimes) could give 
rise to erga omnes obligations. Put together, the results of these discussions are used in this 
thesis to answer whether foreign courts have jurisdiction over non-nationals who have 
committed international crimes abroad on non-nationals and, secondly, whether the personal 
and functional immunities of foreign officials are applicable in respect of international crimes. 
Chapter 3 probes whether States are entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction over 
individuals accused of committing international crimes on the basis that crimes under 
customary international law give rise to erga omnes obligations. This chapter initially analyses 
the application of the rules of jurisdiction in international law, and subsequently applies the 
findings to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. It examines both the permissive and probative 
approach to the rules of jurisdiction. Additionally, the chapter assesses whether the duty of 
non-intervention and rules of immunity affect the operation of the rules of jurisdiction. It 
examines the operation of universal jurisdiction based on the prohibitive rules of international 
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law. The chapter also investigates whether traditional bases of jurisdiction seek to ascertain a 
balance between the rights of the States involved, thereby avoiding breaching the duty of non-
intervention. This chapter evaluates the exercise of universal jurisdiction from the perspective 
that the exercise of universal jurisdiction should not infringe upon the duty of non-intervention 
in the affairs of other States. Furthermore, some of the risks associated with the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction by States are considered in the context of proposed conditions for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by States. 
Chapter 4 contends that functional immunity is determined based on discerning private 
from official conduct and prohibitive rules of international law. The chapter examines whether 
the rules of functional immunity in international law are granted to officials for the benefit of 
their home State or the officials, or both. On that basis, it studies whether rules of attribution 
pertaining to State responsibility shape the outcome of the rules of functional immunity of 
officials. This chapter also assesses whether international crimes, which create dual 
responsibility for States and individuals, justify withholding the functional immunity of 
officials for the commission of international crimes. It also inquires as to the relevance of the 
duty of non-intervention as a prohibitive rule of international law and the individual 
responsibility of officials in relation to crimes committed in the territory of the forum State.  
Chapter 5 examines whether immunity ratione materiae is distinct from State immunity 
(acta jure imperii/acta jure gestionis). This chapter also queries whether the immunity of State 
and high-ranking officials share any similarity in respect of their development in international 
law. It considers whether an exception to the personal immunity of high-ranking officials in 
respect of international crimes is emerging in international law and explores whether States 
can withdraw the personal immunity of foreign officials based on the defence of necessity in 
international law. The chapter also reflects upon the relationship between international crimes 
and the rules of immunity from a conflicts of norms perspective. It assesses whether arguments 
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based on the conflicts of norms can provide a better explanation for the interaction of the rules 
of immunity and international crimes. Finally, this is examined from the perspective of the 
interests of the international community and the customary status of rules of immunity and 
international crimes.
 11 
Chapter One: Interests of the International Community 
1. Introduction 
This chapter contends that there is an international community based on three factors. 
First, there are shared interests among States which are objectively recognisable rather than 
being based on a set of pre-determined objectives (Section 2.1). Secondly, a community must 
not only have shared interests based on the self-interests of States but also shared interests 
among its members which are perceived as legitimate (Section 2.2). Finally, the existence of 
obligations owed to all the members of the community is recognised as a precondition for the 
existence of community (Section 2.3) and that the basis of such obligations in the international 
community is international law (Section 3.2 and Chapter 2). All of the three elements of the 
international community can be understood from a constructivist perspective. It is argued that 
the interests of the international community are socially constructed (Section 3.2) by the mutual 
constitution of the agent and the social structure of the State system (Section 3.1). This is in 
comparison with rationalist theories that argue that interests are exogenously determined; 
rather, by viewing international law from a constructivist perspective, one can determine these 
interests in international law (Section 3.2).  
In addition, the norms institutionalised in international law could be based on self-
interests or the legitimacy of the norm (Section 3.2). The level of their internalisation by States 
does not necessarily affect their legal consequences once they are institutionalised in 
international law (Chapter 2, Sections 1 and 2). On this basis, one should not differentiate 
between norms which are institutionalised in international law based on the self-interests of 
States or the legitimacy (eg rules of jurisdiction, immunities and international crimes) of the 
rules if they have the same legal status in international law (eg customary international law). 
Chapter Two argues that some customary rules based on legal criteria could give rise to erga 
omnes obligations which are also norms which have been fully internalised by most States 
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(Chapter 2, Section 3.3-3.5). 
 It is maintained that legal interests of the international community are norms which 
have been internalised by most States and have also been institutionalised in international law 
(Section 3.1). It is proposed that institutionalisation of norms in international law can expedite 
the internalisation of norms by States due to the influence of the social structure of the State 
system on States' interests (Section 3.1). The role of shared understanding/culture/legal 
discourse in the State system social structure (Section 3.1) is considered in Chapter Two in the 
discussion of ascertainment of binding usus. Chapter Two discusses how the creation of 
customary law – as a legal discourse and as a subset of the social structure of the State system 
– both constitutes State interests and behaviour and is influenced by State behaviour and 
interests (Chapter 2, Section 2). Chapter Two argues that customary law is created by binding 
usus (actions of State which enshrine State interests) and is determined through discursive 
practices in the international community in the form of legal discourse.  
2. International Community (Society of States) 
2.1. Community and Shared Interests (Objective or Subjective Interests) 
Heeren defined the State system as the union of States ‘resembling each other in their 
manners, religion and degree of social improvement, cemented together by reciprocity of 
interests’.1 Bull defines a society of States as a group of States conscious of certain common 
interests and values ‘in the sense that they perceive themselves to be bound by a common set 
of rules in their relations with each other and share in the working of common institutions’.2 
The feature, which ‘distinguishes a “community” from its components is a “higher unity”, as 
it were, the representation and prioritisation of common interests as against the egoistic 
                                                 
1 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Palgrave Macmillan 
2002) 12; Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren, A Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe 
and Its Colonies (David Alphonso Talboys tr, HG Bohn 1846) vii–viii. 
2 Hedley Bull (n 1) 13. 
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interests of individual’ States.3 Thus, a community must contain a sense of shared interests 
(reciprocity of interests) among its members. 
The idea that the shared interests are subjective or objective is, however, contentious. 
Koskenniemi identifies three approaches to the concept of community which are widely 
representative of the legal literature on the issue of community. The first model is the approach 
which sees ‘the pre-legal world already vested with a normative project (a high law, natural 
reason, etc.) which it is the task of law to express and enforce’.4 Secondly, there are those who 
‘aim to combat national egoism by referring to the factual – political, economic, cultural or 
ecological – interdependence between States’.5 In this approach, if there is a normative order 
in the community, it is maintained solely because of the needs of interdependence. The third 
approach is based ‘on arguments concerning universality of human nature, culture, socio-
economic deep structure or interests’.6  
Koskenniemi criticises these three approaches of the notion of community on the basis 
that these values appear subjective, ie there is no immediate perception of what human nature 
is7 (as these three are based on values, interests and nature). Secondly, no such common 
interests seem to exist, which could be distinguished from the interests of individual States. 
Thirdly, the fact that all of these three approaches occupy a normative perspective8 and do not 
reflect the States’ wishes, interests and will (the “concreteness”) of States.  
If it is held that the interests of the international community are based on a set of pre-
determined criteria, the aforementioned criticisms are justified. These notions of interests are 
                                                 
3 Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law (Brill Nijhoff 
1994) 245. 
4 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(CUP 2005) 477. 
5 ibid. 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid 479. 
8 ibid 478. 
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subjective in the sense that they are open to interpretation, depending on the values of the 
interpreter and his or her views on the international community. Secondly, the State as an 
entity, which is the primary subject of the international community, does not have a dominant 
role in the creation of these interests or values. Only in the second and third models is the role 
of States in generating these shared interests acknowledged, but to the extent that pre-
determined values are shared by States. On that basis, as Koskenniemi has stated, it would not 
be incorrect to hold the view that subjectivity ‘tends to degenerate into an outright harmful 
totalitarianism: who prevents the communitarian myth from turning into a negative utopia?’.9  
Franck referred to the State system as a community in which rules are deployed to 
achieve order and promote such societal goals as trade, environmental protection, health, 
economic development, communications and the peaceful enjoyment of the fruits of labour 
(secular goals may also attain notions of justice), and community refers to a system of 
multilateral reciprocal interaction which is capable of validating its members, its institutions, 
and its rules.10 The objectives to which Franck referred could be read as subjective aims which 
are shared by the members of the international community due to the wide spectrum of social, 
political and economic objectives they include. 
Koskenniemi posits that if no one can know these interests in an objective way, there 
is no justification to claim that the law should impose them on States.11 Thus, the question 
arises whether, if we accept “shared interests” as a requirement of the a community, we can 
identify objectively the interests of the international community which are subjectively 
recognised by its members. On that basis, if the view of the international community is based 
on the promulgation of interests and preferences recognised by States in international law, 
rather than natural principles or a pre-determined set of objectives, the aforementioned 
                                                 
9 ibid 480. 
10 Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, vol 3 (OUP 1990) 51. 
11 Koskenniemi (n 4) 481. 
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criticisms of the international community become irrelevant. These could be common values 
which have been promulgated in international law on the basis of either the self-interest of 
States or legitimacy of the norm. This approach does not delve into the intentions of States to 
adhere to a shared norm (eg based on self-interests or perception of legitimacy of the norm) 
but accepts that if shared interests can be institutionalised in international law, then at least 
from a legal perspective they comprise the interests of the international community. 
Simma maintains that the institutionalisation of norms in international law provides the 
key to the substance of what is referred to as the international community.12 Simma has pointed 
out that community interests are to be viewed as a consensus according to which recognition 
and ‘respect for fundamental values is not to be left in the free disposition of States individually 
or inter se but is recognised in international law as a matter of concern to all States’.13 In another 
word, the notion of community becomes inextricably attached to the existence of international 
law.14 Thus, if it is held that international law has the capacity to comprise the common interests 
of States, this should settle the question of the existence of an international community of 
States. International law would by definition be subject to the objective identification of rules 
(in that case interests). 
Moreover, the mere existence of international law demonstrates that States have 
institutionalised at least some of their common values or interests, as, without the basis of 
cooperation and coordination, which could be viewed as a shared value, there would be no 
need for international law, as egoistic States, each totally having sets of different agendas, let 
the distribution of power settle their disputes. There must be at least a minimum set of interests, 
even if they are derivative solely from materialistic objectives, to bring about a framework 
                                                 
12 Simma (n 3) 256–58; Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of 
Mankind on the Eve of New Century (Brill Nijhoff 1999) 79. 
13 Simma (n 3) 233. 
14 Koskenniemi (n 4) 476. 
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within which the social needs of the community are transformed to legal obligations and rights. 
Dworkin not only linked the existence of a community to the existence of shared 
interests based on shared understandings but also that its law must adhere to the principle of 
the integrity of law. Dworkin, considering the definition of “community” within the State level, 
postulated that there are two general models of community (models of political associations). 
The first model of community (the rulebook model) supposes that members of a community 
accept a general commitment to obey rules established in a certain way that is special to that 
community (this model accepts a checkerboard compromise).15 The second model agrees with 
the first model that the community requires a shared understanding, but it takes a more 
comprehensive view of what that understanding is.16 The members of the second model of the 
community accept 'that they are governed by common principles, not just by rules hammered 
out in political compromise’ and accept the “integrity of law” as an ideal of the community.17 
Dworkin did not illustrate how the common principles are made, but the suggestion that there 
must be a shared understanding with respect to its principles resonates with a constructivist 
understanding of community. One could, therefore, assume such principles emanate from a 
shared understanding of the members of the community.  
The rationale of the second model of community tends towards equality and subjects 
must be treated with equal concern according to some coherent conception of what that 
means.18 In this context, the integrity of law does not mean consistency in the application of 
law or the law itself but rather a requirement of a principle justifying inconsistent laws or their 
application.19 This could be explained by the principles or rules of international law, which 
explain the inconsistent laws or their application. For instance, rules of immunity distinguish 
                                                 
15 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 210. 
16 ibid 211. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid 213. 
19 ibid 219–21. 
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between an individual and an official who have committed the same crime but exemption of 
the official from prosecution in certain circumstances is justifiable on the basis of the principle 
of non-intervention. The principle of non-intervention justifies the checkerboard solution in 
certain circumstances involving officials. 
Moreover, it is contended that international law as a law governing the international 
community does not need to give effect to all of the social needs or interests of the international 
community. It is sufficient for the purposes of community that its laws can give effect to 
common or shared interests based on the shared understanding of the community. Tomuschat 
posits that some assume for the society of States to be an international community there must 
be an actor with ‘clear-cut responsibilities in all fields requiring international regulation, 
monitoring and enforcement but this is not intended by the term international community’.20 
Tomuschat asserts that these attempts have generally been ‘to translate the common interest 
perceived from the field of political rhetoric to the sphere of law’; instead, the ‘litmus test for 
the fruitfulness of the concept of international community must be whether, impelled by its 
driving force, rules, procedures and mechanisms have been established with a view to 
vindicating and enforcing the common interest recognised by all States’. 21  
This chapter illustrates that the interests of States and subsequently the interests of the 
international community are socially constructed. States’ interests are socially constructed by 
discourses prevalent in the State system. However, this does not necessarily mean that every 
shared interest of States, even if held by most States, will be considered as the interest of the 
international community in a legal sense. International law provides an avenue for the common 
interests of States to be institutionalised in international law (eg rules of immunity and 
diplomatic protection), but it does not guarantee that all shared interests will gain the status of 
                                                 
20 Tomuschat (n 12) 78 emphasis added. 
21 ibid 78–9 emphasis added. 
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law. The institutionalisation of interests of the international community in international law is 
discussed in Chapter Two. 
This reading of the community requires that international law must only have the 
capacity as a law regulating the relations of States in the international community to 
institutionalise interests of States. This reading does not require the same procedures and 
mechanisms associated with domestic legal systems to be present in international law. It does 
not require a replica of domestic institutions at the State system level. The interests, which are 
predominant in the State system and upheld by most States, have the capacity to be 
institutionalised in international law. In this vein, interests of the international community are 
akin to a common denominator of what States subjectively recognise as the interests of the 
international community22 which are crystallised in international law. These interests could be 
based on the self-interests of States or legitimacy of norms. 
2.2. Community and Normative Considerations 
The idea of ‘normative phenomena – rules, norms, conventions, prescriptions and 
standards of correctness, is one of the most central premises of communitarian epistemology’.23 
In other words, socially isolated entities ‘are unable to generate normative phenomena on their 
own’'.24 Franck maintained that ‘a community is based on a common, conscious system of 
reciprocity operating among its constituents and it is this system of reciprocity which makes 
fairness-dialogue possible’ and that ‘the members of a community share not only a system of 
mutual legal, but also of moral obligations’.25  
It has been contended that ‘legitimacy resides in the belief of international society and, 
                                                 
22 Alfred Verdross, ‘Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law’ (1966) 60 AJIL 
55, 574 (see Verdross’ views on ‘ethical minimum’). 
23 Martin Kusch, Knowledge by Agreement (OUP 2002) 175. 
24 ibid. 
25 Thomas M Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System (Brill Nijhoff 
1993) 27–8. 
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as such, reflects the condition of international society at any one time: norms form part of that 
condition, but do not amount to its total sum’.26 Put differently, ‘a community is defined by 
having a corpus of rules which it deems to be legitimate and by having agreed on a process that 
legitimates the exercise of authority, one which conduces to the making of fair rules and fair 
allocations’.27 The members of the community must ‘also participate in determining the rule of 
fairness by which the shares are allocated’ and that it ‘be a moral community engaged in 
formulating itself as a rule-community’.28 Equally, ‘if it can be demonstrated that the legitimacy 
of rules and institutions can be measured, that itself constitutes important evidence of 
community’.29 Community precedes legitimacy; ‘it is because States constitute a community 
that legitimacy has the power to influence their conduct’.30  
Similarly, Dworkin asserted that ‘we treat community as prior to justice and fairness in 
the sense that questions of justice and fairness are regarded as questions of what would be fair 
or just within a particular political group’.31 A community of principle ‘can claim the authority 
of a genuine associative community and can therefore claim moral legitimacy –that its 
collective decisions are matters of obligation and not bare power, in the name of fraternity’.32 
When a community is born it follows that notions of procedural and substantive legitimacy 
gain meaning. This is also evident in Clark's study of the concept of legitimacy. 
Clark’s study suggests that legitimacy is stripped of any meaning outside a societal 
framework because legitimacy constitutes international society: ‘by studying its principles of 
international legitimacy – and how in turn these are translated into practice – we demonstrate 
                                                 
26 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (New edn, OUP 2007) 245. 
27 Franck, Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System (n 25) 29. 
28 ibid 29. 
29 Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (n 10) 204. 
30 ibid 205. 
31 Dworkin (n 15) 208. 
32 ibid 214. 
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that such a society exists’.33 What is of great importance is that State conduct that ‘acts 
consciously to maintain an international society, defined by its principles of legitimacy and 
reflects a belief in being bound by such a social enterprise’.34 The existence of that commitment 
in State conduct precedes the existence of international society.35  
International law as a conscious legal order is receptive to the awareness of the common 
interests of the international community, a community that comprises not only States but also 
individual human beings.36 To view the concept of law as the command of the sovereign, would 
make the law distinguishable from normative considerations, and international law in this sense 
cannot qualify as true law but ‘has to be downgraded to a status of international comity, 
morality, or convenience’.37  
Bull maintains that international law is a social process which ‘is not a pure process of 
the application of existing legal rules, but reflects the influence of a variety of actors extraneous 
to legal rules themselves, such as the social, moral and political outlook of judges, legal 
advisors and legal scholars’.38 Koh refers to international law as a transnational legal process, 
which is normative, dynamic and constitutive. 39 Law from a constructivist perspective is seen 
as a ‘broad social phenomenon deeply embedded in the practices, beliefs, and traditions of 
society, and shaped by interactions among societies’.40 Under this broader view of law, the 
                                                 
33 Clark (n 26) 245. 
34 ibid 247. 
35 ibid. 
36 Koskenniemi (n 4) 23–9. 
37 Friedrich V Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and 
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, vol 2 (CUP 1991) 187, 186–93 see 
Kratochwil’s critique of Hart and Kelsen. 
38 Hedley Bull (n 1) 123. 
39 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ (1997) 106 YaleLJ 2599, 
2645–6. 
40 Martha Finnemore and Stephen J Toope, ‘Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of 
Law and Politics’ (2001) 55 Int’l Org 743, 743; see also Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, 
‘Constructivism and International Law’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (CUP 2012) 312. 
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legalisation of politics ‘encompasses features and effects of legitimacy, including the need for 
congruence between law and underlying social practice’.41 There seems to be a shared 
knowledge among actors (ie mainly States) as to the sources of international law (ie what makes 
rules binding42) and the rules of international law.  
Accordingly, international law must be able to contain not only shared interests but also 
interests which are perceived as legitimate by the States and produce a belief in its legality 
(social construct) to assert that international community exists. Tomuschat has contended that 
the three concepts of jus cogens, obligations erga omnes and international criminal law ‘operate 
independently of the actual will of the parties involved in a legal relationship’.43 Tomuschat 
continues that these concepts have ‘a similar background, seeking to strike at conduct which 
not only constitutes a breach of international norms, but seriously compromises the foundations 
of a peaceful international order inspired by values of humaneness’.44 
It must be mentioned that it is not necessary to distinguish between the will of States 
and States’ responsibility for particular acts to demonstrate that legitimate norms arise in 
international law. It is merely sufficient to conclude that a community exists if it can be 
demonstrated that legitimate norms can also be made in international law and create obligations 
for States and/or individuals. Again, it is the capacity of international law to generate legitimate 
norms rather than guaranteeing that it will always create legitimate norms. 
2.3. Community and Obligations 
According to de Visscher, a community exists if there is a sense of the higher good of 
a universal community, which engenders the idea of law and a sense of legal obligation.45 Bull 
                                                 
41 Finnemore and Toope (n 40) 744. 
42 ibid. 
43 Tomuschat (n 12) 81, emphasis added. 
44 ibid 81. 
45 Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law (Percy Ellwood Corbett 
tr, Princeton University Press 1968) 89–90. 
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asserts that there can be no doubt that ‘there are rules which States and other agents in 
international politics regard as binding on one another’ and it is on this basis that ‘we may 
speak of the existence of an international society’.46 Franck and Dworkin also both argued that 
certain kinds of obligations and the concept of community are intertwined. Franck held that the 
international system is a functioning community with a concept of obligation47 and Dworkin 
argued that political associations are in themselves pregnant of obligations.48 Dworkin held that 
the obligations of a subject owed to the other members of the community must arise from 
shared or common principles and its rules must be perceived to be interests of all members 
equally.49  
Franck posited that obligation is deeply embedded in the notion of community and 
although States’ compliance with the rules in the international system may be voluntary, States’ 
obligations to them are not.50 Franck viewed the obligations of States to the international 
community based on the fact that members of a developed community ‘accept specific 
reciprocal obligations as a concomitant of membership in that community, which is a 
structured, continuing association of interacting parties’.51  
In this context, reciprocity is not limited to material exchange, but can also be grounded 
in the desire to interact and to create sustained relationships,52 and the membership of States in 
the ‘international community carries with it the duty to submit to the existing body of such 
rules, and the right to contribute to the modification and development in accordance with the 
                                                 
46 Hedley Bull (n 1) 124. 
47 Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (n 10) 206. 
48 Dworkin (n 15) 206. 
49 ibid 199–200, 211. 
50 Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (n 10) 196. 
51 ibid 196–97; Charles Hermann, ‘International Crisis as a Situational Variable’ in James N 
Rosenau (ed), International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (Free Press 
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52 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
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prevailing rules for such processes’.53 The interactions among States create shared 
understandings which will become established in rules, and ‘if the rules are of a high level 
legitimacy, they, in turn, will reinforce the tendency to conform to established patterns of 
behaviour’.54  
Franck maintained that the belief in obligatory character of rules is ‘essential to the 
existence of an ongoing normative system of relations between sovereign States’55 and that the 
power of (international) law to secure compliance is not, primarily based on enforcement ‘but, 
rather on the general belief of those to whom the law is addressed that they have a stake in the 
rule of law itself: that the law is binding because it is law’.56 Thus, the obligatory character of 
international law ‘emanates from the value States place in law’s ability to make interactions 
predictable’.57 This belief in the legality of international law (ie rule of recognition) is a social 
construct.58 
These obligations are owed to the international community in the sense they are owed 
individually to all members of the community. Franck noted that the community obligations of 
members do not arise out of the terrain of contract; rather, obligations such as obligations erga 
omnes are inherent in the status59 of members as members of the international community. For 
instance, Franck held that the obligation to honour treaties (pacta sunt servanda) is acquired 
associatively, not by consent, and is owed generally towards all (erga omnes)60. Chapter Two 
discusses the modes of creation of obligations based on interests of the international 
                                                 
53 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol 1 Peace (9th 
edn, Longman 1992) 14. 
54 Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (n 10) 200. 
55 Brunnée and Toope (n 40) 129. 
56 Thomas M Franck, ‘The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International 
Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium’ (1996) 100 AJIL 88, 91. 
57 ibid. 
58 ibid. 
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community in international law. Chapter Two argues that rules of customary international law 
can be identified on the basis of consensus among States both in terms of binding usus and 
individual norms and discusses how interests of States may emerge in customary rules. Chapter 
Two also argues that some customary rules could also give rise to erga omnes obligations. 
Accordingly, to say that there is an international community, international law must be 
able to produce not only rules based on shared interests subjectively recognised by States but 
also rules which are perceived as legitimate and produce a belief in the legality of its rules and 
produce obligations which are owed to other States. The next section discusses how the 
interests of the State are created as a result of their statehood in the international community. 
 
3. Cultures and the Social Structure of the State System 
3.1. Social Structure of the State System 
Studying the social structure of the State system explicates the processes by which the 
interests of the international community are made. It puts international law in the context of 
other social phenomena, such as social norms. Studying the social structure of the State system 
is ‘an alternative way of understanding the relationship between law and its neighbouring 
discourses, social description and political prescription’.61 Through such a perspective, we can 
also study the creation of international law as part of the social structure of the State system 
and how international law relates to the interests of the international community. This section 
introduces the concept of constructivism, which is applied in Chapter Two to argue that 
customary international law is made by binding usus (ie State action) by consensus, which is 
socially constructed. It argues that binding usus is determined through the process of 
socialisation. This is argued on the basis that State interests, which guide State actions, are 
socially constructed. It also argues that customary rules can comprise the interests of the 
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international community. Based on the findings in Chapter Two, it is argued that international 
crimes are crimes which create responsibility for both States and individuals on the basis of 
binding usus (Chapter 2, Section 2) and represent the interests of the international community. 
According to constructivism, the structure of the State system is a social one62 and 
international law is part of this social structure63. The social structure of the State system is 
constructed on two levels: macro (system level) and micro (desire and belief of individuals).64 
Constructivism emphasises the role of ideational factors (such as ideas) in constituting social 
facts (language, religion, beliefs, norms) through social interaction and holds that once social 
facts are established, they will influence the behaviour of agents.65 When an idea (or belief) is 
shared (ie is inter-subjective) by an agent through social interaction (or social practice66) it 
becomes known as culture or a social fact on that level (ie State level or State system level)67 
and could take many specific forms: norms, institutions, ideologies, organisations and threat-
systems.68 Accordingly, standards of behaviour or norms, shared understandings or shared 
expectations are created through mutual expectations in social settings.  
The State system ‘is an “anarchy” in the strict sense because of the lack of a world State 
but is highly social’; ‘what really determines the behaviour within anarchies is shared 
expectations and understandings that give specific meaning to material forces’.69 In this 
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context, the States’ perceptions of the States and ‘their roles in the world are socially 
constructed within a dense network of transnational and international social relations’.70  
Interests are products of social practices that mutually construct actors and structure.71 
State interests are created by 'internationally shared norms and values that structure and give 
meaning to international life’.72 Constructivism accentuates ‘a process of interaction between 
agents and structures and its ontology is based on the mutual constitution of agents and 
structures’.73 The recognition of this ‘mutual constitution is an important contribution to the 
theory of international relations, because many interesting empirical phenomena in 
international relations are understandable only by a methodology that avoids assuming a neat 
separation between agents and structures’.74  
Shared understandings are simultaneously the product of State action (causal effect) 
and influence States' interests and acceptable form of behaviour (constitutive effect),75 ie the 
structure of the international system has both a causal and constitutive effect in relation to 
States and their societies (both top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top effects).76 Accordingly, when 
States claim that they are using force only in self-defence, they cannot avoid reinforcing 
Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UNCH and at the same time are redefining the rules by specifying 
how they wish the concepts of self-defence and sovereignty to be understood by other States.77 
For instance, the norm of sovereignty regulates the interactions of States in international affairs 
and also defines what a State is, and similarly, human rights norms not only protects citizens 
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from the State but also defines what a civilised State is (“good people do X”).78 This does not 
mean that norms which constitute identity and the interests of States are not amenable to 
change; for instance, ‘the content norm of sovereignty has changed dramatically over time, 
becoming more circumscribed, particularly when it comes to human rights’, but ‘sovereignty 
still constitutes a State – as opposed to any other corporate actor’.79 The content of the norms 
is dependent on the shared understanding in the social structure of the State system.  
Socialisation could be broadly explained as the process through which shared 
understanding between agents and the social structure begins to emerge. The socialisation 
process illustrates the effect of the social structure on agents (top-to-bottom). Socialisation 
refers to ‘the internalisation of, the norms and behavioural patterns of any particular society –
members simply absorb what they see around them’80 – by which identities and interests get 
formed, and is in part a process of learning to conform one’s behaviour to societal 
expectations.81 State socialisation ‘is grounded in the beliefs, conduct and social relations of 
individuals’ and relates to the identification of ‘various causal pathways through which global 
or regional norms are internalised by relevant individuals associated with the State’.82 
Wendt argues that the three cultures of anarchy (enemy, rival, and friend) reflect the 
three degrees in which a norm can be internalised and thus three pathways in which structure 
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can be produced.83 Norms internalised to the second degree, are perceived to be in the self-
interests of States and norms internalised to the third degree are perceived to be legitimate.84 
The degree of legitimacy of a norm affects its compliance pull.85 Norms will be internalised in 
various stages which occur on the international and domestic levels separately, but are 
increasingly linked, and the line between the various stages is not clear-cut.86 Hence, 
objectively looking at the social structure of the State system at any given time, norms are 
internalised to different degrees by different States until a norm has been completely 
internalised by most States. The predominant structure of the international system in relation 
to a norm or set of norms depends on the degree of internationalisation of that norm or norms 
by most actors.  
When ideas or norms are institutionalised at the international level as international 
norms or set of norms, ie in the form of a treaty or emerging customary rule, this could expedite 
the process of socialisation and as a consequence those norms are more likely to affect State 
behaviour and the internalisation of norms.87 As they are emerging, or when they have emerged 
in the social structure of the State system, they could influence the formation of States’ 
interests.88 This is on the basis that norms ‘structure realms of possibilities and create options 
that would not have been self-evident in the absence of the norm’ and the ‘normative discourse 
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structures new contexts of the realm of acceptable practice’.89 Norms do not ‘determine 
outcomes but makes certain practices acceptable or illegitimate’.90 
When a norm has been internalised to the second degree or third degree and 
institutionalised in international law, the constitutive and causal effects of the structure 
(cultures of “anarchy”) of any sets of rules vis-à-vis States should be taken into consideration. 
That is the reason why institutionalisation in international law may expedite the process of 
socialisation.91 In this way, international law, which institutionalises the predominant culture 
of the State system, affects the culture of States, which could lead to a change of States’ 
interests. International actors – mainly States but including international institutions (IOs and 
international courts), and NGOs92,  shape the culture of State system and domestic actors –eg 
government institutions, groups, and individuals, shape the culture of the domestic level. Both 
cultures at the domestic level and at the system level continuously impact each other. 
The major contribution of constructivism in respect of the mutual constitution of agent 
and structure can pose a problem for researchers to distinguish at exactly which moment the 
agent affects the structure and vice versa. It has been maintained elsewhere that if actors 
constitute the social structure of the State system, ‘which in turn constitutes the actor, ad 
infinitum, then how do the original identity and interests develop?’.93 In this context, the main 
drawback of some constructivism research is that it often fails to ‘distinguish adequately 
between explanatory and outcome variables – often claiming that both variables are mutually 
constitutive’.94 It has been argued that this methodological inconsistency can be resolved ‘by 
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reference to the internal dimension of State identity’.95 The idea is that ‘socialisation processes 
internal to a State can change the State’s identity and interests independently of [inter-state] 
interaction’.96 Accordingly, most scholars who have conducted empirical research have utilised 
quantitative and qualitative research methods to examine either top-to-bottom or bottom-to-top 
construction of interests/identities vis-à-vis the social structure of the State system.97 
It must be pointed out the claims of constructivism, ie the mutual constitution of agent 
and structure, have been supported by qualitative and quantitative studies. For instance, 
Finnemore's qualitative study illustrates that the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(bottom-to-top effect) contributed to shaping States’ interests and identities by promulgating 
and transmitting humanitarian norms (eg the Geneva Conventions).98 Similarly, Katzenstein 
has argued that the European identity affected the social structure of the State system (in 
Europe) as the role of regional politics in Europe in the form the European Union exhibits 
(bottom-to-top effect).99 In addition, Goodman and Jinks have posited that States linked to one 
another by network ties (ie membership in the same IGOs) generate social effects in terms of 
increased and stronger ties between countries which correlate between the convergence of their 
interests and practices (top-to-bottom effect).100 They argue that empirical evidence suggests 
that, when networks are formed through IGOs, convergence of State practices and preferences 
occurs ‘once a critical threshold of States closely interacts in these IGO networks and 
disappears in parts of the network where a larger number of States have [sic] more distant 
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network ties’.101 
International law, which is part of the social structure of the State system, is influenced 
by the social practice of States in the State system (eg States and international institutions and 
courts) and at the domestic level State institutions and individuals influence the actions and 
interests of States. Accordingly, from a constructivist point of view, international law is not 
simply the product of State wishes and interests independent of the social structure of the States 
and State system. It must be mentioned that State interests and actions are not only influenced 
by international law but also by other cultures which may also exist in the State system. 
International law is simultaneously the product of State actions (causal) and shapes State 
interests through the socialisation of States (constitutive effect). 
The institutionalisation of (social) norms in international law as legal norms is one of 
the effects of structure in the formation of States' interests. This view does not perceive legal 
rule as the end of the spectrum of development of a norm. Social norms which have only been 
internalised to the second-degree (self-interests) as well as norms which have been fully 
internalised by States could be institutionalised in international law. First, both self-interest 
norms and norms on the basis of legitimacy are socially constructed (ie what is in the self-
interests of States or what is perceived as legitimate norms) (top-to-bottom). Secondly, the 
institutionalisation of rules in international law is not the only factor that could influence State 
interests and there are other cultures and discourses102 (eg the human rights discourse) in the 
social structure of the State system which can influence States’ interests. The ideas or norms 
which become institutionalised in international law are created through legal discourse 
(Chapter 2). Legal discourse itself not only includes institutionalised norms in international 
law but also the process of rule creation. Finally, constructivism is in line with rationalist ideas, 
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which maintain that State interests constitute the social structure of the State system (bottom-
to-top effect). The influence of States through their actions on legal discourse and the influence 
of legal discourse on States' interests and actions are discussed in the next chapter in the context 
of custom formation. 
3.2. Interests: Constructivist vis-à-vis Rationalist Understanding 
It has already been argued that States' interests and the social structure of the State 
system (eg international law as a subset of that structure) are mutually constitutive. The 
assertion of this section is that States' interests are socially constructed and guide States' 
behaviour. This is particularly relevant to formation of law in international law which is based 
on State actions (signing a treaty, State practice in CIL). The argument in this section is based 
on the comparison of rationalist theories with a constructivist theory (adopted in this chapter) 
in relation to constitution of States’ interests in the context of international law.  
It is contended here that rationalist explanations cannot fully explain the adoption of 
norms in international law which are inexplicable based on the self-interests of States. 
Rationalist explanations cannot also explain compliance with international law when material 
inducements are lacking. On the basis of constructivism, compliance with international law 
could also be explained on the basis of the legitimacy of its rules or rule creation procedures 
rather than material inducements alone. In this regard, a constructivist understanding of 
international law also differentiates between the legality and legitimacy of the rules. 
Accordingly, in comparison to rationalist theories, a constructivist approach to international 
law provides a more comprehensive understanding of the creation and change of rules on the 
basis of mutual constitutions of States' interests and social structure. 
According to a rational understanding, State identity and interests are largely 
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independent from social structures of the international system103 and norms are merely the 
‘intervening variable or intermediate variable -mediating between interest and political 
outcomes with little or no independent explanatory power’;104 ie they do not shape State identity 
and interests.105 Both liberalism and realism only accept that structures affect State behaviour 
but they do not construct actor properties (eg interests or identities)106 because they perceive 
them to be ontologically prior to norms and social structure of the international system.107 
Rationalism ‘as an analytical method suffers from shortcomings in the explanation of the full 
range of real-life behavioural normative phenomena’ and reduces State behaviour to strategies 
of utility maximisation, the ‘logic of consequences’108.109  
For realists, it is the structure of the State system that affects State behaviour and, in 
the social structure of the State system, it is the distribution of capability which is the 
variable.110 The logic behind self-help is the material distribution of power which drives State 
behaviour.111 For realists, the determining factor of State behaviour is force; for neorealists, the 
determining factor behind State behaviour is the reward from the interaction with others based 
on certain acknowledged precepts (self-interest is a determinant of State action).112 Neoliberals, 
on the other hand, pay more attention than neorealists to norms but only in an instrumental way 
and posit that States can maintain and maximise their goal of cooperation by adhering to such 
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norms.113 Furthermore, liberal theories are generally ‘open to norms but tend to project 
homogenous normativity that undermines the value of diversity of international society’.114 
According to social constructivism, the value of the argument ‘does not, for instance, depend 
on the extent to which States cooperate in security affairs’.115 
Rational explanations based on the logic of consequences, which take the interests of 
States as given, cannot account for some changes in State practice. According to 
constructivism, processes of interest and identity formation are guided by cognitive 
frameworks are not only subject to rational cost-benefit analysis.116 Social preferences or 
interests are often incalculable, as a practical matter, and also sometimes actors ‘engage in 
materially costly, high-risk, and self-destructive practices to avoid social disapproval or to 
maintain self-respect’.117 For instance, humanitarian interventions or international concerns 
about human rights violations committed in other States cannot be fully explained by realist or 
liberalist theories.118 In addition, relatively generous welfare policies ‘representative of moral 
and humanitarian concerns have prompted foreign aid policies’ which are not easily explained 
in terms of narrow conceptions of economic self-interest.119  
Moreover, Goodman and Jinks have posited that material inducements or exogenously 
identified interests cannot account for “mimicry” which does not depend on the presence of 
power (self-interests): hegemonic and counter-hegemonic norms illustrate a pattern of 
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diffusion suggesting that the conventional concept of global power politics provides inadequate 
descriptive accounts (eg the initial disinclination of the UK to sign the Genocide 
Convention).120 They further contend that material inducement explanations cannot account for 
“persistent decoupling” in all cases.121 That is, States under the influence of the social structure 
of the State system adopt policies which are not necessarily in line with the exogenously 
defined interests of a State. On this basis, neorealism and neo-liberalism have been criticised 
for overlooking ‘the content and sources of State interests and the social fabric of world 
politics’.122 
State interests (and identities123) do not just exist waiting to be discovered (ie they are 
not exogenously determined); rather, they are socially constructed.124 State interests are 
variables dependent on social, political, cultural, and historical contexts that are not definite 
over space and time.125 The non-material nature of some rules in the international system, and 
accordingly in international law, indicate that normative considerations are extant in 
international law and cannot be accounted for by rationalist theories.126 According to the logic 
of appropriateness, ‘human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular 
identities’ (and consequently interests127) ‘to particular situations, approaching individual 
opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice 
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dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations’.128  
 Constructivism emphasises the discursive power of knowledge and culture even in 
relation to material power, ie how material power such as wealth and military power is 
interpreted.129 States may still be egoistic and have wealth and power maximising objectives 
but such interests are socially constructed.130 In this context, ‘State actions are rigorously 
constrained by a web of understandings, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in 
historical contexts’.131  
Other than their causal and constitutive effects, shared understandings or social norms 
can have a variety of other effects; they can work instrumentally (eg sanctions or constraints 
imposed by domestic and international public opinion) and may have permissive or enabling 
effects permitting alternatives.132 What is important to consider based on constructivism is that 
State interests and actions are influenced by the culture of the State system. Whilst materialist 
interests such as wealth-maximisation still exist, such interests are also socially constructed 
and, as such, their existence does not reject the existence of the instrumental use of norms for 
power or wealth-maximisation objectives.  
Constructivism holds that compliance with norms cannot solely be explained by 
coercion and self-interest but also by the legitimacy of norms.133 This directly rejects the 
compliance theory, in which compliance to international norms is solely based on the power 
relations between States and that international law has only little or no effect on State 
behaviour. Rationalist theories undervalue or disregard the evidence of socialisation processes 
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that persuade States to adopt norms which may not serve or are in contradiction with interests 
based on self-interest.134  
Moreover, enforcement tools available at the domestic level cannot explain compliance 
at the system level because ‘the probable, predictable, direct, imposed costs of disobedience 
are higher in every mature domestic system than in its international counterpart’.135 The 
capacity of domestic law to elicit compliance is grounded in its special status as a State-
sanctioned commitment.136 In domestic ‘legal systems, an illegitimate regime may compensate, 
at least in the short run, for its laws’ illegitimacy by an increased emphasis on enforcement’.137  
Habermas’ discourse theory claims that voluntary, intersubjective agreement by all 
those affected by a legal norm provides a basis for legitimation.138 Legitimacy ‘depends on the 
shared beliefs among those rules of the ruler’s rightful authority and it must be intersubjective 
to regulate social behaviour which is made through social interaction’.139 Franck defined 
legitimacy as a property of a rule or rule-making institution exerting a pull toward compliance 
on those addressed because those addressed believe that the rule or institution that has come 
into being, operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process’.140 
Actual compliance factor is only one indicator of a rule’s perceived legitimacy.141 Actual 
compliance is not quite the same as compliance pull: ‘a State may violate a rule because the 
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perception of national advantage to be gained by rule disobedience in a particular instance is 
so powerful as to overwhelm the most powerful compliance pull’.142 
According to Franck, the link between legitimacy and legality is the substantive and 
procedural requirements of legitimacy, ie both substantive and procedural legitimacy factors 
should be present in the rules of international law to gain legitimacy. 143 On the other hand, 
legality or the institutionalisation of norms in international law is a factor of legitimacy 
perceived by members of the international community.144 Clark contends that legitimacy is 
situated in the vicinity of both morality and legality, and thus it cannot be a matter of legality 
alone.145 Clark asserts that ‘the fact that the representatives of the international society so 
regularly speak of legitimacy and, separately, of legality clearly suggests that they are taken to 
be cognate, but not identical, terms’.146 According to this reading, legality is viewed as a factor 
which influences the level of legitimacy of a norm.147  
This view is in contradiction with legal realists (positivists) who view legitimacy in 
light of legality: law is distinct from political or moral values.148 If legality and legitimacy are 
identical, the concept of legitimacy becomes essentially redundant, and we might as well speak 
exclusively of conformity to the law.149 It is precisely the political space between the two 
concepts that contributes to normative change in international society, to refinements in 
international law, and to developments in actual State practice.150 Clark argues that ‘the idea of 
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legitimacy has a greater role to play precisely at those moments when the legal ground appears 
least secure, or possibly in flux’, which is confirmed by the practice of the UNSC during the 
post-Cold War period.151 The discourse of legitimacy is employed to reach those parts that 
cannot be reached by the language of legality alone.152 
The legitimacy of a norm as stated could act as a stronger force for the internalisation 
of a norm by other States which have not internalised those norms. As this chapter has noted, 
interests based both on self-interest and on legitimacy are socially constructed. Chapter Two 
argues that custom can be created by consensus and binding usus alone and that custom can 
include norms which have been internalised by most States either to the second- or third-
degree. If the level of the internalisation of norms is to have any legal effect vis-à-vis their 
operation with other norms, it has to be based on legal doctrines such as jus cogens and erga 
omnes. 
4. Conclusion 
It was argued in this chapter that the State system is a community since there are shared 
principles and values among States (Section 2.1). In addition, this chapter explained that the 
notion of community is inherently intertwined with the notion of obligations and normative 
considerations (Sections 2.2-3). By adopting a constructivist approach, it was further argued 
that the interests of the international community are norms that have been internalised by most 
States (either to the second- or third-degree) and institutionalised in international law (Section 
3.1).  
This chapter also contended that rationalist theories cannot account for three 
phenomena in relation to international law. First, they cannot account for compliance with 
international law that are inexplicable only based on material factors (eg coercion and 
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sanction). Secondly, they cannot account for rules in international law which are not based on 
the self-interest of States. Thirdly, they cannot account for the influence of international law 
on States’ actions and interests (Section 3.2).  
The distinction between the rules of international law which have been internalised to 
the third-degree (ie legitimate norms) and those which have internalised to the second-degree 
(based on self-interests) is arguably more important from a legitimacy, rather than legal, 
perspective (Section 3.2). The interests of the States which are perceived as legitimate but have 
not been institutionalised in international could lead to development of international law in line 
with those legitimate interests because of the mutual constitution of agent and structure 
(Section 3.1-2). 
The idea that States' interests are socially constructed and guide States’ behaviour based 
on the constructivist idea of the mutual constitution of agent and structure, provides an 
alternative way to understand the creation of rules in international law. Moreover, it also 
provides a more comprehensive understanding of how the rules of international law relate to 
States' interests and the interests of the international community (Section 3.1-2). Accordingly, 
accepting that States' actions and interests can be influenced by the shared understandings in 
the social structure of the State system illustrates how custom formation, which is based on 
State practice, could be produced (Section 3.2). Chapter Two applies a constructivist approach 
to custom formation in order to determine what international crimes and how they relate to the 
interests of the international community. 
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Chapter Two: A Constructivist Approach to the Formation of 
Customary International Law and International Crimes 
1. Introduction 
This chapter identifies how crimes that give rise to the dual responsibility of States and 
individuals could be created in customary law. Examining crimes that give rise to the dual 
responsibility of States and individuals as customary rules clarifies their legal consequences 
regarding the rules of jurisdiction and immunities, which have also developed in customary 
law.  
The contention is that customary rules enshrine community interests, which is relevant 
regarding the interaction of international crimes with the rules of (universal) jurisdiction and 
immunities in international law. Put together, the findings of this chapter are used in this thesis 
to answer whether foreign courts have jurisdiction over non-nationals who have committed 
international crimes on non-nationals abroad, and, secondly, whether the personal and 
functional immunities of foreign officials are applicable in respect of international crimes. 
Crimes in international law that incorporate the dual responsibility of States and 
individuals as customary rules, could be created by international treaties and resolutions of 
international organisations if there is a consensus in the international community (Section 3.3). 
This is on the basis that international crimes as customary rules could be created by binding 
usus alone when there is a consensus in the international community with regards to the crime 
itself and the binding usus involved in its creation (Sections 2.1-2.4).  
The fact that binding usus alone can generate customary law is explained by the 
interaction between belief, desire and action (Sections 2.1 and 2.4). A constructivist 
understanding of custom, which is based on the recognition that belief precedes action, would 
avoid the circularity inherent in the alternative understanding of the formation of customary 
law. In the alternative understanding of custom, opinio juris is invoked to discern binding usus 
and vice versa (Section 2.3). 
 42 
Binding usus is determined through the discursive practices of the international 
community, which according to a constructivist understanding inherently comprise the 
interests of States (Section 2.1). Action is produced because of the desire and beliefs of States 
as agents (Section 2.1). These interests could be self-interests as norms which have been 
internalised to the second degree or as interests which have been fully internalised by States 
and perceived as legitimate (Section 2.1 and Chapter 1, Section 3). In other words, international 
crimes as rules of customary law are either based on self-interests or legitimacy (Sections 2.5 
and 3.3). 
There is an international community because of shared values (self-interests and 
legitimacy) and obligations owed to States as members thereof (Chapter 1, Section 2). The 
interests of the international community are socially constructed and are those, which have 
been internalised by States either based on self-interests or on the basis of legitimacy of the 
norms (Chapter 1, Section 3). Norms, which are internalised by most States either to the second 
degree or third degree and are institutionalised in international law, could represent the interests 
of the international community (Chapter 1, Section 2).  
Under international law, State actions are legal unless prohibited by international law 
(Section 3.2) and that international crimes are crimes, which give rise to the dual responsibility 
of States and individuals under customary law (Section 3.3). The degree of internalisation of 
international crimes by States cannot have an impact on their legal effects as customary rules 
(Section 3.3).  
The degree of internalisation of norms in the social structure of the State system can, 
however, expedite their institutionalisation in customary law. When a crime reaches the status 
of a crime in customary law incorporating the dual responsibility of States and individuals, its 
legal implications would not be different from other crimes in customary law, whether 
perceived as less serious or not (Section 3.3).  
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The degree of internalisation of norms can be relevant to the erga omnes obligations, 
which can comprise some customary rules that have been fully internalised by States. A breach 
of erga omnes obligations creates a right for non-injured States (Section 3.5). On that basis, if 
it can be proven that crimes giving rise to the dual responsibility of States and individuals are 
in fact customary rules which are also obligations erga omnes, the right created for non-injured 
States can be considered in the context of the rules of immunity and jurisdiction.  
Jus cogens have a strong claim to comprise the interests of the international community 
which are also perceived as legitimate (fully internalised norms in the social structure of the 
State system). However, due to difficulties regarding the identification of the source of jus 
cogens, the content of jus cogens and their legal consequences outside treaty law, this thesis 
focuses on the rules of customary law instead (Section 3.4).  
2. Constructivist Approach to the Formation of Custom 
2.1. Constructivist Approach to Action 
This section maintains that customary law is created through State practice alone, which 
is determined by consensus among States. Further, it contends that binding usus and rules of 
customary law are both determined through the socialisation process. It is argued here that 
since customary rules emanate from State actions, they inevitably comprise the interests of the 
international community (either second-degree internalised or third-degree internalised 
norms). In other words, some customary rules are not only valid as rules of international law 
but are also perceived as legitimate norms, while other customary rules are based on the self-
interests of States only.  
The finding that customary rules represent the interests of the international community 
is independent of the constructivist approach to the identification of binding usus. The fact that, 
for the identification of customary rules, the actions of States (both intra-State and inter-State 
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evidence) used either as opinio juris or as practice or both, is sufficient to justify the fact that 
customary rules comprise the interests of the international community. The interests of the 
international community can be either based on the self-interest of States or based on the 
legitimacy of the norm. 
These arguments are explained by examining the interaction between belief and action.1 
First, certain acts may be dis/regarded as binding usus (eg treaties, resolutions of international 
organisations, denunciations of those norms by States, denial of the commission of acts 
contrary to those norms, and commission of acts contrary to those norms) by a form of diffused 
consensus among States through deliberation. Secondly, rules of customary law are generated 
through deliberations in national and international fora as well as through a diffused consensus 
rather than the individual consent of States.  
The rationalist explanation in international relations is that preferences and 
expectations generate behaviour.2 This is known as the equation of desire plus belief equals 
action,3 which is otherwise known as the intentional explanation.4 The desire of actors in the 
rational explanation is determined exogenously and cannot be influenced by the social 
processes of the system. Irrespective of the interaction between desire and belief, it is sufficient 
for customary law formation to posit that, at least regarding individuals, these two elements 
precede action. However, any theory for ‘predicting action on the basis of reason must find a 
way of evaluating the relative force of various desires and beliefs in the matrix of decision’.5 
Hobbes and Hume concur that ‘there cannot be action unless motivated by desire, and 
done in order to satisfy the desire’.6 According to this reading, action is conducted on the belief 
                                                 
1 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (CUP 1999) ch 3. 
2 ibid 63. 
3 ibid. 
4 Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change (CUP 1983) 69–88. 
5 Donald Davidson, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ (1963) 60 JPhil 685, 796. 
6 Martin Hollis, The Cunning of Reason (CUP 1987) 63. 
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that a certain desire would be achieved.7 Two types of beliefs are important: ‘beliefs about the 
[states of the] external world and beliefs about the efficacy of different means to achieve 
desires’.8 Rationalists’ general assumption has been that the agent had complete information 
(belief) and thus the emphasis was on desire (interest).9 Wendt criticises the Humean view of 
belief and desire as dualistic, since according to the Humean view, action is explained by two 
unrelated mechanisms and treats desire as a matter of passion rather than cognition.10  
According to the cognitive theory of desire, ‘reason is not the slave of the passions, but 
cognition is the very basis of desire’.11 This reading proposes that ‘the root of the desire is the 
perception of value in the world, a perception that is heavily socially conditioned’.12 Desire is 
a cognitive phenomenon that is heavily influenced by social learning.13 Wendt posits that 
desires (interests) are themselves cognition or ideas: desires are functions of culturally 
constituted conditions rather than biology (ie having a materialist foundation).14  
In this respect, the role of deliberation in constituting interests is not merely the 
weighing of different interests. In other words, ‘it is a complex and highly contested process 
of discussion, persuasion and framing of issues’ and, in short, what goes on is collective 
deliberation about the interest of agents in a given situation.15 Deliberation and interpretive 
communities play a central role in determining both binding usus and the rules of customary 
law themselves. Deliberations by interpretive communities shape States' actions by influencing 
States' interests (desires).  
Legal discourse can be viewed as a distinctive form of deliberation recognised by 
                                                 
7 Wendt (n 1) 117 emphasis added. 
8 ibid emphasis added. 
9 ibid. 
10 ibid 119 and 126. 
11 R Howe, ‘A Social-Cognitive Theory of Desire’ (1994) 24 J Theory Soc Behav 1, 23. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid. 
14 Wendt (n 1) 120–1; Roy G D’Andrade, ‘Schemas and Motivation’ in Roy G D’Andrade and 
Claudia Strauss (eds), Human Motives and Cultural Models (CUP 1992) 28. 
15 Wendt (n 1) 128. 
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‘lawyers, policy makers, diplomats, and attentive publics’,16 which affects the behaviour of 
States, ie discursive interactions among State and non-State actors affect States’ behaviour.17 
Legal discourse is viewed as shared understandings ‘through the exchange of reasons that are 
distinctly “legal”.18  
The processes of argumentation, deliberation and persuasion are ‘important in relation 
to international law as the law is determined in large measures by claim and counterclaims 
made by interested parties in response to international incidents’.19 The structure or form of the 
‘legal argument is indeed determinate in that it follows certain recurring patterns – a constant 
dissociation and association of arguments about normativity and concreteness and an attempt 
to avoid a material solution’.20 
The role of legal discourse should be viewed in light of the fact that international law 
lacks central organs of judiciary, legislature and enforcement, and, in this environment, legal 
discourse as a distinct form of persuasion becomes a medium for States to achieve shared 
understandings on issues that affect them. 
Within this process of constituting State interests (deliberation), we could consider the 
role of governmental and non-governmental organisations, international and domestic 
institutions, groups and individuals. States are recognised as the main actor in the State system 
but other agents, as vehicles for distribution of knowledge (or teachers of norms)21 also play a 
role in the process of deliberation.22  
                                                 
16 Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organisations 
(OUP 2011) 6. 
17 ibid 3. 
18 ibid 25. 
19 ibid 13. 
20 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (CUP 2005) 69. 
21 Wendt (n 1) 129; Anthony Clark Arend, Legal Rules and International Society (OUP 1999) 
43–45. 
22 Martha Finnemore, ‘International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy’ (1993) 47 Int’l Org 565. 
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Public reasoning and justification occur in the institutions of governments and 
intergovernmental bodies, as well as political parties, nongovernmental organisations, social 
movements, and other elements of civil society, whose activities are not confined by national 
borders.23 Interpretive communities or teachers of norms set the parameters of legal discourse 
and pass judgments on legal claims and secondly, they define, interpret and extend the rules of 
international behaviour, thereby influencing the evolution of the law.24  
In this context, the deliberations and argumentations by interpretive communities, 
which adhere to ‘the responses dictated by the conventions of the enterprise’ are likely to be 
more persuasive in that community.25 In the international legal system, the legal opinions of 
different institutions carry different weights. This is dependent on the type of institution and 
the quality of argumentation engendered in that institution, which is determined by the 
parameters set by the legal discourse and substantive norms prevalent in that community. In 
the absence of a central judicial institution in the international system, no single institution has 
the ultimate interpretive authority, but it could be argued that the ICJ’s legal opinions carry 
special weight26 and that there are also other interpreters, such as international institutions (eg 
UNGA),27 with persuasive powers. 
Moreover, non-State international actors, unlike States, are not ontologically prior to 
the State system. International organisations are products of States and the State system, and 
their qualities are shaped both within States and in the State system, and constantly influence 
system-level cultures. Just as it would be difficult to define a State without a society, it would 
be difficult to define international organisations or courts without the State system. Both intra-
                                                 
23 Johnstone (n 16) 18; Seyla Benhabib (ed), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the 
Boundaries of the Political (Princeton University Press 1996) 74. 
24 Johnstone (n 16) 33. 
25 ibid 36; Stanley Fish, ‘Fish v. Fiss’ (1984) 36 StanLRev 1325; Koskenniemi (n 20) 37. 
26 Johnstone (n 16) 40; Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga 
Omnes (OUP 2000) 104. 
27 Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, vol 3 (OUP 1990) 87–8. 
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State and inter-State norm interpreters are influenced by the State system and domestic social 
structures. Thus, both domestic and international norms interpreters take part in the legal 
discourse and are at the same time influenced by it. Legal discourse and the deliberations of 
interpretive communities shape States' desires or interests and thus their behaviour.  
In discussing State desires or interests, anthropomorphic qualities are attributed to the 
State as a unit. This can be explained on the basis that international law recognises State 
personality (similar to the recognition of corporate agency by domestic legal systems).28 
Further, in determining custom formation, there is a reliance on opinio juris as the belief of 
States on the legality of action. Thus international law implicitly in this way recognises 
anthropomorphic qualities for States. Also, it is also argued that States are similar to people29 
and that they have anthropomorphic qualities such as desire, belief and intentionality30 on the 
basis of the macro-micro-macro process proposed by Goodman and Jinks. 
Goodman and Jinks do not posit that ‘a State is a person or [that] it exhibits any property 
of personhood’; rather, they ‘claim that patterns of formal State practice suggest that … 
[international-] level institutions systematically influence State-level legal and policy choices’. 
For instance, macro level phenomena (eg human rights treaties) cause other macro-level 
phenomena (eg changes in State policy) which are ultimately explicable at a micro-level.31 
Macro-level factors ‘influence relevant actors within States, including government officials, 
members of the national and local media, issue-specific activists, and even ordinary citizens’ 
which in turn ‘influence national level legal and policy outcomes’; in other words, a macro-
micro-macro explanation.32 Thus, through a macro-micro-macro process, States are capable of 
producing anthropomorphic qualities. 
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29 ibid 193. 
30 ibid 193–240. 
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32 ibid 40. 
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The interaction of the belief and action of States conveys that desire or opinio juris is 
the cognition of States and is heavily influenced by socialisation processes. This desire then 
gives rise to the perception of the relevant legal act, which can be portrayed only in the actions 
of States. Belief in legally relevant State practice or opinio juris, whether viewed as a category 
of desires or beliefs, is only cognitions or ideas as opposed to actions. Accordingly, opinio juris 
in the theory of custom is an attempt to capture the cognition of States on legally relevant State 
practice. Cognition could only be portrayed as a form of action, ie the desire of States to uphold 
existing rules of custom or a desire in manifesting their acknowledgement in legally relevant 
State practice.  
In other words, one cannot determine what the opinio juris or cognition of States are 
unless we look at their actions or other actors' actions (eg international organisations or courts) 
to discover what is perceived as relevant State practice. On this basis, if States (eg national 
courts) and international courts and institutions (eg the ICJ) start relying on treaties as a form 
of binding usus, it could be suggested that treaties also count as a form of binding usus. In other 
words, the institutionalisation of rules in international law is socially constructed, eg the 
instances of States practice which give rise to international law or how treaties become 
binding.33 
Constructivism views desire as interests and recognises that States' interests are 
receptive to the culture of the social structure of the State system. On that basis, it is argued 
that, customary rules comprise the desires of States (through determining binding usus and 
individual customary rules) through binding usus as a form of action which enshrines the 
socially constructed interests of States. Accordingly, rules of customary international law 
represent the interests of the international community.  
                                                 
33 Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law (Brill Nijhoff 
1994) 235. 
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Binding usus is determined through socialisation processes rather than being pre-
determined by any theory of custom formation. Opinio juris is a belief and belief cannot 
materialise without action (whether it is a belief in binding or non-binding usus). It is the action 
that imparts such belief with it; therefore, it is not the belief that is imputed to the action, but 
rather the reverse. Thus, subjective acceptance is inferred from material behaviour, and the 
inference of desire from action is produced objectively through discursive practices prevalent 
in the international community. 
Opinio juris could be interpreted as the way in which the perceptions of States are 
determined; for instance, why judges assign legal relevance to some State practice but not to 
others.34 Opinio juris is the form of action accepted by the States in the socialisation process, 
which gives meaning to it as relevant or irrelevant legal conduct or when a new rule of custom 
has emerged. State practice is not an automatic operation and is open to interpretation.35 In turn, 
‘the interpretation of State practice depends upon perception’ and is viewed through the lens 
of culture and interest.36 It is argued here that it is the consensus that emerges in the social 
structure of the State system, which determines the eligibility of binding usus.  
2.2. Is Custom Consensus-based? 
Consensus is an element which is central both to the discerning of binding from non-
binding usus and recognising individual norms as rules of customary law. Custom has been 
held to be ‘a matter of general rather than universal consent, so that a dissenting State cannot 
free itself by an act of will from the obligations imposed on it by a rule of customary 
                                                 
34 Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and 
Customary International Law (CUP 1999) 140 citing Haggenmacher, Peter (1986) ‘Law doctrine des 
deux elements du droit coutumier dans la pratique de la cour internationale’ (1986) 90 Revue generale 
de droit international public 5. 
35 Anthony D’Amato, Concept of Custom in International Law (Cornell University Press 1971) 
97–98. 
36 J Patrick Kelly, ‘The Twilight of Customary International Law’ (1999) 40 VaJInt’l L 449, 
467. 
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international law’, in reference to new States or to an existing State dissenting to an already 
established customary rule.37 A practice does not have to be either observed or accepted as law, 
tacitly or expressly by every State38 to give rise to custom.  
Furthermore, the notion of pacta tertiis nec prosunt nec nocent is not applicable to 
customary law.39 Custom can bind all parties, even those which have not participated in their 
creation – provided they have not objected to their creation.  
Having said that, there are suggestions that even the persistent objector principle, one 
that is associated with the creation of custom, may not be an integral part of the theory of 
customary international law because it is a new concept based on a doubtful pedigree.40 A State 
(even the most powerful one) cannot persistently object for an indefinite period.41  
A persistent objecting State may eventually be persuaded to adopt the new rule of 
customary law. A persistent objector State may eventually exclude itself from the customary 
process in the area governed by the new rule because a persistent objector cannot freeze the 
development of customary international law so as to benefit itself. 42 The objecting State puts 
itself at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other States, as many States appear reluctant to recognise the 
rights of persistent objectors, thus excluding the advantages of any benefits of the new rule to 
the objecting State.43 Accordingly, it is the capacity of custom eventually to obligate non-
consenting or even persistent objectors that makes customary law consensus-based rather than 
consent-based44. 
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Custom is different from treaty precisely by being something other (“more”) than 
agreement, but at the same time ‘it seems impossible to think of custom as fully non-
consensual’.45 If customary law formation was non-consensual, ‘it would become a set of 
natural principles and vulnerable to the standard objection about the utopian character of 
natural law’.46  
The belief that ‘community consensus over individual State consent in modern custom 
reflects the priority of substantive normativity over procedural normativity in important moral 
issues’ may not necessarily be correct.47 Although this may be one of the implications of 
recognising community consensus over individual consent, this is not the reason why 
community consensus should be understood as the most relevant factor in the formation of 
custom rather than individual consent.  
First, as noted, custom has the capacity to bind even persistent objectors. However, 
binding usus is itself recognised through the process of deliberation by interpretive 
communities. Accordingly, even if it is accepted that a State can object to a rule of customary 
international law, a State or a group of States do not have the ability on its own to change the 
perception of States regarding the validity of an act as binding usus.  
Secondly, since custom is produced through actions, and actions are based on desires 
or interests, this would mean that some customary rules could be based on the self-interests of 
States and others on the legitimacy of the norms. Hence, prioritising community consensus 
over individual State consent does not necessarily entail a higher normative criterion for 
customary rules. 
In consideration of the foregoing, the case can be made that ‘the traditional 
requirements of generality, consistency and duration are superfluous or, at best, evidence of 
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the consent behind them’.48 Instead, the recognition of a rule of customary international law 
depends on the clarity of the norm debated, the clarity of intention to promote a norm of 
generally applicable international law and the strong consensus in favour of the norm.49 Norms 
are socially defined, and the legitimacy or imputed authority of custom is a product of the 
relevant social group: it is neither a product of individual consent or central authority.50  
Common consent does not mean ‘that all States must at all times expressly consent to 
every part of the body of rules constituting international law, for such common consent could 
never in practice be established’.51 This is consistent with the ICJ’s practice, as the ICJ usually 
relies on general opinion, not that of States individually.52 Common consent does not 
necessarily mean ‘express or tacit consent of States to the body of rules comprising 
international law as a whole at any particular time’.53 It is not argued here that consent to 
customary law as a system (eg by relying on custom) justifies the absence of the requirement 
of individual consent of every State as a whole. Rather, it is the fact that States as a whole 
partake in the legal discourse prevalent in the international community, either directly or 
indirectly through the interpretive communities, which sets the parameters of legal discourse. 
It is the involvement of States in the process of legal argumentation in the social structure of 
the State system that justifies the non-requirement of explicit consent of every State for every 
norm. 
Moreover, if consensus is not at the core of customary law, then, according to a 
traditional understanding of custom, new contrary State practice should change or modify the 
                                                 
48 Koskenniemi (n 20) 416. 
49 Jonathan I Charney, ‘Universal International Law’ (1993) 87 AJIL 529, 546; Frederic Kirgis, 
‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ (1987) 81 AJIL 146. 
50 Ian Hamnett, Chieftainship and Legitimacy: An Anthropological Study of Executive Law in 
Lesotho (Routledge & Kegan Pau 1975) 13. 
51 Jennings and Watts (n 37) 14. 
52 Alain Pellet, ‘Article 38’ in Andreas Zimmermann and others (eds), The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2nd edn, OUP 2012) fn 616. 
53 Jennings and Watts (n 37) 14. 
 54 
old rule. In this respect, the traditional understanding of custom does not sit well with the 
practice of national and international courts, which have widely ignored contravening State 
practice regarding certain norms in international law, for instance in respect of international 
crimes.54 When considering the customary status of torture, the ICTY declared that ‘no State 
has ever claimed that it was authorised to practise torture in time of armed conflict, nor has any 
State shown or manifested opposition to the implementation of treaty provisions against 
torture’.55 The ICTY further emphasised that when ‘a State has been taken to task because its 
officials allegedly resorted to torture, it has normally responded that the allegation was 
unfounded, thus expressly or implicitly upholding the prohibition’56 of torture.  
The ICTY did not reject the fact that contravening State practice does not have the 
capacity to change customary law; rather, it qualified this on the basis that the practice was in 
contradiction of the Torture Convention and that no State has manifested opposition to its 
provisions. These two forms of actions were preferred over contrary State practice due to a 
consensus over the prohibition of torture in international law and the non-legal considerations 
involved in the practices which contravened the prohibition of torture. 
The role of consensus over the prohibition of torture is also evident in Filartiga, in 
which the US Court of Appeals emphasised that no government has asserted the right to torture 
its own nationals.57 The US Court further noted that where reports of torture elicit some 
credence, a State usually responds by denial or, less frequently, by asserting that the conduct 
was unauthorised or constituted rough treatment short of torture.58  
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This way customary law is produced by consensus rather than by the individual consent 
of States. It has previously been contended, following Dworkin and Franck, that the source of 
legal obligations in the community is by societal association rather than consent (Chapter 1, 
Section 1). In this respect, Byers asserts that, if the customary process is accepted as an integral 
part of international society, it would seem likely that the basis of obligation in international 
law also lies within the societal character of inter-State relations.59 Byers (following Dworkin 
and Franck) also adopts an interpretation for consent which is reflective of the fact that the 
source of obligation in international law lies in societal interactions. Here, it is thus 
acknowledged that consent may take the form of general consent to the process of customary 
international law – ie a form of diffuse consensus rather than a specific consent to individual 
rules.60  
Norms may be inferred from repeated and consistent acts that are believed to be 
required by a community and it is ‘the community-wide belief that a norm is legally required 
that provides customary law with authority and legitimacy’.61 Regardless of the belief/action 
discussion earlier, this is in line with the fact that many lawyers have also associated opinio 
juris with a general will among States to be bound.62 
2.3. The Role of Opinio Juris and State Practice in Custom Formation  
The prevalent method to ascertain opinio juris of States has been to infer opinio juris 
from the general and consistent practice of States.63 This is in line with the assertions made 
here, that belief of the legality of an act is inferred from State acts; however, it is argued that 
modes of binding usus are shaped in the socialisation process and thus, are to some extent, 
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fluid.  
That said, it must be noted that recent trends have often reversed the process: ‘following 
the expression of an opinio juris, practice is invoked to confirm opinio juris’.64 For instance, 
the ICJ in Nicaragua stated that consent to resolutions such as the UNGA resolutions is one 
form of expression of opinio juris (with regards to the principle of non-use of force)65. The ICJ 
only relied on the opinio juris of States to assert that a customary right of non-intervention 
existed under international law,66 and ignored contrary State practice to the rule of non-
intervention.67 Similarly, some also argue that treaties and declarations represent opinio juris 
because they are statements about the legality of action rather than examples of such.68 
The ICTY in Kupreskic also acknowledged that, at least in relation to human rights 
norms, even if a body of State practice consistently supports the proposition that one of the 
elements of custom, namely, usus or diaturnitas has not taken shape, opinio juris plays a greater 
role.69  
It is clear that if an approach (to custom creation which is) based on a clear delineation 
between opinio juris and State practice is adopted, there simply would be no custom, both in 
relation to the right of non-intervention and torture. However, an approach based on communal 
consensus which identifies binding usus could justify the outcome of these judgments.  
The ICTY took the same approach in Tadic with regards to Articles 1 and 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions by putting more emphasis on opinio juris rather than the practice of States 
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in reaching their conclusion.70 Meron posits that the ICTY took the same approach as the 
Nuremberg trials by relying on verbal evidence as statements, resolutions and declarations, 
rather than battlefield or operational practice, which it largely ignored.71 According to Meron, 
this methodology was ‘akin more to that applied in the human rights field than in other areas 
of international law’72 whereby, in ‘both human rights and humanitarian law, emphasis on 
opinio juris helps to compensate for scarcity of supporting practice’.73  
This approach to identification of customary law is also evident in the judgments of the 
ICJ, which does not correspond to the generally acknowledged theoretical definition of 
customary international law.74 The examination of the ICJ judgments also demonstrates that, 
even when the ICJ has proclaimed ‘the theoretical distinction between practice and opinio juris, 
the ICJ mixes them up’75. The ICJ mainly refers to ‘the resolutions of international 
organisations and general treaties’ and, even more importantly ‘the attitudes of the States vis-
à-vis these instruments’ (as the ICJ practice of relying on UNGA as evidence of opinio juris).76 
Having said that, the ICJ’s recognition of customary law has generally led to a globally 
acceptable result.77  
More than the fact that this approach proves the legal authority for reliance on opinio 
juris as the main element of customary law formation, it also demonstrates the assertion that 
custom formation is based on consensus rather than on the basis of predetermined and fixed 
modes of State practice and opinio juris. This should be viewed in the context that the instances 
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of State practice are also formed by consensus through the process of socialisation and are thus 
fluid to a certain extent. 
In this respect, the practice of the ICJ and ICTY are in line with modern approaches to 
custom, which have generally been inductive with less emphasis on State practice as 
traditionally understood, but more on opinio juris. Modern approaches put more emphasis on 
declarations and resolutions of international organisations and treaties (ie declare existing 
custom, crystallise new custom or generate new custom),78 and from this perspective, custom 
can be created rapidly compared with the traditional notion of custom.79 The emphasis on 
opinio juris, as opposed to State practice in the formation of customary law, is especially 
relevant to international crimes and human rights obligations.80 
International actors (mainly States but including international institutions, international 
organisations and international courts)81 shape the culture at the international level, and 
domestic actors (government institutions, groups, individuals) shape the culture at the domestic 
level, and both cultures at the domestic level and international level continuously influence 
each other. Thus, the judgments of international courts, especially the ICJ, are influential in 
terms of persuading States to adopt a new norm or accept a form of binding usus. 
If the legal argument does not have not a strong institutionalisation claim in 
international law, eg based on a treaty which does not have the majority of States as signatories, 
                                                 
78 Bin Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary 
Law?’ (1965) 5 Indian J Intl L 23, 23; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(n 54) [544–45]. 
79 Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens 
and General Principles’ (1989) 12 Aust YBIL 82, 90; Louis Henkin, ‘Human Rights and State 
Sovereignty’ (1995) 25 GaJInt’l& CompL 31, 37; Ted L Stein, ‘The Approach of the Different 
Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law’ (1985) 26 HarvInt’l LJ 457, 
457. 
80 Lori Lyman Bruun, ‘Beyond the 1948 Convention - Emerging Principles of Genocide in 
Customary International Law’ (1993) 17 Maryland JInt’l L& Trade 193, 216–18; Richard B Lillich, 
‘The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law’ (1995) 25 GaJInt’l& 
CompL 1, 8. 
81 Kathryn Sikkink and Martha Finnemore, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change’ (1998) 52 Int’l Org 887, 895–900. 
 59 
then the onus is on the norms interpreter to illustrate in the relevant argument that the norm has 
become internalised by most States to count as a rule of customary law –ie consensus regarding 
that norm has emerged.  
For instance, in the Genocide Convention case, the ICJ held that the prohibition of 
genocide was a principle recognised by civilised nations.82 At the time, most States had not 
incorporated genocide in their domestic laws and there was not consistent State practice 
suggesting that genocide was part of customary international law. 
That said, there was a strong consensus for the prohibition of genocide and that 
genocide arguably had been internalised by most States as a social norm considering the 
historical background of World War II and the tribunals set up to try offenders for crimes 
including genocide. Thus, there was an intersubjective understanding of its illegality under 
general international law. The fact that, at the time, no shared understanding of the scope of 
binding usus (ie treaties at least in respect of human rights) existed justifies the ICJ’s approach 
by relying on the principles of civilised nations instead as the legal source for the prohibition 
of genocide in international law. 
Customary rules represent the interests of the community of States,83 which have been 
internalised to the second or third degree by most States. If, however, a norm has already been 
internalised by most States and is then institutionalised in international law in a treaty, that 
treaty will reflect the interests of the international community. For instance, it has been 
suggested that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea institutionalised the common interests 
of States (based on self-interests).84 In other words, the internalisation of the Convention’s 
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provisions by the majority of States preceded its institutionalisation in international law. 
Additionally, treaties could also expedite the process of the internalisation of a norm 
for States that have not yet internalised it.  The constitutive and causal effects of the social 
structure of the State system vis-à-vis States explain why institutionalisation in international 
law may expedite the process of persuasion85 or socialisation. This can occur when a norm has 
been internalised to the second or third degree by some States and institutionalised in 
international law in a treaty or a resolution of an international organisation. The other States 
that have not internalised the norm will be persuaded to internalise it more rapidly due to its 
recognition by international actors such as international courts. 
States perceive fully internalised norms as legitimate but norms internalised to the 
second-degree have a more bilateral basis and are only based on the self-interest of States.86 It 
is with the third-degree internalisation that a norm constructs agents (shaping their identities), 
in which case the quality of compliance and resistance to normative change will be high.87 
Thus, when an agent propagates a new norm if it challenges existing internalised norms, the 
resistance to change will be higher, depending on its internalisation degree.88 In this regard, 
any claim for a new rule of customary law which challenges any existing customary rule with 
a high degree of internalisation by States would have passed a higher evidential threshold to 
replace or modify the old rule.  
2.4. Treaties and Resolutions of International Organisations 
The fact that the courts have refrained from referring to treaties or resolutions of 
international organisations as instances of State practice could be explained on the basis that 
there is a possibility to conflate custom with treaty if a strict approach (inferring custom from 
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treaties) is adopted.  That is, if treaties are accepted as the necessary and sufficient form of 
State practice to create customary law. However, it could be argued that treaties or resolutions 
of international organisations as a general rule could be considered as a form of State practice 
in international law that contribute to customary law formation.  
In this respect, a treaty which even gains the support of most States will not necessarily 
produce customary law. Rather, it can be used as a form of State practice along with other 
binding usus which portray the consensus among States. For instance, the fact that rules such 
as torture are repeated in many international instruments and treaties, and that almost all States 
proscribe acts of torture, is sufficient on a general level to prove that such a consensus exists. 
Accordingly, the circularity in custom ascertainment (ie opinio juris is extracted from 
practice and vice versa) could be avoided if there existed a general rule (whatever its status) as 
to which practices lead to custom formation and which do not. 89 It seems reasonable in light 
of the difficulties with the ascertainment of custom, and specifically the opinio juris of States, 
instead of requiring opinio juris as the subjective element of States, that the focus should 
instead be on a method for identifying objectively the claims of legality by well-recognised 
legal authorities.90  
International and national courts (as agents in the socialisation process) rely on 
multinational treaties, resolutions of international organisations, States’ denunciation of certain 
acts and States’ reluctance to admit the commission of certain acts (because of their belief in 
their legality) in the process of the identification of customary rules91. This can be justified by 
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a shared understanding among actors of the State system that these instances could be used as 
relevant legal State practice. This shared understanding has developed in the social structure 
of the State system by way of interaction of intra-State elements (ie practice of national courts 
and States internally) and inter-State elements (ICJ and treaties) through the processes of 
socialisation. 
Accordingly, these actions could be considered as relevant legal conduct in the 
formation of a custom. This is in line with the courts’ approach and that of others who contend 
that custom could be created rapidly if the new rule of international law has its origin in, or is 
soon reflected in, a multilateral treaty of general application.92 Additionally, some norms in 
human rights treaties have quickly been transposed to customary law.93 This can be based on 
the consensus that quickly emerged on the inter-State level regarding the customary status of a 
norm and the fact that the norm was internalised by States prior to its institutionalisation in 
international law. In other words, these norms had been internalised at least by most States and 
were perceived as legitimate norms or represented the self-interests of States, prior to their 
institutionalisation in international law. 
Some writers argue that resolutions of international organisations adopted by consensus 
or a near-unanimous decision may declare that a rule has become generally accepted.94 On the 
other hand, it has been argued that according to the ICJ’s practice, treaties cannot be considered 
as an element of State practice but the attitudes of States vis-à-vis the treaty, either during its 
negotiations or regarding its acceptance, can be more important than the text itself.95 Moreover, 
some writers argue that the attitudes of States at diplomatic conferences or in international 
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organisations, as well as the practice of the organisations themselves, can also be of paramount 
importance in establishing the existence of the material element.96  
The inconsistencies that are generated if higher recognition is given to individual States' 
opinion in international organisations can take place in cases where a treaty also addresses the 
rule under discussion. In this way, the consensus of States around an issue which is 
institutionalised in a treaty is ignored, and priority is given (by the form of State practice) to 
individual States’ opinions at diplomatic conferences for evidence of State practice. This 
cannot create a more coherent and accurate result than referring to the treaty or instrument itself 
directly.  
The statements of States in pre-treaty negotiations should be considered, but not as 
important as the treaty itself, which objectively portrays the wishes of States in the form of 
consensus. Any form of reliance on statements or other acts of that nature has the potential of 
being subjected to the values of the interpreter and selective recognition of the relevant data 
and thus subjectivity. 
The ICJ in Nicaragua (also the ICTY as discussed above) inferred the existence of a 
customary rule mainly on the basis of the resolutions of international organisations as opinio 
juris. Nonetheless, the fact that the ICJ or other courts do not refer to treaties or resolutions of 
international organisations as modes of State practice does not undermine their role in 
customary law formation.  
Furthermore, this thesis proposes that mainly binding usus, which is backed up by 
consensus, could generate custom. This approach precludes the inconsistencies associated with 
the balancing of opinio juris and State practice in the formation of custom, as the balancing 
approach has the capacity to reproduce the circularity between opinio juris and State practice. 
For instance, one proposed approach seeks to balance what the practice has been with 
                                                 
96 ibid fns 593-94. 
 64 
what the practice ought to be on the basis of normative considerations of the community (lex 
lata and lex ferenda).97 In this context, practice would be descriptive, but opinio juris could 
represent both lex lata or lex ferenda.98 Opinio juris is used to extract the subjective values of 
States, so that they are given sufficient expression in legal form.99 Multiple eligible 
interpretations of State practice must be balanced against substantive considerations and 
defects of practice may be compensated ‘if the principles of that interpretation are particularly 
attractive’.100  
The flaw with this account is that opinio juris counts as lex lata when assessing State 
practice but as lex ferenda when assessing normative considerations. This approach also fails 
to justify the distinction between binding and non-binding usus fully. This is not to deny that 
certain actions or inactions may or may not be considered for the purposes of custom formation; 
rather, there must be a justified reason behind this selection of actions or inactions as binding 
usus. 
The approaches which seek to create a form of balance or equilibrium between State 
practice and opinio juris can be considered from two perspectives: the reluctance to recognise 
the treaties or resolutions of international organisations as a form of binding usus; and the 
emphasis on consent-based rather than consensus-based custom. The inductive processes of 
identification of customary law on a consent-based basis will also be incomplete due to the 
impossibility of including the practice of all of the States. Any such inductive analysis will be 
subjective on the basis of the values and interests of the interpreters and will be limited only to 
considering the practice of a handful of States.  
Moreover, a State’s commitment to become a signatory to a treaty, objectively, may 
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convey a stronger sense of legal obligation on behalf of a State compared with the opinions of 
governmental advisers or official publications. This is on the basis that States do not have 
central organs to present their views and policies on international law comprehensively, and to 
act on such views and policies in a coherent manner.  
Different branches of governments do not necessarily hold the same view on the same 
issues pertaining to international law. The absence of central organs in States to make the 
policies and actions of different organs of the State coherent, in a manner whereby on every 
issue a State can have one voice and actions confirming such views, makes the task of an 
independent inquiry on the existence of a customary rule very difficult, if not impossible.  
Furthermore, the willingness of a State to become a signatory to a treaty or to support 
a resolution of an international organisation is one of the best manifestations of State policy 
towards international law. Such actions are debated at the highest institutions and offices of a 
State and therefore the value of such actions should be reflected in the ascertainment of rules 
of customary law. 
On the basis of these explanations, it is contended that the resolutions of international 
organisations and treaties could also be taken into consideration as evidence of State practice,101 
if they are accompanied by a sense of consensus in relation to the provisions of the treaty or 
the resolution in question. Recognising resolutions of international organisations and treaties 
as a form of State practice also serves a procedural advantage, as States with fewer resources 
will get equal footing to express their views on international law. This does not empower a 
minority of States to bind the majority,102 since if a claim is not based on consensus, it would 
not be accepted as a rule of customary law. Despite the fact that the courts have generally 
phrased their reliance on treaties or resolutions of international organisations as opinio juris, 
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their reliance could be interpreted as State practice itself if the implications of their decisions 
are taken into account.103 
Accordingly, the case can be made that within the social structure of the State system 
a culture has emerged (through the process of socialisation), that during the process of 
identification of a rule of customary law, if the interests of the community of States (whether 
based on legitimacy or self-interests), which themselves give rise to States' actions, are at odds 
with a certain State practice, then that practice could be ignored. For example, non-recognition 
of the commission of torture as binding usus. Conversely, if they are conducive to the interests 
of the community of States (whether in the form of action or inaction), then they could be 
considered as binding usus. The action or inactions, which are conducive to the interests of the 
international community are determined through the discursive practices of norms interpreters. 
These are boiled down to claims and counter-claims on the status of acts within the discursive 
communication of norms interpreters.  
On that basis, since it is argued that binding usus is determined through a process of 
socialisation rather than merely based on a pre-determined set of actions or beliefs, it is fluid 
in the sense that it could undergo change or accept exceptions to any general rule. Accordingly, 
customary law can be described as the language of interaction and could be viewed as an 
unwritten code of conduct and custom confers meaning on ‘on foreseeable and approved 
actions, which then furnish a point of interaction for ongoing interactive responses’.104 That 
being the case, a significant function of custom ‘is precisely that of communication, of labelling 
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acts so that there can be no mistake as to their meaning’.105  
The process of legal discourse, deliberation and norm interpreters distinguish the 
binding usus from non-binding usus and identify the individual norms of customary 
international law. A norm interpreter such as the ICJ persuades other actors to accept a certain 
conduct as binding usus and to recognise a rule as customary law. It is through the discursive 
practice of domestic and international norms interpreters that meaning is given to binding and 
non-binding usus. Legal discourse determines the boundaries of legally relevant State practice 
in which rule interpreters such as courts and legal scholars play a vital role. These shared 
understandings regarding the legality of certain acts are shaped over a long period of time 
through persuasive argumentation utilised by norm entrepreneurs. International fora resemble 
the deliberative processes extant in domestic legislative processes.106 Shared understandings of 
binding usus are ‘based on the general acceptance by States of the customary process, as 
signalled by their reliance on customary rules and their acknowledgement of the potential 
validity of claims made by other States based on similar rules’.107  
2.5. Criticism of the State Practice Approach to the Formation of Customary 
Law  
Having said that, there is opposition to the fact that State practice alone could amount 
to rules of customary law. Criticism of State practice as the only criterion for the emergence of 
customary law has generally been directed at two main schools of thought which propose that 
State practice alone can produce customary law.  
The first one is based on normative theories (eg New Haven’s policy-oriented concept 
based on “human dignity”) which ‘redefine customary law in a manner that eliminates the 
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requirement of internalised beliefs of the community’. 108 This approach tries ‘to identify as 
relevant practice such behaviour which corresponds to material criteria of justice’.  109 It 
suggests that a practice amounts to custom if it is ‘in conformity with the social needs of a legal 
order’ or if it corresponds to ‘reasonableness or moral utility’.110  
Such considerations have been criticised as ‘utopian' since justice, social need, 
reasonableness and moral utility are subjective notions and ‘cannot be used to achieve a 
determinate delimitation between practice which is and which is not law’.111 It is not contended 
here that a higher value or rule should guide the creation of rules of customary international 
law on the basis of a pre-determined notion. Rather, customary rules are determined through 
the actions of States which represent their interests (ie desires) and the form of binding usus is 
determinate through the discursive practices of the international community in which all States 
play a role through their representatives in international and domestic institutions.  
The second approach holds that ‘statements alone or the accumulation of international 
instruments may be sufficient to create customary international law’.112 On that premise, this 
approach has been held to have the potential to substitute ‘the normative claim of one or a few 
powerful States for that of the community’.113 That said, if international instruments are 
accompanied by a sense of consensus regarding the rule in question, then this criticism is not 
relevant. As discussed, resolutions of international organisations could convey the consensus 
of the community of States pertaining to a rule of international law, and that resolutions of 
international organisations or treaties are not the only indicator of consensus among States. The 
argument made here was not that an accumulation of international instruments alone could give 
rise to custom.  
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It could be argued that if customary law is boiled down to State practice, it would 
essentially entail that States can never act illegally as whatever they do amounts to custom and 
that reliance on State practice alone has the potential of lowering custom to the will and 
interests of States devoid of the normative convictions of the community.  
That said, binding usus and non-binding usus are determined through discursive 
practices in the international community, and the fact that binding usus represent States' 
interests is inconsistent with the assertion that State practice alone cannot comprise community 
interests. States’ interests could be based on the legitimacy of the rule or the mere self-interests 
of States, but when these actions of States are based on interests which are fully internalised 
and are perceived as legitimate, they could also contain normative convictions of the 
community in that sense. Discursive practices through consensus ensure that acts which are 
recognised to be conducive to the interests of the international community (either based on 
self-interests or the legitimacy of the rule) are recognised as binding usus.  
Moreover, it has also been argued elsewhere that ‘legal rules are more likely to be 
respected even when the outcome is unfavourable if they are the product of the process 
perceived as legitimate’ and ‘compliance in a centralised system is more likely if States have 
participated in the process, accepted norms, and then internalised them into their own decision-
making process’. 114 The consensus-based customary law proposed here is based on the 
legitimacy of the process which leads to the annunciation of a rule as customary international 
law. It was not contended that every State's practice would be taken into account or that the 
process is transparent in the way that, for example, it is with regard to treaty-making.  
The process is legitimate in the sense that it ensures binding usus are recognised in the 
discursive practices prevalent in the social structures of inter-State and intra-State leading to a 
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form of diffused consensus on the formation of rules of customary law. In relation to the actions 
of States with regard to legitimate norms, it was stated in the previous chapter that actors which 
have fully internalised norms (which they perceive as legitimate) would automatically follow 
them. Thus, if a rule is proclaimed to be a rule of customary law but has not attracted 
legitimacy, it is more likely to be subject to change as it is only based on the self-interests of 
States rather than legitimacy. In this way, custom is an evolutionary source of law115 which is 
identified in instances of binding usus on the basis of consensus. This undermines the argument 
that the customary law process is not capable of adequately incorporating the interests and 
concerns of many States in international society.  
This argument is based on the assumption that, until a norm is fully internalised by 
States, it does not illustrate the normative conviction of the community. However, the 
internalisation of norms from a constructivist perspective does not necessarily require legal 
incorporation into the domestic legal system. There is a difference between social 
internalisation and the institutionalisation of norms that can be explained by the ICJ's dictum 
in the case of South West Africa. The ICJ asserted that ‘humanitarian considerations may 
constitute the inspirational basis for the rules of law’, but that such considerations do not in 
themselves amount to rules of law and the fact that all States have an interest in an issue ‘does 
not itself entail that interest is juridical in character’.116 Whilst legality is a factor of legitimacy; 
it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor for the legitimacy of a rule.117 
The process of the formation of customary law proposed here is based on the premise 
that the social processes of the State system provide ample opportunity for the inclusion of 
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States’ preferences in the formation of custom. Additionally, even if one takes the view that 
the consent of all States is required (which, as mentioned before, is practically impossible and 
does not represent how national and international courts have identified customary rules), this 
could be rejected because illegitimate processes may lead to legitimate norms.118 Whilst the 
process of norm generation and norms may be related, they are not correlative. Thus, even if it 
is assumed that the process of formation of customary international law is not legitimate, it 
cannot be concluded that norms engendered are also illegitimate and accordingly will not carry 
compliance pull.  
The view that the formation of custom on the basis of consensus is illegitimate was 
rejected in this chapter on the basis that all States play a role in the creation of norms and the 
recognition of binding usus in a form of diffused consensus through legal argumentation and 
discourse. In this way, the resolutions of international organisations and treaties make possible 
the rapid, and unquestionable entry into force of normative rules within a process that is more 
transparent (compared to the traditional understanding of customary international law) and that 
the interests and wills of States are better served.119 Further, the authority accorded to the ICJ 
or international courts is viewed from the perspective of the persuasiveness of their arguments 
regarding the existence of a rule of customary law.120   
It has been argued elsewhere that not all customary rules can enshrine community 
interests. Accordingly, there exist two types of rules of customary law. For instance, 
Koskenniemi, citing the judgment of the ICJ in the case of Gulf of Main, asserts that customary 
rules could be categorised into two categories. 121  The ICJ held that ‘customary international 
law in fact comprises a limited set of norms for ensuring the co-existence and vital co-operation 
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of the members of the international community [utopia], together with a set of customary rules 
whose presence in the opinio juris of States can be tested by induction based on the analysis of 
a sufficiently extensive and convincing practice, and not by deduction from preconceived ideas 
[apology]’.122 Similarly, Roberts argues that there are generally two categories of custom; one 
that is facilitative (enhances cooperation and maintains co-existence) and another that upholds 
commonly held subjective values by the majority of States.123 
Koskenniemi’s interpretation of the ICJ’s dictum in Gulf of Main is that there is a 
“naturalistic” custom, which is distinguished from a “regular” custom by being more “vital”, 
and the fact that it does not need the kind of backing from past practice and consent.124 
Accordingly, these general principles are positivised as ‘generalisation from past practice, 
principles of municipal jurisprudence or derivations from what nations or peoples have 
accepted in their conscience’.125 Koskenniemi raises doubt as to the link between such 
generalisations and State practice (elementary considerations of humanity, the prohibition of 
aggression, of genocide, of racial discrimination, etc) because they are not supported by 
producing impressive lists of past compliance.126  
The notion that actual past practice does not support some of these norms may not be 
correct. Although these crimes do occur and that all modes of State practice (whether binding 
usus or not) do not coherently support a customary law claim regarding their status, this should 
be seen in light of the fact that the majority of States do not practice such crimes. If they are 
recognised as crimes under customary law, then contrary State practice are merely breaches of 
the rules of customary law. If the contention is that there is ample contrary State practice to 
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suggest that these norms have changed or had never been formed in customary law, it could be 
rebutted by the assertions made here: State practice and norms are determined by discursive 
practices and as such preclude the reliance on contrary State practice in relation to international 
crimes. 
Nonetheless, the reference to the conscience of nations and their people resonates with 
the third-degree internalisation of norms proposed by Wendt, which may elevate a rule to the 
status of customary international law with little or no practice. The second category of 
customary rules as proposed by both Koskenniemi and Roberts also resonates with both 
second-degree internalisation and third-degree internationalisation of norms.  
Furthermore, the PCIJ in Lotus stated that ‘rules of international law emanate from their 
own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing 
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims’.127 This dictum 
of the PCIJ relates to second- and third-degree internalisation, as well as to the two kinds of 
custom: the coexistence custom and the custom that enshrines community interests, both of 
which are derived from binding usus.  
Additionally, a culture based on enmity and total anarchy (based on brute force) cannot 
be institutionalised in international law because if international law tolerates the threat or use 
of force, it will lose its credibility or legitimacy.128 The shared knowledge that constitutes rival 
(self-interest, the initiation of the persuasion process) and friendship (third-degree, complete 
internalisation, legitimacy) ‘cultures are to a large extent institutionalised in international law 
with a corresponding manifestation at the domestic level’.129  
The fact that there are two kinds of customary rules on the basis of the degree of their 
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internalisation by States – either second degree, based on self-interests, or third degree, based 
on the legitimacy of the norms – does not mean that customary rules which are legitimate can 
be made even in the absence of binding usus. The justification proposed by Koskenniemi is 
based on the assumption that inevitably there are no recognised criteria to distinguish binding 
and non-binding usus, which could attest to their customary status whilst at the same time 
taking into account the normative convictions of the community. 
It is ideas that give meanings to actions. The socialisation process determines both the 
source and content of norms by clarifying the interests of States and their relationship with 
international law. The process of socialisation determines the binding usus and individual rules 
of customary international law. These explanations of custom, both that it comprises some of 
the interests of the international community, ie those which have been institutionalised, and 
that its formation is heavily influenced by the process of socialisation, assist in identifying how 
international crimes are made in customary law. 
Having said that, there is also a view maintaining that community interests could not 
be created in a system, which has only States as the main actors in its law-making process and 
that States could not, by default, create interests, which are not subservient to their own special 
needs.130 Unless one acknowledges that States (and the officials who represent States) and their 
citizens are separate entities, adhering to non-overlapping values and norms, the idea that States 
are incapable of creating norms which serve the interests of States collectively cannot be 
upheld. The view that community interests or the shared interests of States (either based on the 
collective self-interests of States or the legitimacy of norms) cannot be created is based on a 
rationalist explanation of interests which takes States' interests as given and ignores the 
influence of legal discourse and deliberation on States’ interests (Chapter 1, Section 2). 
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The common interests or community interests are to be differentiated with interests that 
are internalised by States, which include murder, but have not been institutionalised in 
international law. Institutionalisation of a norm in international law correlates with the 
worldwide spread of governmental policies and structures related to the norm: 
‘institutionalisation involves the process by which rules and shared meanings move from 
abstraction to specific expectations and, in turn, taken for granted frames and relatively 
uncontested scripts’.131 
Community interests are the interests of States, which have been internalised by most 
States and institutionalised in international law. Thus, for instance, if a crime such as murder 
(over which some States do exercise universal jurisdiction on the basis of ordinary crimes such 
as order) is institutionalised in international law by a treaty or a multinational convention, and 
this is supported by further State practice in the form of universal jurisdiction, murder could 
become an international crime in a relatively short period of time.  
Some norms may be objectively conceived as beneficial to the international community 
or even legitimate, but have not been institutionalised in international law, eg the protection of 
the environment. States in the international community as a whole, through their actions, reflect 
their views about certain values and norms and their perceived significance (by looking at the 
established principles of customary international law). For instance, there have been attempts 
to give customary law status to the duty to protect the environment from global warming.132 
Whilst the interest to the community of States for this duty may be objectively established, the 
customary nature of the alleged duty is dependent on its recognition by States through modes 
of binding usus, even if it is assumed that the duty to protect the environment has been 
                                                 
131 Goodman and Jinks (n 31) 49. 
132 Eva M Kornicker Uhlmann, ‘State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protection of the 
Global Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms’ (1998) 11 GeoInt’l EnvtlLRev 101; 
Lynn Berat, ‘Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a Crime of Genocide in 
International Law’ (1993) 11 BUInt’l LJ 327. 
 76 
internalised by States. 
The subjective recognition (or consensus) of the duty to protect the environment as a 
norm, which is vital to the interests of the international community, does not yet exist. There 
has not been even one instance of prosecution concerning global warming or damaging the 
ozone layer, either domestically or internationally. In relation to State responsibility, no 
proceeding has ever been brought against a State under this alleged duty. Whilst there are a 
few treaties that deal with global warming and the protection of the ozone layer, there is a lack 
of national legislations in terms of creating an obligation for officials/individuals in this regard. 
International law may, however, develop to recognise such a duty as a customary rule of 
international law. 
3. Common Interests and International Crimes 
3.1. Introduction 
This thesis contends that crimes (or outlawed acts) which have gained the status of 
customary law give rise to universal jurisdiction due to the interests which they protect 
(Chapter 3) and override the functional immunity of officials (Chapter 4). The modes of 
formation of customary law (which includes treaties) can illustrate how international crimes 
are made in customary international law, as well as the fact that crimes under customary law 
represent community interests.  
This thesis has treated community interests as the self-interests of States produced in 
some customary rules that have been internalised to the second degree by States, as well as 
customary rules based on the legitimacy of the norms, which have been internalised to the third 
degree by States. This section proposes that international crimes in customary law are created 
if binding usus attests the existence of custom and there is a consensus among States as to the 
prohibition of the crime in international law, establishing responsibility for both States and 
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individuals.  
3.2. General Approach to International Law 
This section first considers the applicability of the general rule that State actions are 
legal unless outlawed by international law. This is argued with reference to the judgments of 
the ICJ in Nuclear Weapons and Kosovo. In the Nuclear Weapons case, the UNGA posed the 
following question to the ICJ: ‘Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance 
permitted under international law?’133 Use of the word ‘permitted’ was criticised by some States 
because, according to those States, such wording implied that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would only be permissible if authorisation could be found in treaty or customary 
law.134 Those States claimed that States are free to use nuclear weapons unless they are 
forbidden to do so by a prohibitive rule in either treaty or customary law.135 Those States 
referred to the PCIJ's judgment in the Lotus case and the ICJ's judgment in Nicaragua.136  
It has been argued elsewhere that the strategy of the ICJ was to find a specific rule 
prohibiting or authorising the threat or use of nuclear weapons, in which a wide majority of the 
judges found neither.137 However, the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons case recognised that States 
are permitted to take any course of action unless it is prohibited by international law. The ICJ 
recognised this approach by the methodology it adopted in ascertaining the legal status of the 
use/threat of nuclear weapons; ie by examining whether under international law the use of 
nuclear weapons was forbidden. The ICJ focused on the applicability of environmental laws, 
the Genocide Convention, the ICCPR, the UNCH on the use of force, and the applicable law 
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in the situation of armed conflicts to ascertain whether any prohibition for the use/threat of 
nuclear weapons existed in international law.138 The ICJ asserted that ‘State practice shows that 
the illegality of the use of certain weapons as such does not result from an absence of 
authorisation but, on the contrary, is formulated in terms of prohibition.’139 
In determining the applicable law in situations of armed conflicts, the ICJ took into 
account the treaty and customary law prohibiting the use/threat of nuclear weapons and the 
applicability of humanitarian laws in relation to the prohibition of the use/threat of nuclear 
weapons.140 In fact, the ICJ’s decision not to rule out emphatically the use/threat of nuclear 
weapons in all circumstances highlights that the ICJ assumed the use/threat of nuclear weapons 
was permitted unless prohibited by international law. The ICJ's conclusion – that the legality 
of the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence cannot be ruled out – 
was based on the following considerations: the UNCH on self-defence (the principles of 
necessity and proportionality); non-prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in customary or 
treaty law; and the application of humanitarian law. In other words, the presumption was that 
States were permitted to use nuclear weapons unless prohibited, subject to the above relevant 
considerations to the presumed rule.  
Similarly, in Kosovo the ICJ was requested by the UNGA141 to determine whether the 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo was in accordance with international law.142 
The ICJ observed that the answer to that question turns on whether or not the applicable 
international law prohibited the declaration of independence.143 The ICJ posited that it is 
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entirely possible for particular acts, such as a unilateral declaration of independence, not to be 
in violation of international law without necessarily constituting the exercise of a right 
conferred by it,144 and that international law (ie State practice) during the eighteenth, 
nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries contained no prohibition of declarations of 
independence.145  
The ICJ continued that the non-prohibition of declarations of independence continued 
in the second half of the twentieth century during which the rule of self-determination 
developed in such a way as to create a right of independence for the peoples of non-self-
governing territories and for those subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.146 
The ICJ considered that general international law contained no applicable prohibition of 
declaration of independence; accordingly, the declaration of 17th February 2008 did not violate 
general international law.147 Moreover, in Arrest Warrant, Judge Wyngaert suggested that the 
dictum in the Lotus case not only applies to the international law of jurisdiction but is also an 
authority on the formation of customary law.148  
3.3. Customary International Law and International Crimes 
The definition of an international crime or international offence is one of the most 
problematic terms since a ‘generally accepted definition or list of international crimes does not 
exist’.149 There is ‘no international consensus that defines the category of crimes that constitute 
customary international law and would, therefore, allow for universal jurisdiction to be 
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asserted’.150 The categorisation of international crimes ranges from only recognising “core 
crimes” to the inclusion of crimes such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, slave trade, sabotage 
of civilian aeroplanes, and state-sponsored disappearances.151 With that being said, one could 
conclude that the debate over the definition or scope of the acts covered by international crime 
does not necessarily deprive the offence of its universal character; for instance, whilst piracy 
was for a long time considered an international crime, its exact definition was not settled in 
practice.152  
On the basis that, under international law, actions of States (and their nationals) are 
legal unless they are prohibited, and to demonstrate the existence of international crimes, one 
has to establish a dual responsibility for crimes under customary law. The two necessary factors 
in the creation of international law are its prohibition in international law both for individuals 
and States (the obligation to prevent the commission of the crimes and prosecute alleged 
offenders). The binding usus for the prohibition of an act for individuals and States can be 
extracted from international treaties (as binding usus if there is consensus) and its prohibition 
in the domestic laws of States and their internal practice. These two main factors are proposed 
on the basis that any legal consequence which arises for the offenders affects both the States 
and the individuals involved.  
First, this is on the basis that international crimes primarily create obligations for 
individuals as the Nuremberg Tribunal stated that international crimes ‘are committed by men, 
not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
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provision of international law be enforced’.153 
Secondly, the reference to the punishment of individuals as the Nuremberg Tribunal 
noted is important since an act cannot gain the status of a crime without legal repercussions for 
individuals, whether it is in international law or domestic law. A positivist view entails that 
there should be neither crimes nor punishment unless positive international law proscribes the 
acts or omissions.154  
Thirdly, the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction over alleged offenders of international 
crimes raises another question: whether the rights and obligations of the State whose 
official/national is prosecuted will be affected. For instance, prosecution by a foreign court 
raises the question of immunities and jurisdiction, which are both primarily owed to the State 
under international law, rather than the individual. The rights and obligations of a State in 
respect of immunities cannot be affected in international law unless the State breaches its 
obligations under international law in respect of international crimes. Thus, this chapter 
considers whether there are rules of customary law creating obligations for both States and 
individuals in respect of international crimes. 
That said, the concept of individual criminal responsibility or recognition of 
international crimes in international law is generally tied to one or more of the following 
factors: the gravity of the offence, the means of enforcement155 (ie prosecution in international 
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tribunals156), associating crimes with rules intended to protect values considered important by 
the whole international community157, associating crimes with violations of customary law 
which emanate from treaties or are clarified by treaties158, and finally associating international 
crimes with their legal consequences (ie the rules of immunity and universal jurisdiction)159.  
Cassese refers to values mainly as humanitarian considerations, which could be derived 
from international instruments.160 It is not justifiable to differentiate between community 
interests and customary law on the basis that customary rules represent the interests of the 
international community either based on self-interests or the legitimacy of the norms. The 
categorisation of crimes based on community interest in isolation of customary rules is 
unnecessary. If the intention is to differentiate between rules based on the self-interests of 
States and rules based on legitimacy, then custom cannot distinguish between either.  
On the basis of the conditions above (except for the gravity of the offence and 
prosecution in an international tribunal), Cassese concludes that piracy is not an international 
crime.161 This is not because piracy does not give rise to universal jurisdiction or the fact that 
piracy is established as a crime under customary law but because the prohibition of piracy does 
not protect values considered important by the international community as a whole. 162   
However, the proscription of piracy was ‘due to nations’ commonality of interests in 
securing themselves from the perils of piracy’,163 ie the protection of international trade, as 
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shipping was the main method of transport in that era. Piracy could, under the law of nations, 
be ‘tried and punished in the court of justice in any nation, by whomsoever and wheresoever 
committed’.164 This could be interpreted as internalisation to the second degree (one which is 
based on self-interests rather than the legitimacy of the norms); nonetheless, there is a 
consensus regarding its illegality in international law as a rule of customary law. The fact that 
it is based on the accumulation of self-interests or purely on the legitimacy of the norms as 
protecting the higher values of the community does not render the legal status of the crime of 
piracy any less than other crimes under customary law. 
With respect to the gravity and systematicity criteria for recognition of international 
crimes, Sunga, argues that a ‘general rule’ has evolved in international law, creating individual 
criminal responsibility for ‘serious violations of human rights’.165 Similarly, Ratner and 
Abrams divide crimes which give rise to individual responsibility into two categories: acts 
which must take place in a certain context against a particular group in a systematic manner; 
and specific offences, such as slavery, forced labour, or forced disappearance, which are 
criminal regardless of the circumstances.166 Ratner and Abrams maintain that international 
criminal law in respect of identifying individual criminal responsibility has adopted an 
approach which ‘is characterised by the directness and gravity of their assault upon human 
person, both corporeal and spiritual’.167  
Associating the crimes or their legal consequences (ie the existence of universal 
jurisdiction) with the gravity or seriousness of the violations or with other factors of this nature 
cannot in general justify instances when crimes under different categories give rise to similar 
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legal effects. For instance, a crime not as grave as genocide, such as kidnapping, also gives rise 
to universal jurisdiction. The proposals to reach a consensus on the gravity of offences (or 
whether they are carried out in a systematic manner) are too varied and fail to provide a 
comprehensive framework for studying international crimes and their legal effects. More 
importantly, they are generally partially oblivious towards the role of the status of crimes in 
international law and their legal effects. 
The categorisation of acts as international crimes on this basis cannot be fully justified, 
as the categorisation of acts as international crimes should be based on their status in 
international law. The existence of a doctrine of the definition of crime on the basis of scale 
and systematicity has also been doubted as a rule of customary international law in the 
literature.168 More generally, the problem with such categorisations is that they generally also 
fail to provide a convincing account of the interaction of international crimes with other rules 
of customary law. 
The gravity or systematicity of offences could, however, influence the internalisation 
and institutionalisation of these norms by States. A crime such as genocide or crimes against 
humanity, once introduced into the legal and political discourses, can influence actors to 
internalise these norms more rapidly because of their perceived legitimacy. Once a crime has 
reached the status of a crime in international law, its legal effects should be identifiable by its 
status as an international crime in customary law, rather than the factors which propelled it to 
reach that status, or non-legal factors such as the level of the internalisation of the norm by 
States (whether States have adopted the norms purely on the basis of self-interests or because 
of its legitimacy). 
In a similar vein, the prosecution of offenders in an international tribunal such as the 
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ICC (most States are party to the Rome State169) could be considered as a compelling factor, 
indicating consensus of the international community regarding the status of proscribed 
conducts as international crimes. The inclusion of the crimes against humanity and war crimes 
in the Statutes of the IMT and IMTFE, which found numerous legal precedents in international 
law prior to their inclusion in these Statutes170, provided a more compelling justification for the 
claim of the customary status of these crimes.  
By the same token, the inclusion of the crime against peace in the Statutes of the post-
World War II tribunals could be considered as a factor merely contributing to the customary 
status of the crime against peace, taking into account that the customary status of the crime of 
aggression was disputed,171 ie the status of the crime of aggression as an international crime is 
currently under dispute. Accordingly, the inclusion of prohibited conducts in the statute of an 
international tribunal cannot necessarily be an indicator of the status of an act as a crime in 
customary law as the example of crimes against peace in the Statutes of the IMT172 and the 
ICC173 illustrates. 
Factors such as gravity, systematicity of crimes, prosecution of offenders in ad hoc 
criminal tribunals, and the exercise of universal jurisdiction174 by States, may persuade States 
that have not internalised these values to uphold and internalise such values more rapidly, 
which may eventually lead to the creation of custom. For instance, the commission of mass 
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atrocities by a State followed by prosecution of perpetrators in an international or regional 
tribunal would be strong persuading factors for actors that have not yet internalised such values.  
The higher legitimacy attributed to prosecutions by regional and international tribunals 
coupled with the conceived higher morality attributed to the prohibition of large scale and 
systematic offences will naturally lead to a more rapid internalisation of these offences by 
States. Morality is a contributor to the legitimacy of any claim175. The immorality of grave and 
systematic offences by legal authorities are, for instance, expressed as offences shocking the 
conscience of mankind176 and as those posing a danger to the foundation of international legal 
order and the international society177. Additionally, the prosecution in international or regional 
courts not only illustrates a form of consensus, at least among some States regarding the 
legitimacy of their prohibition it more importantly provides a symbolic validation and pedigree 
for the prohibition of such offences178. 
In this respect, social internalisation of offences by States which still have not adopted 
these values will ultimately elaborate itself in the domestic laws of the States concerned. 
Accordingly, more States will promulgate laws to proscribe such offences which will, in turn, 
reinforce or give rise to the customary status of such offences as crimes proscribed for both 
States (to prevent and prosecute) and individuals at least on a domestic level. Factors such as 
gravity and systematicity may lead to rapid socialisation of States in respect of adopting a 
certain value (international crime) but cannot be the sole indicators regarding the status of an 
act as a crime in customary law. 
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UN GAOR Supp. (No 10) at 14, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.532, corr 1, corr 3, commentary to art 4 para 1. 
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Moreover, the identification of international crimes is intended to clarify their 
consequences rather than the other way around. The legal consequences attached to a certain 
category of acts, and in this case international crimes, may undergo change. For instance, 
assuming that personal immunity should be upheld in respect of international crimes, there is 
the possibility that a rule of customary law will develop to create an exception to the personal 
immunity of officials. The assertions that functional immunity may not be available to 
offenders of international crimes or that States are entitled/obliged to exercise universal 
jurisdiction could be categorised as legal consequences of crimes in international law.  
In the period between the Second World War and the establishment of the ad hoc 
tribunals by the UNSC, most prosecutions of international crimes were based on jurisdictional 
bases other than universal jurisdiction but, at the same time, there was a slow but gradual 
reliance on universal jurisdiction by States.179 The development of international crimes in 
customary law is only partially dependent on the prosecution by national courts on the basis 
of universal jurisdiction as these prosecutions illustrate the existence of a consensus among 
States regarding the individual responsibility for the prescribed conducts and States’ 
recognition of their responsibility to prevent and prosecute the alleged offenders. If States 
prosecute offenders on the basis of universal jurisdiction it can be argued that they have 
accepted the responsibility to prevent and prosecute offenders when the crime(s), offender(s) 
and victims all concern the same State180.  
The exercise of universal jurisdiction for the violation of international crimes by a 
foreign State not only regards State practice as binding usus but also affects the culture of the 
State system, which, in turn, affects the internal social structure of States. Accordingly, the 
                                                 
179 Mitsue Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law (Intersentia 2005): see 
generally chs 2 and 3. 
180 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 652–72: There are exceptions to 
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prosecution in international and ad hoc tribunals, and the exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
States could both transform the culture of the State system regarding recognition of an act as 
an international crime; that is for States which have not yet internalised those norms. They 
could also be indicative of the existence of consensus regarding the status of an act as an 
international crime when most States have internalised these values. That said, the creation of 
international crimes is not solely dependent on the prosecution in international courts or the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by States. 
The definition of crime in international law is ambiguous in the sense that it is not clear 
whether international crime entails the highest common denominator or lowest common 
denominator amongst prohibited conducts in international law to be considered as crimes. As 
the discussion in this section illustrated, some scholars link international crimes with the legal 
consequences which may follow commission of international crimes (eg inapplicability of 
immunities) or the seriousness and the gravity of the conducts.  
The lowest common denominator of an act as a crime in international law is the 
acknowledgment of individual criminal responsibility for a proscribed conduct and the 
obligations of States to prevent the commission of the crime and prosecute the offenders rather 
than guaranteeing enforcement of breaches of international crimes, the seriousness of the 
conducts, or the legal consequences, which may follow the commission of international crimes 
by offenders (eg inapplicability of immunities). An international criminal tribunal such as the 
ICC also provides for an international enforcement mechanism. Accordingly, it goes further 
than the lowest common denominator required for the recognition of an act as an international 
crime181.  
In that respect, the definition of crimes in international law does not necessarily include 
                                                 
181 UNGA, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (last amended 2010) 
arts 12,13 and 17: Also, see Chapter 3 Section 3.2. 
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the criterion of prosecution before international tribunals and is independent of the gravity or 
systematicity of the offence. Accordingly, the use of the term international crimes in this thesis 
is wider as it includes a broader range of crimes than those only prosecuted in international 
tribunals and is limited to the dual responsibility of States and individuals. 
3.4. International Crimes 
Crimes under international law (ie duty to prevent and prosecute) can be established by 
custom, treaty or both182. Taking into account the findings of this chapter, the interests of the 
community could be extracted from treaties, which could also be considered as a form of State 
practice.183 Accordingly, one can argue that a treaty which is a form of State practice and which 
is further supported by other indicia of State practice can give rise to customary law (Section 
2.4). International crimes as defined in this thesis are crimes which give rise to the dual 
responsibility of States and individuals. Hence, the treaty and other indicia of State practice 
(Section 2.4) should illustrate the consensus of States over creating individual responsibility of 
the individual within States and States’ obligations to prevent and exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over offenders. 
Accordingly, if most States are signatories to a treaty, which establishes a system that 
goes further than the mere illegality of an act and establish individual responsibility and obliges 
States to prevent the commission of the crime and prosecute offenders, this treaty has a strong 
claim to represent State practice. For instance, treaties which only enshrine aspirational norms 
(for instance the ICCPR184) or merely recognise the illegality of an act without creating the dual 
responsibility of States and individuals cannot represent a strong claim as State practice 
                                                 
182 Lee A Steven, ‘Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United States Is 
in Breach of Its International Obligations’ (1998) 39 VaJInt’l L 425, 436. 
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184 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 
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regarding crimes as defined in this thesis. The customary status of the crimes under that treaty 
could only be confirmed if the dual responsibility is supported by further State practice 
indicating consensus (as it was argued that consensus was the main factor in the development 
and ascertainment of custom) in the international community. Domestic criminalisation of the 
proscribed conducts and measures adopted by States internally to prevent the commission of 
the prohibited conducts as State practice can illustrate consensus among States. 
On the other hand, in respect of the duty to prevent and prosecute, if most States have 
criminalised an act before its prohibition under international law, then its institutionalisation in 
international law in a treaty may create instantaneous custom. In this way, treaties may give 
rise to customary rules that have already been internalised by States as values either based on 
self-interest or legitimacy, which would be evident, for instance, by the criminalisation of their 
acts in domestic law. The prohibition of torture, in this respect, is a good example, as before 
its promulgation in the Torture Convention, most States had prohibited torture in their domestic 
laws, thus, as soon as the majority of States became party to the Torture Convention, there was 
a strong claim as to its customary status185.  
Binding usus is a social construct and determined through consensus by way of 
deliberation and legal discourse prevalent in the international community, such as international 
or national courts and other relevant norm interpreters, such as legal scholars and the ILC. 
Specifically, in relation to crimes, it was noted that the ICJ and ICTY have referred to 
resolutions of international organisations and treaties in their annunciations of a rule of 
customary international law (Section 2.4). The existence of international crimes could in this 
way be illustrated if the act is prohibited by international law, both for individuals and States, 
                                                 
185 Decision on Admissibility, Dated November 23, 1989, Regarding Communications nos 
1/1988, 2/1988 and 3/1988 (OR, MM and MS v Argentina) Report of the Committee Against Torture, 
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which is evident in domestic legislation and practice, as well as international treaties and 
resolutions of international organisations. 
The aim of this section is not to provide an exhaustive list of crimes which establish 
dual responsibility for States and individuals. Rather, it examines the customary status – ie the 
dual responsibility of States and individuals, of some of the international crimes according to 
a constructive understanding of custom formation. The dual responsibility of States to prevent 
and prosecute, and for individuals not to commit war crimes186, genocide187, and slavery188 are 
well established in international law189.  
There are also various treaties (Appendix) which oblige States to prevent and prosecute 
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of Achievement (Springer 1999) 104; Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of the History of International Law (OUP 2012) 132–33; Ratner and Abrams (n 155) 110; Sunga (n 
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(ie to criminalise and establish jurisdiction over them) and establish individual responsibility 
on the national level in international law190. The ICJ in Belgium v Senegal noted the obligations 
of a State under the Torture Convention to establish the (universal) jurisdiction of its courts 
over the crime of torture as a necessary precondition for enabling a preliminary inquiry and for 
submitting the case to its competing authorities for the purpose of prosecution191. The ICJ 
further noted that ‘the obligation to criminalise torture and establish its jurisdiction over it finds 
its equivalent in the provisions of many international conventions’.192  
The ICJ declared that the obligation to prosecute under the Torture Convention, which 
is based on a similar provision in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft, obliges the State to submit the case to its competent authorities.193 The obligation to 
prosecute along with the preceding obligations to criminalise and establish jurisdiction over 
torture under the Torture Convention are similar to the obligations of States under various 
international conventions enumerated in the Appendix. 
These conventions do not necessarily create individual responsibility directly, yet the 
indirect effect of these conventions is that they entail individual responsibility on the domestic 
level, as they require States to exercise jurisdiction over the proscribed acts. Accordingly, the 
reference to individual responsibility is different from the term ‘individual responsibility’ used 
to refer to crimes which may also be prosecuted in international tribunals194.  
The majority of States are signatories to the treaties and that these treaties create a 
responsibility for States to prevent the commission of the offence and prosecute the alleged 
offenders for the proscribed conducts and to give rise to individual responsibility on a domestic 
                                                 
190 Ratner and Abrams (n 155) 11. 
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level (Appendix). Due to the obligations arising from these treaties and the fact that most States 
have also criminalised these crimes in their domestic legislations,195 there is a strong claim to 
the emergence of consensus regarding these offences in the international community in respect 
of establishing a dual responsibility for States and individuals. Domestic criminalisation of 
prohibited conducts under international law has been recognised as an essential element in 
recognition of customary status of crimes.196 The claim of the customary status of the obligation 
of States to prevent and prosecute is stronger in relation to the States which have a link to the 
offence197. 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea198 in contrast to the conventions mentioned 
in Appendix only entitles States to seize ships or aircrafts taken by pirates and entitles those 
that have seized the vessel taken by pirates to arrest/prosecute.199 The explanation for piracy as 
an international crime, which only gives rise to individual criminal responsibility is based on 
the fact, that no State has jurisdiction in international waters. In customary international law, it 
is the flag State which has the sole penal jurisdiction over most acts committed on board its 
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ships on the high seas.200 It is inconceivable to create an obligation for States to prevent acts of 
piracy since pirates operate in a territorial vacuum -over which no State has exclusive 
jurisdiction, until the moment they board a ship. 
Judge Moore in Lotus alluded to this fact and stated that,  
as the scene of the pirate’s operation is the high seas, which it is not the right or 
duty of any nation to police, he is denied the protection of the flag which he may 
carry, and is treated as an outlaw, as the enemy of all mankind – hostis humani 
generis – whom any nation may in the interest of all capture and punish…201  
 
Similarly, Grotius considered the application of universal jurisdiction to piracy as an 
extension of the territoriality principle: if a ship did not carry a flag of any State, there was a 
vacuum in relation to who could exercise universal jurisdiction, and every State had the right 
to exercise universal jurisdiction.202 Thus, for the crime of piracy, it is a prerogative and States 
are not under any obligation to exercise their prerogative to prosecute the offenders or prevent 
acts of piracy on the high seas. 
Accordingly, the criterion of the State's obligation to prevent and prosecute does not 
apply to the crime of piracy. The factual difference that piracy can only occur on the high seas 
should not affect the legal status of the crime of piracy in international law. Moreover, the 
controversy over the classification of acts as international crimes is almost exclusively related 
to their legal consequences regarding rules on the jurisdiction of States under international law 
and the rules of immunities of officials. As the evolution of the crime of piracy in international 
law was solely dependent on its legal consequence, namely, universal jurisdiction, piracy can 
also be categorised as an international crime. 
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In addition, with respect to the crime of enforced disappearance (as an isolated act and 
distinct from enforced disappearance under crimes against humanity203), it must be noted that 
most States have not ratified the Enforced Disappearance Convention. There are two arguments 
which support the customary status of the crime of enforced disappearance – ie the dual 
responsibility of States and individuals under customary law. The first argument is that the act 
of enforced disappearance could also be viewed as a crime of torture.204 Secondly, the fact that 
almost half of the States in the world are signatories to the Enforced Disappearance Convention 
should be viewed in light of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
obliges signatory States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the 
treaty.205  
The second argument is also supported by the fact that the UN Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance provides that States shall not practise, 
permit or tolerate enforced disappearance and that States shall take effective measures to 
prevent and terminate acts of enforced disappearance.206 The second argument should also be 
viewed in the context that many States have prohibited enforced disappearance in their 
domestic legislations.207 The claim here is not that a consensus has emerged with respect to the 
crime of enforced disappearance, but merely that there is strong evidence to that effect. 
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Moreover, there are claims that the duty to prosecute most international crimes, 
especially with regards to crimes against humanity208, crimes against peace (crime of 
aggression) and apartheid have not been established in customary international law209. The 
status of these crimes as customary rules establishing dual responsibility for States and 
individual are considered individually.  
Despite the fact that there is support for the customary status of the crimes against 
peace210 by authoritative sources, commentators generally disagree on its status as customary 
law. The customary status of the crime of aggression is generally tied to the prosecutions of 
the post-World War II tribunals and military courts. 211 This is supported by the contention that 
the principles of the Nuremberg Charter and judgments as a result of the General Assembly 
Res 95(i) are declaratory of customary international law.212 Accordingly to these commentators 
the claim is not that its prohibition in customary law arises from treaty law or that its prohibition 
is supported by criminalisation in domestic legislations.  
Apart from the statutes and judgments of the post-World War II tribunals213, the Treaty 
                                                 
208 Michael P Scharf, ‘Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute 
International Crimes in Haiti Symposium on Humanitarian Intervention and International Justice’ 
(1996) 31 TexInt’l LJ 1, 28. 
209 Ferdinandusse (n 155) 12–13. 
210 Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution 
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (‘London Agreement’) (8 August 
1945) art 6 (a); Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (19 January 1946) art 
5(a); UNGA Res 95(I) (n 187): unanimously affirmed the principles from the Nuremberg Charter and 
judgments; UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX) Definition of Aggression (14 December 1974) art 5; Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 2625(XXV) (24 October 1970): 
provides that a war of aggression constitutes a crime against peace for which there is State 
responsibility; 34 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v Spain) (Judgment) [1970] 
ICJ Rep 3 [34]; Regina v Jones (Margaret) and Others [2006] UKHL 16, paras 12–19, 44, 59, 96–97, 
99; United States of America v Ernst von Weizsäcker (11-13 April 1946) United States Military Tribunal 
319; May Larry May, Aggression and Crimes Against Peace: Philosophical and Legal Aspects of War 
and Conflict (CUP 2005) 3; Whiteman Marjorie M Whiteman, ‘Jus Cogens in International Law, with 
a Projected List’ (1977) 7 GaJInt’l& CompL 609, 626. 
211 Scharf, ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression’ (n 172) 369–72. 
212 ibid. 
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of Versailles214 and Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind215 are also used 
as evidence supporting the customary status of the crime of aggression. The problem with 
reliance on the Treaty of Versailles is not only that Kaiser was not prosecuted216 but also that 
the definition of aggression in the Treaty of Versailles does not correspond to the generally 
recognised definition of aggression.  
The crime of aggression is generally recognised as acts of war in violation or without 
justification under international law217 by high-ranking officials218 (ie ‘by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State’219). 
Whereas, Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles only related to the prosecution of Kaiser and 
was also limited to ‘supreme offences against international morality and the sanctity of 
treaties’220 rather than acts of war in violation of international law.  More broadly, pre-
Nuremberg sources on the crime of aggression were ambiguous on ‘whether aggression would 
involve individual responsibility, State responsibility, or both’.221 
Similarly, the Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind does not claim 
that the crime of aggression is a customary rule; rather it merely states that it is a rule of 
international law, which gives rise to individual responsibility222. In this sense, one can 
maintain that the crime of aggression is not a crime under customary law, but rather it is one 
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which can be prosecuted in an international tribunal such as the ICC when the State parties 
have accepted or ratified the crime of aggression or through referral by the UN Security Council 
(UNSC)223.  
Against this background one should also consider that, the element of State practice, 
that is, its criminalisation under the domestic law of States before the adoption of the ICC 
Statute in 2001 and the agreement on its definition in 2010 by the Assembly of the States 
Parties, was not present in international law. The only exceptions are prosecution by military 
tribunals of a few States224 post-World War II on the basis of the Control Council Law No 10225. 
Prior to 2010, some States, which had enacted implementing legislations, excluded the 
crime of aggression from the ambit of their domestic implementing instruments or were silent 
on its application226. On the other hand, States that had included the crime of aggression in their 
domestic instruments had made the applicability of the crime of aggression subject to the 
agreement on its definition227 according to the ICC Statute228. However, the ICC only has 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in respect of the States Parties which have accepted 
or ratified the 2010 amendment to the Rome Statute229. For instance, Australia and Kenya230 
have not accepted or ratified the 2010 amendment to the ICC Statute231, and accordingly, their 
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courts may not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Courts in these States may still 
have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when the ICC can assert its jurisdiction over a 
crime committed in the territory of a State which has accepted or ratified the amendment, when 
the offender is a national of a State that has ratified or accepted the amendment232 or when the 
UNSC refers a situation to the ICC233.  
At the same time, the exercise of the ICC over the crime of aggression is subject to a 
few restrictions. First, the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in cases which are 
not referred by the UNSC is subject to the determination by the UNSC234 but when a 
determination has not been made within six months of an incident the prosecutor may proceed 
with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression235. Secondly, States by lodging a 
declaration with the Registrar of the ICC can opt out of the ICC’s jurisdiction over a crime of 
aggression236. Finally, non-ICC State Parties are exempted from the ICC’s jurisdiction over a 
crime of aggression unless the situation has been referred to the ICC by the UNSC237. 
Accordingly, on the basis of the following factors one cannot conclude that the crime 
of aggression even after its adoption in the Rome Statue has achieved the status of customary 
law: the low number of ratifications of the 2010 amendment by States238, the fact that only a 
few States have enacted legislations to allow their courts to exercise jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression,239 and the fact that the ICC Statute does not oblige States to exercise jurisdiction 
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over the crimes enshrined in its Statute240. This is in spite of the fact that most State Parties to 
the ICC (more than two-thirds241) agreed to the 2010 amendment, and that there are legal 
authorities justifying the existence of a customary rule of the crime of aggression prior to its 
adoption in the Rome States and amendment in 2010. 
The prohibition of apartheid finds support in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UNDHR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICEARD). The UNDHR includes a non-discriminatory provision242, and the 
ICEARD obliges States to prevent, prohibit and eradicate practices of racial segregation and 
apartheid243. The Apartheid Convention obliges States Parties to adopt legislative measures to 
suppress, discourage, and punish the crime of apartheid244. Although the Apartheid Convention 
obliges States to prevent and prosecute, the Convention was drafted with mainly the practices 
of South Africa in mind245 and today may only be applicable in relation to the practices of the 
Israeli government in the occupied territories246.  
Apartheid is also included in the Statute of the ICC concerning the element of crimes 
against humanity247. There are indications that the crime of apartheid as a rule which obliges 
States to prevent and prosecute has now a reached a customary status. First, the inclusion of 
apartheid in the ICC Statute can support the status of the crime of apartheid as a customary 
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rule. Secondly, in spite of the fact that the ICC does not oblige States to prevent and prosecute, 
the implementation of the ICC Statute by States provides strong support for the customary 
status of apartheid. This is supported by the fact that States have an obligation to prohibit 
apartheid under the ICERD and prosecute offenders under the Apartheid Convention.  
Thirdly, the customary evidence in relation to the obligation of States to prevent and 
prosecute is stronger in relation to practices of apartheid in the context of armed conflict. This 
is on the basis of the inclusion of apartheid in Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions248 as grave 
breaches; one can conclude that in the context of armed conflict, apartheid has a more 
convincing claim to be considered as a crime in customary international law. A report by 
Amnesty International indicates that many State are both signatories to the Additional Protocol 
and have criminalised war crimes in their domestic statutes249.  
Moreover, there are numerous international legal sources in support of the duty to 
prevent and prosecute with respect to crimes against humanity250. However, not all 
commentators agree that States do not have a duty to prosecute international crimes including 
crimes against humanity under customary law251. Generally, writers, who maintain that a duty 
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to prosecute does not yet exist in customary law (eg crimes against humanity or offences in 
Appendix) rely on the non-prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes in the domestic 
courts of the States primarily because of amnesties granted by national authorities of the States 
in which the crimes were committed.252 These writers ignore the fact that a large number of 
States have criminalised these crimes (eg crimes against humanity253) and the duty to prevent 
as enshrined in the conventions in the Appendix. 
Merely relying on the non-prosecution of some crimes (eg torture, genocide, crimes 
against humanity), which are associated with gravity and systematicity and can generally only 
be committed by States as State policy or by individuals in a position of power and control, 
may not be sufficient. One may have to take a broader perspective by considering the wider 
practices within States to gauge a better understanding of the status of some crimes under 
international law.  
Accordingly, the prevention of some crimes (eg genocide, apartheid and crimes against 
humanity, etc) and the internalisation of these crimes as prohibited conducts by States is not 
only dependent on its criminalisation in domestic legal systems. The prevention and 
internalisation of these crimes as prohibited conducts is also dependent on the nature of the 
political regimes in States and institutions within States, which prevent the commission of these 
crimes.  
In this regard, one can hardly reject the idea that liberal democracies are less prone to 
commit crimes because of the institutions and practices in these States, which may not 
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necessarily target any specific crime254. Certain values and practices (eg human rights, civil 
societies, robust domestic legal institutions255) are enshrined in the political philosophies that 
influence the operation of the practices and the institutions within these States, which prevent 
the commission of international crimes or at least reduce the likelihood of their commission. 
From this perspective, the claim of the customary status of the duty of States to prevent and 
prosecute for the crime of apartheid becomes more compelling. Conversely, the same cannot 
be claimed for the crime of aggression as ‘democracies are no less war-prone than other forms 
of government’256.  
Writers who reject the customary status of the duty to prosecute with respect to some 
international crimes generally adopt a traditional understanding of custom creation by only 
taking into consideration inconsistent State practice (ie the number of non-prosecution with 
respect of international crimes). 257 Furthermore, these writers generally underestimate the role 
of international and regional treaties and international resolutions in the creation of custom258.  
In the process of finding a concrete or extensive State practice, as required by such 
writers for the formation of custom, even the amnesties granted by national authorities are 
equated with the practice of impunity, regardless of whether such amnesties are endorsed or 
not by the international community. From this perspective, the practice of “impunity” amounts 
to State practice providing support for the idea that States do not have an obligation to prosecute 
some international crimes under customary law259.  
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As discussed, custom can be created by consensus, and international resolutions or 
treaties may be considered as relevant binding usus. Accordingly, the creation of crimes in 
custom is independent of the legality of amnesties granted by national authorities under 
international law (Chapter 3), as one cannot argue that custom has not formed as a result of the 
practice of States to grant amnesties to their nationals who have committed international 
crimes. Even if a traditional understanding of custom formation is adopted to determine 
whether States have a duty to prosecute, the opinio juris element which is that the State must 
be acting under a sense of legal obligation260, does not necessarily support that State practice.  
Most international crimes transpire in the context of civil wars within States. 
Accordingly, the negotiations for peace within States entangled in civil wars make it necessary 
for parties to offer amnesties to the individuals involved in the civil war as a bargaining tool 
during the process of negotiations. Against this background, any amnesty offered during peace 
negotiations is usually based on political necessity rather than arising out of a sense of legal 
obligation that States do not have a duty to prosecute offenders of international crimes261. 
Alternatively, the granting of amnesties by national authorities could be seen as a breach of the 
duty of States262 to prosecute the offenders or as an exception to the duty of States to prosecute 
offenders under customary law263.  
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The nature of the duty to prosecute international crimes under customary law is not 
absolute and could be qualified and made subject to certain exceptions arising from 
international law; ie amnesties endorsed by the international community (Chapter 3). The 
incorrect assumptions that proponents of a traditional understanding of custom formation have, 
is that the duty to prosecute offenders of international crimes must necessarily be a rule of jus 
cogens and consequently no derogation from that duty is permitted264. This argument follows 
that if there are derogations or non-prosecutions of alleged offenders, this will disprove the 
existence of the duty to prosecute. 
First, this understanding conflates a duty to prosecute under customary law with a duty 
to prosecute which has achieved the status of jus cogens. Even if some crimes have achieved 
the status of jus cogens this by no means necessitates that all the legal elements associated with 
that crime have achieved the status of jus cogens265. 
Secondly, obligations of States Parties to the conventions (Appendix) creating a duty 
to prosecute offenders may be absolute as the relevant conventions do not allow for the 
amnesties granted by national or even international authorities. However, outside the 
framework of these conventions, the duty to prosecute in customary law could recognise 
exceptions including the recognition of amnesties in limited circumstances, for instance, when 
the amnesties are endorsed by the international community. The 2008 General Comment of the 
Torture Committee’s indicates that the “absolute duty” referred to by the Committee mainly 
relates to the non-commission of the crime of torture in any circumstance and irrelevance of 
national amnesties with respect to the crime of Torture266. 
The duty to prosecute is not absolute as it is a customary rule rather than a rule of jus 
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cogens status. Accordingly, amnesties cannot necessarily be used to support the claim that 
States do not have a duty to prosecute offenders. Amnesties granted to individuals can be either 
as an exception to that duty (if endorsed by the international community) or as a breach of that 
duty (if only granted by national authorities) under customary law. That is, if the approach 
proposed here is adopted then the treaties or resolutions of international organisations, which 
have received the widespread support from the international community and are supported by 
State practice (ie prevention and criminalisation in domestic laws of States), could form 
customary law. 
In this context, the proponents of the idea that such a duty does not exist in customary 
law ignore the weight of international treaties and resolutions in custom formation as a form 
of relevant State practice. Furthermore, they consistently ignore the weight of domestic 
legislations criminalising the acts prohibited by the conventions enumerated in the Appendix 
and other institutionalised practices in States which prevent the commission of crimes. 
First, as discussed, opinio juris can only manifest in actions, whereas signing a treaty 
can amount to the relevant form of action for the purpose of custom formation as it is inherently 
enshrined with the belief of legality. Actions that could amount to relevant State practice for 
the purpose of custom formation are discerned through the prevalent discourses in the 
international community. Secondly, even accordingly to a traditional understanding of custom 
formation, domestic criminalisation of international crimes should undoubtedly manifest a 
higher sense of legal obligation than non-prosecution on the basis of amnesties granted for non-
legal considerations.  
Thirdly, a traditional understanding of custom formation requires more weight to be 
given to the practice of States which are involved in such acts.267 Accordingly, as long as there 
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are even a handful of States involved in the commission of international crimes and their rate 
of prosecution is low, one cannot content that such a duty exists in customary law268. The flaw 
with this line of reasoning is that it is oblivious to the fact that the majority of States have 
significantly diminished the likelihood of such crimes being committed in their territories in 
the first place. This is done through establishing governmental institutions and other practices 
to prevent the commission of the crimes; therefore, the need for prosecution may not even arise 
in those States. Accordingly, this understanding of custom formation can lead to artificial 
recognition of laws, which are detached from the practices and laws of the majority of States 
from a broader perspective269. 
The importance of domestic legislation to criminalise and measures to prevent the 
commission of crimes is illustrated by the fact that such measures are in fact required by most 
international conventions (Appendix)270. On that basis, States not only have a duty to prosecute 
the offenders of international crimes but also have a duty to prevent the commission of 
international crimes271; therefore, the institutionalisation of practices (other than criminalising 
the crimes in domestic laws) in States, which prevent the commission of such acts, along with 
the criminalisation of such acts by States, must account for relevant State practice in the 
formation of the customary rule of the duty to prevent and prosecute.  
That being so, taking into account the large number of States that are signatories to 
these treaties and the fact that most States have successfully prevented the commission of the 
crimes and have criminalised such acts, one can conclude that there is a strong claim that a 
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duty to prevent and prosecute has been established in customary law in relation to the crimes 
enshrined in the international treaties (Appendix). Further, the prevalent shared understanding 
discerned from the judgments of national courts and international courts is that the commission 
of international crimes and non-prosecutions of international crimes do not amount to relevant 
State practice for the purposes of custom formation in respect of international crimes (Section 
2.4)272. 
Studying rules of international law from the perspective of their status in international 
law illuminates the interaction between international crimes and the rules of immunities and 
jurisdiction. Customary law, which is part of the social structure of the State system, not only 
depends on the current political and environmental conditions but also on its own origin, 
history and internal dynamics.273 Customary law (which enshrines community interests) creates 
stability in the State system,274 which could be explained by reference to the logic of 
appropriateness.  
The logic of appropriateness explains the internal dynamics of international law or the 
relationship between one norm and other norms. The standards of appropriate actions or norms 
are defined by prior norms,275 so when a norm is institutionalised in international law as 
customary international law, its legal effects are to be identified in light of other norms of 
customary law. A form of equilibrium or stability is achieved by giving recognition to other 
community interests which have been institutionalised in international law when identifying 
the legal effects of a rule of customary law. For instance, when a norm is institutionalised as 
an international crime, its full legal effects should be taken into account with respect to already 
established rules of customary law, such as immunity or jurisdiction. 
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3.5. Jus cogens 
There is a considerable overlap between international crimes developed in customary 
international law and jus cogens (eg aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, piracy, slavery and slave-related practices, and torture276). The similarity between jus 
cogens and crimes under customary law, from a constructivist perspective, could be the level 
of internalisation of these norms. Although the full effects of jus cogens are contentious, their 
effects vis-à-vis inconsistent treaties are generally accepted. The fact that, under Article 53 of 
the VCLT, a treaty (or provisions within it277) is annulled278 on the basis of its conflict with a 
peremptory norm and that a peremptory norm can only be modified by a subsequent 
peremptory norm, suggests that the resistance of these norms to change is higher, and 
consequently they enjoy a higher legitimacy compared to rules which have not achieved the 
status of jus cogens.279  
The fact that jus cogens have high legitimacy is also supported by the opinions of 
various authors and other legal authorities, explained by the following terminology: ‘attack on 
the international legal order’ or as acts ‘which shock the conscience of mankind’, norms which 
represent ‘the interests of the international community’ or as ‘fundamental standards of the 
international community’.280 Jus cogens are also generally believed to represent the common 
interests of States, or the interests of the international community and arguments of the 
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availability of universal jurisdiction to jus cogens are generally based on this assumption.281 
Although there is support for the proposition that jus cogens give rise to universal 
jurisdiction or that they represent the interests of the international community, which is also 
perceived as legitimate, jus cogens as a legal concept cannot provide a comprehensive 
understanding of international crimes and their legal effects vis-à-vis other rules of 
international law, such as the immunities of officials and rules of jurisdiction. Additionally, as 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the concept jus cogens cannot provide a sound justification for 
their operation with respect to the immunity of officials and States due to its undetermined 
relationship with the sources of international law such as customary law (ie the main source of 
immunities). 
In this respect, jus cogens could be explained as the institutionalisation of norms in 
international law which have been internalised to the third degree by States. It has already been 
suggested that rules of customary law are divided into two categories: rules which are based 
on self-interests (second-degree internalisation) and rules which are perceived as legitimate 
(third-degree internalisation), and it was explained that custom does not differentiate between 
second-degree and third-degree internalisation of norms. 
However, whilst the courts of many States have recognised the existence of jus cogens, 
                                                 
281 Pinochet (No 3) (n 176) Lord Millet 275, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 198; ILC, ‘The Scope 
and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction: Report of the Secretary-General Prepared on 
the basis of Comments and Observations of Governments’ (29 July 2010) A/65/181 8; Jorgic (n 187) 
152; Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists v Attorney General and Minister of State 
for Provincial Administration and Internal Security and Kenyans for Justice and Development Trust 
(joining) Final judgment [2011] eKLR, ILDC 1804 (KE 2011), 28th November 2011, High Court [64–
9]; Demjanjuk v Petrovsky, 776 F 2d 571 (6th Cir 1985) 75 ILR 539 583; William J Aceves, ‘Liberalism 
and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of 
Transnational Law Litigation’ (2000) 41 HarvInt’l LJ 129, 154; Johan D van der Vyver and Johan, 
‘Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ (1999) 23 Fordham Int’l LJ 286; Prosecutor v 
Anto Furundzija (n 54) [155–56]; Andreas Zimmermann, ‘Violations of Fundamental Norms of 
International Law and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters’ in Christian 
Tomuschat and Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: 
Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 337–38; Kenneth C Randall, 
‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’ (1987) 66 TexLRev 785, 830. 
 111 
there is disparity between the norms accepted in international law as jus cogens and those 
recognised as jus cogens in these legal systems, and the legal consequences attached to norms 
recognised as jus cogens.282 To be more specific, there is no recognition of a link between jus 
cogens and universal jurisdiction or the rules of immunity in the national legislations of 
States.283  
There are three main difficulties with the concept of jus cogens; first, how jus cogens 
are created (ie their source in international law); secondly, their content (outside the few norms 
which are generally accepted as jus cogens284); and finally, the indeterminacy over the legal 
consequences of jus cogens outside the realm of treaty law.285 The difficulties associated with 
jus cogens stem from the fact that there is no legal method or tool associated with the 
identification of jus cogens. It is not even clear whether the legitimacy of the norms is a 
sufficient or necessary factor of a rule to be accepted as jus cogens. 
Due to the inability to determine the process of their creation or source in international 
law, and the inability to determine their legal consequences outside the law of treaties, this 
study is instead primarily focused on the legal consequences of international crimes under 
customary law. Even if one accepts a rule has achieved the status of jus cogens (eg genocide), 
the difficulty remains in identifying the interaction of jus cogens rules with other rules of 
international law such as immunities. Thus, one has to determine whether immunities are 
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perceived as legitimate or are purely based on the accumulation of the self-interests of States 
if this is the factor for the identification of jus cogens. To do that, one has to resort to non-legal 
considerations and take into account factors of legitimacy to determine their level of 
internalisation by States. This should be regarded, in the sense that legitimacy itself is not a 
black or white concept, and that norms enjoy different degrees of legitimacy.286  
3.6. Can Rules of Customary Law Give Rise to Erga Omnes Obligations 
It is argued that at least some rules of customary law, including international crimes 
under customary international law, give rise to obligations erga omnes on the basis of three 
main factors: first, that obligations erga omnes are owed to the international community as a 
whole; secondly, that all States have a legal and non-legal interest in their protection; and 
thirdly that there is consensus with regard to their existence. 
The first condition is that all States must have a legal interest287 in their protection. The 
ICJ in Barcelona Traction stated that ‘in the view of the importance of these rights all States 
can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes’.288 As 
discussed, all rules of customary law enshrine community interests either based on the 
accumulation of States’ self-interests or based on the legitimacy of the norm. This chapter 
illustrated how crimes are generated in customary international law, but the section on 
international crimes did not consider whether international crimes are based on the legitimacy 
or the accumulation of States’ self-interests. 
The second condition is that obligations erga omnes are not necessarily bilateral in 
character but are obligations, which may or may not cause injury to another State and are owed 
to the international community as a whole. The ICTY has asserted that ‘the violation of such 
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an obligation simultaneously constitutes a breach of the correlative right of all members of the 
international community and gives rise to a claim for compliance accruing to each and every 
member, which then has the right to insist on fulfilment of the obligation or in any case to call 
for the breach to be discontinued’.289  
According to this condition, an obligation under treaty or customary law could have the 
character of erga omnes obligations. An obligation of this sort under a treaty was alluded to by 
the ICJ in Belgium v Senegal. The ICJ referred to such obligations as erga omnes partes 
obligations as common interests, ‘in the sense that each State party [to the Torture Convention] 
has an interest in compliance with them in any given case’.290 The ICJ also stated that ‘any 
State party to the Convention may invoke the responsibility of another State party with a view 
to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes’, such as 
those under the Torture Convention.291 The ICJ's judgment could be read as follows: whilst the 
non-performance of certain treaty obligations may not necessarily negatively impact another 
State or other States under the treaty, any State under that treaty can invoke State responsibility 
of the State in breach of its obligations. Obligations erga omnes are owed to all of the members 
of the international community, as opposed to obligations under international law, which only 
create a right for the injured State to seek reparation. 
An obligation which gives rise to erga omnes obligations could also have a bilateral 
character, for instance, with regard to a State which commits genocide292 in the territory of 
another State. However, the example of the commission of the use of force293 as an obligation 
erga omnes suggests that the latter should not necessarily be only of a multilateral character, 
                                                 
289 Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija (n 54) [151]. 
290 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (n 191) 
[68]. 
291 ibid 69. 
292 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v Spain) (n 210) [34]; Ragazzi (n 
26) 93–103. 
293 Ragazzi (n 26) 75–91. 
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but that a dimension of multilateralism is sufficient to make the obligation erga omnes.  
The multilateralist character of (some) international rules is also alluded to in Article 2 
of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which notes 
that there is an internationally wrongful act if an act or an omission is attributable to the State 
under international law and constitutes a breach of an international obligation.294 It has been 
argued that Article 2 ‘departs from classical notions of State responsibility by relying almost 
exclusively on the consistency of the State’s conduct with its international obligations without 
regard to damage to other States or to fault’.295 The ICJ has in several cases recognised that 
some wrongful acts engage the responsibility of the State towards several or many States or 
towards the international community as a whole.296 The ILC, in its commentary to the Draft 
Articles, also recognised a broader conception of international responsibility, which was not 
limited to the bilateral responsibility of States.297  
The fact that erga omnes obligations can give rise to obligations owed to the 
international community as a whole and generate a right for non-injured States suggests that 
these norms have a stronger claim to legitimacy than those purely based on self-interests (ie 
they have a multilateral dimension). In other words, these are norms which have been 
internalised to the third degree by most States. It has already been argued that rules of 
customary law can be based either on the accumulation of States’ self-interests or on 
legitimacy. Due to the fact that erga omnes obligations introduce a legal criterion which is 
                                                 
294 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001) 
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capable of ascertaining legitimate norms, and the fact that international crimes also have a 
multilateral dimension, it could be argued that international crimes give rise to erga omnes 
obligations. The criterion of possessing a multilateral dimension is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition for ascertaining the legitimacy of the norms. This is on the basis that, in 
international law, it is difficult to justify the legal status of international crimes based on self-
interests, especially when this relates to acts committed by a foreign State or its officials in its 
own territory on its own nationals. 
It could be argued that customary rules determine the content of norms, which can be 
exercised against any State if a State is found in violation of them based on obligations erga 
omnes. It has been asserted that obligations erga omnes pertain to the legal implications arising 
out of a certain crime's characterisation as jus cogens298 or rules of customary law.299 Meron 
has posited that the same principle should apply to customary rules (ie they too could create an 
obligation owed to the international community), but acknowledges that the doctrine in this 
respect has moved ahead of practice.300  
The idea that customary rules give rise to erga omnes obligations is not unanimous 
among scholars. However, within the category of rules of customary law, which give rise to 
obligations erga omnes, there has been some agreement on fundamental customary 
international law or general international law, which gives rise to international crimes in light 
of the perceived community interests they protect.301 Meron postulated that, in Barcelona 
Traction, the ICJ ‘may have intended to bestow erga omnes character on rights which have 
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matured into customary law (general international law) or have been incorporated into 
universal or quasi-universal instruments’.302  
Moreover, the ICJ in Belgium v Senegal contended that the relevant provisions of the 
Torture Convention are similar to those of the Genocide Convention.303 As States are under no 
obligation to extradite or prosecute based on universal jurisdiction under the Genocide 
Convention and the fact that Belgium v Senegal involved the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
by Belgium, the ICJ’s reference to the Genocide Convention, it could be interpreted as crimes 
under customary law, which give rise to obligations erga omnes.304 Thus, it could be argued 
that the obligations not to commit and punish genocide/torture are, under the relevant treaties, 
obligations erga omnes partes,305 and in customary law are obligations erga omnes and are 
owed to the international community as a whole, as most States have promulgated laws in 
respect of these international crimes. The ICJ emphasised that the negative impact of a breach 
on other States was non-essential and stated that if ‘a special interest were required for that 
purpose, in many cases no State would be in the position to make such a claim’.306 Thus, if 
obligations of that nature can be promulgated in a treaty, there is no legal reason to suggest that 
they cannot develop in customary law.  
This chapter has argued that international crimes create dual responsibility for States 
and individuals in customary law, and that the responsibility of States in customary law is the 
prevention and prosecution of international crimes. It was not argued that States have, under 
customary law, an obligation to prosecute or extradite. However, these obligations are similar 
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in nature based on their emphasis on the interests, which they protect and the non-requirement 
of an injured State to give rise to State responsibility. Moreover, in Belgium v Senegal the 
violation of the erga omnes obligation to prosecute or extradite did give rise to a direct right to 
Belgium which could be adjudicated on the basis of the Torture Convention through referral 
of the dispute between the parties to the ICJ.307 It is not contended that violation of erga omnes 
obligations give rise to a right owed to all non-injured States which could automatically be 
subject to adjudication in international or national courts, regardless of their procedural rules. 
This, however, does not negate the fact that this right, which emanates from a violation of erga 
omnes obligations, cannot be subject to enforcement or adjudication through other venues that 
do not require consent of the parties, as required by the ICJ procedural rules for example.308 
The Democratic Republic of Congo v Rwanda309 and East Timor310 have been cited to 
support the assertion that the erga omnes character of a norm is not sufficient basis to provide 
a direct right against the offending State.311 These cases are generally cited to rebut the claim 
that erga omnes can give rise to a direct claim by non-injured States. The recognition of a norm 
as erga omnes, for instance, in the East Timor case did not lead the ICJ to ignore the rules on 
the ICJ’s jurisdiction, which require the consent of the parties. The ICJ’s stance on erga omnes 
is not necessarily in contradiction with the obligations that certain norms of international law 
(eg genocide, slavery and apartheid312) may create towards the international community as a 
whole. It must be noted that these two cases related to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and cannot be 
used as evidence that a rule of customary law cannot give rise to a right for a non-injured State. 
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States can limit or delimit the jurisdiction of their courts and international courts by their 
constitutions and laws and intra-State jurisdictional regimes respectively. Existence of such a 
right in international law does not necessarily (automatically) translate into a right under 
domestic legal systems or the jurisdictional regimes of international courts.  
It must also be mentioned that the ICJ held that States had a duty of non-recognition of 
erga omnes violations in Namibia – the ICJ held that the illegality of the situation was an 
obligation erga omnes and could not be recognised as lawful even by States that are not 
members of the UN.313 In addition the ILC suggested that States had a duty of non-recognition 
of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait314. More importantly, the ICJ in Belgium v Senegal held that 
genocide could give rise to obligations erga omnes. Based on these examples and the 
discussion in Chapter 1, the following characteristics could be argued to belong to erga omnes 
obligations. First, there may be rights for States (not automatically enforceable); secondly, they 
may create obligations for third States; and thirdly, obligations erga omnes can arise from rules 
of customary international law; and, finally erga omnes obligations arise because of the 
multilateralist dimension inherent in some rules. For instance, the ICJ in Barcelona Traction 
stated that diplomatic immunities were not obligations erga omnes, justified on the basis that, 
in an event of a breach of diplomatic immunities, there will be an injured State and that State 
could reciprocate; further, the duty of non-recognition by third States does not arise due to 
factual circumstances.315 In other words, it lacks a multilateralist dimension. 
However, the aspect of whether erga omnes obligations could create obligations for 
third States has also been criticised. For instance, Judge Kooijmans in Legal Consequences of 
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the Construction of the Wall stated that he had ‘considerable difficulty in understanding why a 
violation of an obligation of erga omnes should necessarily lead to an obligation by third 
States’.316 Having said that, Judge Higgins, in the same case, stated that in Nicaragua the ICJ 
had also emphasised that when ‘a binding determination [was] made by a competent organ of 
the United Nations to the effect that a situation is illegal cannot remain without 
consequences’.317 This assertion is also in line with the ILC's commentary in 1982 to the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, in which it was suggested that the duty of non-recognition is 
engendered when a competent UN organ representing the international community as a whole 
recognises that an international crime has been committed.318 Moreover, it was also suggested 
that States may have a right to adopt measures amounting to non-recognition, ‘at least pending 
a decision of the competent [United Nations] organ’.319  
On the basis of the explanations above, one could propose that rules of customary 
international law, which have a dimension of multilateralism (ie the absence of injury), can 
give rise to erga omnes obligations and generate rights for non-injured States. A breach of erga 
omnes obligations creates a right owed to a non-injured State. In terms of international crimes 
that create a dual responsibility for States and individuals, violation of erga omnes obligations 
gives rise to a right by foreign States to exercise universal jurisdiction over the offender.  
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4. Conclusion 
This chapter argued that customary international law could be created on the basis of 
binding usus alone when there is consensus in the international community (Sections 2.1-2), 
which includes treaties and resolutions of international organisation (Section 2.4). This is on 
the basis that the desires or beliefs of States could only be portrayed in the form of actions and 
that distinguishing between belief and action becomes a circular task by inferring one from the 
other (Section 2.1). It was argued that both binding usus and individual rules of customary 
international law are determined through the discursive practices prevalent in the international 
community through consensus (Section 2.1). It was also argued that, since custom is based on 
a form of action (whether as opinio juris or State practice), it will comprise the interests of the 
international community (whether these are norms which are based on the self-interest of States 
or norms which are perceived as legitimate) (Sections 2.1 and 2.3). Thus, on the basis of 
constructivism, customary rules could be categorised in two ways: those rules which have been 
internalised by States only to the second degree (based on self-interests); or those rules which 
have been fully internalised by States (ie perceived as legitimate) (Sections 2.3 and 2.5). 
This chapter contended that international crimes could be created by treaties or 
resolutions of international organisations when there is consensus regarding the responsibility 
of the State to criminalise and prevent such acts in its territory and the responsibility of 
individuals (Sections 2.4 and 3.3). This chapter argued that international crimes not only 
include the so-called “core crimes” but also include terrorism, hijacking, kidnapping and other 
crimes under the conventions which have received near unanimous recognition by States and 
establish dual responsibility for States and individuals (Section 3.3). It was argued that 
recognition of crimes based on their status in international law as customary rules provided a 
better alternative to subjecting international crimes on the basis of non-legal considerations, 
such as their gravity or their prosecution in international courts (Section 3.3). 
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It was proposed that the gravity of an act and the prosecution of crimes in international 
courts could, however expedite the process of their institutionalisation in international law and 
internalisation by States that have not internalised these norms (Section 3.3). Although the 
gravity of an offence may propel actors to internalise a crime more rapidly on the basis of its 
perceived higher legitimacy, this does not affect the legal consequences of that crime vis-à-vis 
other crimes under customary international law which do not enjoy the same gravity (Section 
3.3). It is the status of these crimes in international law as customary rules which should be 
taken into account, rather than the factors shaping their creation in the social structure of the 
State system (ie their internalisation and their institutionalisation in international law) (Section 
3.3). 
International crimes giving rise to the dual responsibility of States and individuals may 
be created under customary law if most States become signatories to a treaty which obliges 
States to prevent the commission of an act and prosecutes the alleged offenders and that these 
obligations are followed by State practice (Section 3.4). In this respect, domestic 
criminalisation of the proscribed conducts, internal institutions and practices of States which 
prevent the commission of the crimes and the irrelevance of national amnesties granted to the 
alleged offenders were considered to be relevant State practice for the customary status of 
crimes giving rise to the dual responsibility of States and individuals. The conventions, 
enumerated in the Appendix, which oblige States to prevent and prosecute, and the 
criminalisation of the prohibited conducts in the domestic laws of States provide a strong claim 
to the customary status of these crimes. Furthermore, while the crime of aggression might not 
have achieved the status of customary law, there is stronger support for the customary status 
of enforced disappearance, apartheid and crimes against humanity (Section 3.4). 
It was also argued that although jus cogens have a strong claim for the 
institutionalisation of fully internalised norms in international law, the reliance on the jus 
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cogens concept is not without difficulty, given it is based on an indeterminate source and that 
there is a lack of consensus on its content (Section 3.5). It was argued that some customary 
rules could give rise to obligations erga omnes, which include international crimes due to their 
multilateral dimension; in other words, States could infringe them without causing injury to 
any other State (Section 3.6). This chapter also argued that a breach of an obligation erga omnes 
gives rise to at least a right for non-injured States against the offending State. This could 
translate to a right to exercise universal jurisdiction by a non-injured State (which is based on 
the analogy from the ICJ's judgment in Belgium v Senegal) (Section 3.6). The universal 
jurisdiction aspect of this right is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
 123 
Chapter Three: Universal Jurisdiction and International Crimes 
1. Introduction 
This chapter puts forward the case that the interpretation of international law which 
holds that States are permitted to do anything that unless prohibited by international law 
(Chapter 2 Section 3.2) similarly applies to customary international law including the rules on 
the exercise of jurisdiction. Its application to rules of jurisdiction would imply that States are 
permitted to exercise any form of jurisdiction unless prohibited by international law (eg rules 
of non-intervention and immunity) (Section 2.1). The prohibitive rules are not only prohibitive 
rules specifically targeting rules of jurisdiction but other prohibitive rules in international law, 
including the duty of non-intervention and the rules on immunity. Moreover, the prohibitive 
rules of international law apply to prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction 
individually (Section 2.1-2). From this perspective, the role of traditional bases of jurisdiction 
can be balancing the rights of the States involved and preventing the violation of the duty of 
non-intervention (Section 2.2).  
Chapter 2 argued that violations of erga omnes obligations, which include crimes under 
customary law that represent the interests of the international community, ie legitimate norms 
due to their multilateral dimension, create a right for non-injured States (Section 3.5).  
It is contended that States are entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction subject to certain 
conditions in respect of violations of erga omnes obligations. Any right for States arising from 
the violations of erga omnes obligations is not an unrestricted right and should be considered 
in the context of other relevant rules of international law. The claim that States are permitted 
to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes should be subject to balancing the 
rights of the States involved to avoid the infringement of prohibited rules under international 
law (Sections 2 and 3). In other words, the right for non-injured States arising from the 
violations of erga omnes obligations may justify the exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
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avoiding the breach of the duty of non-intervention. Any exercise of universal jurisdiction even 
if a State loses its claim of non-intervention is still subject to other prohibitive rules in 
international law, -ie immunity of officials. 
Accordingly, it is contended that a State with a closer link to the crime loses its claim 
to non-intervention if it fails to prevent the crime or prosecute the offenders (Section 3). The 
duty of non-intervention is not breached if certain conditions are met (Sections 3.2 and Section 
4). The community interests rationale supports the right of non-injured States to exercise 
jurisdiction by legitimising what would otherwise amount to the violation of the duty of non-
intervention (Section 3.5). 
It is necessary to examine the conditions that may accompany the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction to prevent the breach of the duty of non-intervention under international law. The 
conditions include whether States are allowed to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia, 
issuance of arrest warrants and carry out investigations. Further, this chapter evaluates the right 
of States to exercise universal civil jurisdiction based on the community interests and the duty 
of non-intervention, while acknowledging that State practice does not support the exercise of 
universal civil jurisdiction (Section 3). Finally, this chapter evaluates the criticisms against the 
right of States to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
2. Jurisdiction in International Law 
2.1. The Prohibitive Approach  
Chapter 2 argued that States are permitted to do anything unless prohibited by 
international law (Section 3.2) and that this principle also applies to rules of jurisdiction. 
However, this chapter also provides a justification for the traditional bases of jurisdiction. The 
understanding of how the rules of jurisdiction operate and what their basis are in international 
law is important in determining whether States can exercise universal jurisdiction on the basis 
of violations of erga omnes obligations. 
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There two approaches to the rules of jurisdiction: a permissive approach, which tends 
to look for a specific rule of international law entitling a State to act and a prohibitive approach, 
which looks for a specific rule prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction by a State.1 It seems 
contrary to the logic of foreign relations for a State to be entitled to initiate a criminal 
proceeding against any foreigner, irrespective of any restraint.2 Judge Fitzmaurice in Barcelona 
Traction noted that,  
‘international law does not impose hard and fast rules on States delimiting 
spheres of national jurisdiction but leaves to States a wide discretion in that 
matter… It does, however, (a) postulate the existence of limits whereupon, in 
any given case, it may be for the tribunal to indicate what these are… and (b) 
there is an obligation on States to exercise moderation and restraint as to the 
extent of the jurisdiction assumed by their courts in cases having a foreign 
element.3 
 
In other words, there is agreement that States’ powers to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over foreigners for acts committed abroad is limited to certain conditions but that there is 
disagreement over what the restraining conditions are.  
Scholars and authoritative sources are divided over the application of the judgment of 
the PCIJ in Lotus4 to the rule of universal jurisdiction in respect of international crimes. 
According to a broad interpretation of Lotus States are allowed to regulate their jurisdictional 
rules unless expressly prohibited by international law. Applying a prohibitive approach to the 
rules of jurisdiction, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, in their Joint Separate 
Opinion in Arrest Warrant, proposed that international law entitled States to exercise universal 
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 126 
jurisdiction in absentia over international crimes.5 Likewise, Judge Wyngaert asserted that 
‘there is no prohibition under international law to enact legislation allowing it to investigate 
and prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity committed abroad’.6 In a similar 
fashion, some commentators relying on the PCIJ’s judgment have concluded that in the absence 
of a prohibitive rule of international law restricting the exercise of jurisdiction by States, States 
could exercise universal jurisdiction over certain crimes.7   
From this perspective, State sovereignty precedes international law, and States are 
vested with a natural liberty and limitations on the jurisdiction of States are always self-
imposed and can be lifted at any time.8 Hence, a broad interpretation of the PCIJ’s judgment 
pays ‘only marginal attention, to the sovereignty or independence of another State that might 
possibly be encroached upon by the assertions of the regulating State’9.  
The proponents of a broad interpretation of the PCIJ's dictum tend to look for a specific 
rule prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction and do not pay attention to other prohibitive rules 
under international law (eg the duty of non-intervention or rules of immunity). This 
understanding of Lotus is inconsistent with the general approach to customary international 
law as discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 3.2) and does not include the prohibitive rules of 
international law such as the duty of non-intervention and rules on immunity. In this respect, 
the prohibitive approach is even inconsistent with the PCIJ's approach in Lotus and the ICJ’s 
approach to customary law in the Nicaragua, Nuclear Weapons, and Kosovo cases. The 
interpretation that the limits on States should include other prohibitive rules such as non-
intervention and immunities is in line with the general approach to customary international law 
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7 Claus Kreß, ‘Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut De Droit 
International’ (2006) 4 JICJ 561, 565. 
8 Reydams (n 1) 13. 
9 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (OUP 2008) 25. 
 127 
(Chapter 2). 
The PCIJ in Lotus held that ‘international law leaves States a wide discretion which is 
only limited by prohibitive rules’10 and that ‘a State can only be required not to overstep the 
limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction but within these limits, a State’s title 
to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty’.11 The PCIJ explicitly referred to the limits 
imposed on a State by international law. Accordingly, the limits imposed by international law 
were not the limits that international law directly imposed by restricting the rules of 
jurisdiction.  
The PCIJ also confirmed that international law does not prohibit ‘a State from 
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which 
have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international 
law’.12 The PCIJ also asserted that territorial criminal law was not an absolute principle of 
international law and did not coincide with territorial sovereignty.13 That is to say, that there 
could be cases where a State could exercise jurisdiction over acts committed abroad while not 
infringing its duty of non-intervention in the affairs of other States (eg on the basis of passive 
personality). This reading justifies the exercise of jurisdiction over acts committed abroad in 
the absence of a prohibitive rule (the duty of non-intervention).  
The general prohibitive rules in customary international law, which are also related to 
the rules on jurisdiction, are the customary law principles of non-intervention and the 
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sovereignty of States14, and also rules of immunity.15 The rules of jurisdiction should also give 
weight to the customary law principles of non-intervention and sovereign equality of States.16 
The ICJ in Nicaragua emphasised that the customary status of the duty of non-intervention is 
based on the expression of opinio juris of States, which has been reflected in numerous 
declarations and resolutions adopted by international organisations and backed by substantial 
State practice.17  
The ICJ affirmed that every State has the right to conduct its affairs without outside 
interference, which includes respect for the political integrity of other States and adhering to 
the duty of non-intervention by refraining from direct or indirect interference in the internal 
and external affairs of other States.18 The ICJ only defined the aspects of the principle of non-
intervention which were relevant in Nicaragua19 (eg financial support, training insurgents) and 
indicated that coercion or the use of force infringe the duty of non-intervention.20 Apart from 
the use of force and the enforcement of a State’s rule in the territory of another State,21 the 
extent of the principle of non-intervention is not clear.22 
The international relations costs incurred by a State because of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction is different from the duty of non-intervention under international law.23 It is the 
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24 April 1964) 500 UNTS 95 art 41; Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) (Judgment) 
[1949] ICJ Rep 9 [35]; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
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18 ibid 202. 
19 ibid 205. 
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duty of non-intervention under international law which determines the legality of the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction rather than the subjective perspective of the State whose rights are 
being affected as a result of a proceeding based on universal jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
assessment of any disruption in the foreign relation of the two State concerned should take into 
account that a subjective understanding of the duty of non-intervention does not necessarily 
entail the violation of that duty.  
In other words, a proceeding based on the exercise of universal jurisdiction by a State, 
which may even lead to the deterioration of bilateral relations between the States concerned, 
cannot necessarily be considered as an infringement of the duty of non-intervention. That said, 
the degree of disruption in foreign relations caused as a result of an action of a foreign State 
may have an impact on the shared understanding of States on the kinds of actions that constitute 
a breach of the duty of non-intervention under international law.  
Moreover, a broad interpretation of the Lotus judgment or the approach which aims to 
find a prohibitive rule does not generally apply the prohibitive rules of international law to 
different forms of jurisdiction. A State exercises its jurisdiction by establishing rules 
(prescriptive), by establishing procedures for identifying breaches of the rules and the precise 
consequences thereof (adjudicative), and by forcibly imposing consequences such as the loss 
of liberty or property for breaches or, pending adjudication, alleged breaches of the rules 
(enforcement).24 Even when there is legislative jurisdiction, an attempt to exercise enforcement 
or adjudicative jurisdiction in the territory of a foreign State raises issues of consent of the latter 
State.25 Furthermore, ‘adjudicative’ jurisdiction is not ‘confined to the activity of courts but 
                                                 
24 ‘Jurisdiction of States’ s 3.4 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1436> 
accessed 30 June 2015; Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Universality Principle and War Crimes’ (1998) 71 Intl 
LStudSerUS Naval War Coll 17, 30–2; Roger O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Clarifying the Basic 
Concept’ (2004) 2 JICJ 735, 737. 
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extends to that of the prosecutorial authorities of a given State’.26  
Although the enforcement of a rule is also subject to the prohibitive rules of 
international law, the PCIJ's dictum did not infer that the prohibitive rules of international law 
only related to enforcement jurisdiction. Accordingly, without any authority in international 
law in this regard, one cannot conclude that prohibitive rules (eg duty of non-intervention) do 
not apply to prescriptive or adjudicative rules of jurisdiction. 
From this perspective, a State's right under international law to exercise prescriptive, 
adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction are all individually subject to the prohibitive rules of 
international law. The level of non-intervention in the affairs of other States could be different 
depending on the form of the exercise of jurisdiction. The application of any one prohibitive 
rule (eg non-intervention and immunity) to the three forms of the rules of jurisdiction (eg 
adjudicative and enforcement) would not necessarily be the same. For instance, a State may 
have prescriptive jurisdiction over an offence committed abroad but may not have adjudicative 
jurisdiction (trial) because of a prohibitive rule, such as the personal immunity of an official.  
The broad interpretation of the PCIJ's judgment can only give effect to the prohibitive 
rule of non-intervention and only in a very limited sense. On that basis, the duty of non-
intervention is only applicable to the rule of enforcement jurisdiction of one State in the 
territory of another State. However, intervention may not only occur in this form and could 
include other acts which can be carried out outside the territory of a State (eg freezing the assets 
of a State). More importantly, the broader problem with this interpretation is the non-
application of the rule of non-intervention and other prohibitive rules of international law to 
adjudicative and prescriptive rules of jurisdictions. 
The facts of PCIJ’s judgment also support the contention made here since both Turkey 
and France had jurisdiction (on different grounds), but only Turkey could legitimately exercise 
                                                 
26 Kreß (n 7) 16. 
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its jurisdiction on the basis that the French ship had docked in Turkish territory after the 
incident. Furthermore, Turkey’s claim was reinforced by the principle of passive personality, 
ie the victims of the incident held Turkish nationality. The duty of non-intervention in the 
affairs of France (as its nationals were prosecuted) could be justified on the basis that the 
victims of the incident were Turkish, thus creating a legal right for Turkey to exercise 
jurisdiction without infringing the duty of non-proliferation. 
Furthermore, the broad interpretation of the PCIJ's dictum fails to distinguish between 
the availability of universal jurisdiction to international crimes vis-à-vis other crimes, which 
are recognised under the domestic laws of States, such as murder. Lee asserts that much of 
domestic criminal law is based on the same values; for instance, he argues that the prohibition 
against murder is equally universal.27 Thus, according to this broad interpretation, any State is 
allowed to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia in respect of any act.  
2.2. Permissive Approach 
The historical development of the rules of jurisdiction suggests a ‘careful regard for the 
necessity of specifying circumstances in which jurisdiction may be exercised’, and even today, 
the overwhelming view of States is that jurisdiction is restricted to avoid infringing the 
sovereignty of other States.28 From this perspective, ‘sovereignty is a quality allocated to 
certain entities by international law’ whereby ‘the legal order pre-exists the sovereignty of the 
State and remains in their control thereof’.29 Therefore ‘a State will always have to show a 
specific rule of international law entitling it to act or at least the absence of a prohibiting rule’.30 
According to the permissive principle, ‘an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction requires a 
                                                 
27 Win-Chiat Lee, ‘International Crimes and Universal Jurisdiction’ in Zachary Hoskins and 
Larry May (eds), International Criminal Law and Philosophy (CUP 2010) 26. 
28 AR Carnegie, ‘Jurisdiction Over Violations of Laws and Customs of War’ (1963) 39 BYBIL 
402, 403–4. 
29 ibid 13–4. 
30 Reydams (n 1) 13–14; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of 
International Legal Argument (CUP 2005) 196–200. 
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justifying principle, whether nationality, the requirements of security, or the universality 
principle, as in piracy'.31 
Accordingly, the prohibitive approach emphasises the sovereignty of the forum State 
and the permissive approach emphasises the sovereignty of the State or States whose nationals 
may be subject to the jurisdiction of other States.32 However, neither explanation can fully 
explain the rules of jurisdiction in international law and a compromise between the two is 
proposed here.  
The theory, which requires a permissive rule, is also not without difficulty, as it places 
the rules of jurisdiction in a different category vis-à-vis other rules of customary law. In other 
words, it does not provide a justification why a permissive rule is required for the exercise of 
jurisdiction by States in customary law; yet other actions of States are governed by the general 
rule, which provides that States are allowed to do anything unless prohibited (Chapter 2). 
Nevertheless, the traditional bases of jurisdiction could be viewed as rules which strike 
a balance between the rights of the forum State to exercise jurisdiction and the right of other 
States not to be subject to interference in their affairs or other rights which such States or their 
officials may enjoy under international law, such as immunities33. In this context, the four types 
of jurisdiction can be viewed as the distribution of established interests that determine which 
State has a stronger jurisdictional claim over the offence and the accused34 and inherently aim 
to prevent the breach of the duty of non-intervention. The traditional bases of jurisdiction 
contain the competing rights of the States involved, as they both enable and at the same time 
impose limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction.35   
                                                 
31 Robert Yewdall Jennings, General Course on Principles of International Law (Brill Nijhoff 
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Defined Crimes’ (2004) 36 GeoJIntl L 537, 541; Ryngaert (n 9) 8. 
35 Reydams (n 1) 23–24. 
 133 
The traditional bases of jurisdiction cannot always provide a clear-cut hierarchy 
between the claims of various States regarding a claim of jurisdiction over the offence or the 
accused.36 Since, the traditional bases of jurisdiction do not necessarily determine the outcome 
of rules of jurisdiction alone, other (prohibitive) rules of international law should still be 
considered to give proper weight to the legal claims of the States involved.  
From this perspective, the traditional bases of jurisdiction are rules regulating the 
jurisdiction of States by taking into account the sovereignty of the States involved. They are 
the result of the balancing exercise by taking into account the sovereignty of the States 
involved. The links (nationality, territoriality, etc) inherent in the traditional rules of 
jurisdiction allow States to have a stronger claim regarding the non-infringement of the duty 
of non-intervention. Hence, consistent with the interpretation of the sovereignty of States 
involved and the general approach to customary international law, one can argue that the right 
to exercise jurisdiction is dependent on the non-infringement of the prohibitive rules of 
international law. As discussed, the prohibitive rules need not specifically be limitations on the 
jurisdiction of States. 
The rules of jurisdiction in international law, properly read, should give effect not only 
to the rights of the forum State to exercise jurisdiction but also to the rights of other States 
affected as the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum States. This is the balance 
between the right of one State to exercise its jurisdiction and the prohibitive rules of 
international law (the duty of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States and rules 
of immunity). The correct balance between the rights of the States involved by applying the 
prohibitive rules of international law dictates the conditions attached to any form of exercise 
of jurisdiction by States, ie whether States are permitted to exercise universal adjudicative 
                                                 
36 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives 
and Contemporary Practice’ (2001) 42 VaJInt’l L 81, 83 see the example of Lockerbie. 
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jurisdiction in absentia over international crimes. 
3. Erga Omnes Obligations and Universal Jurisdiction 
3.1. Introduction 
Universal jurisdiction is ‘the authority of the State to punish certain crimes wherever 
and by whom committed’37 and has been described as ‘a principle, allowing jurisdiction over 
acts of non-nationals where the nature of the crime justifies the repression of some types of 
crime as a matter of international public policy’.38 Universal jurisdiction is thus usually defined 
‘negatively as grounds of jurisdiction which does not require any link or nexus with the elected 
forum’.39 In other words, it is the ‘absence of a link between the crime and the prosecuting 
State that has captured the essence of universal jurisdiction’.40 
Legal authorities are divided over the offences which give rise to universal jurisdiction. 
There only seems to be a consensus around a few international crimes such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, slavery, and piracy, which are also generally accepted as jus 
cogens.41 
Jus cogens status of crimes is generally associated with the right of States to exercise 
universal jurisdiction, but, at the same time, there are conventions which also provide for 
universal jurisdiction for crimes such as hijacking and hostage-taking. In the case of the latter, 
however, the status of these crimes as jus cogens is disputed and the justification for universal 
jurisdiction for these crimes, instead, is based on their customary law status or the fact that 
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these crimes are only limited to conventional law.42  
Chapter 2 noted that, due to problems with the identification of the source of jus cogens, 
there is inevitably disagreement over the norms which have reached the status of jus cogens. 
The reliance on jus cogens as a legal concept enabling States to exercise universal jurisdiction 
has fallen short of providing a persuasive legal justification for crimes of genocide vis-à-vis 
terrorism or hijacking for the same legal consequence, ie universal jurisdiction.  
Adoption of the “core crimes” approach as the method for inference of universal 
jurisdiction gives rise to the same issue, whereby, in this case, even the status of torture as a 
crime which could give rise to universal jurisdiction would be disputed.43 Chapter 2 
nevertheless suggested that factors such as the gravity of the offence or prosecution of offences 
in international tribunals could, however, lead to rapid internalisation of these norms by States 
and thus propel their customary status. Relying on factors such as the gravity of the offence 
will inevitably lead to the categorisation of international crimes sometimes on non-legal 
considerations (core crimes). Similarly, as in the case of jus cogens, relying on such factors 
lead to relying on different legal rationales to justify the same legal consequence, ie universal 
jurisdiction, for different crimes. 
Instead, the status of crimes in customary law should be the basis of the categorisation 
of international crimes which represent the interests of the international community. The 
factors relevant in the identification of crimes in customary law are the responsibility of States 
to prevent the commission of crimes and prosecute the alleged offenders and the responsibility 
of individuals not to commit such acts. This thesis has also argued that offences which give 
rise to the dual responsibility of States and individuals in customary law give rise to erga omnes 
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obligations. Violations of erga omnes obligations create a right for non-injured States (Chapter 
2). 
If States are found in violation of crimes giving rise to the dual responsibility of States 
and individuals and are unwilling or unable to prosecute the perpetrators, then other States can 
act as a trustee for the international community to prosecute the offenders based on the interests 
that these norms protect. Accordingly, States are entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction 
because of the values these norms protect and their multilateral dimension. These two factors 
were identified to ascertain the customary rules which give rise to erga omnes obligations. On 
the basis that international crimes fulfil both criteria, ie due to their multilateral dimension and 
interests they protect, it was proposed that they are customary rules which give rise to erga 
omnes obligations. 
There are two arguments against the right of States to exercise universal jurisdiction on 
the basis of violations of erga omnes. First, it is generally believed that only jus cogens can 
give rise to erga omnes obligations hence arguments based on erga omnes obligations cannot 
explain the right of States to exercise universal jurisdiction in respect of crimes of hostage-
taking or hijackings in international law.44 Chapter 2 demonstrated that although the concepts 
of jus cogens and erga omnes are both associated with the rules which have been internalised 
by States to the third degree (legitimate norms), some customary rules which have also been 
internalised by States to the third degree may also give rise to erga omnes obligations. That 
argument undermined the assumption that only jus cogens can give rise to erga omnes 
obligations. 
 Secondly, the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States is sometimes associated with 
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the concept of hostis humani generis.45 The discussions in Chapter 2 on international crimes, 
community interests (third-degree internalisation) and erga omnes obligations contended that 
to understand the interests of the international community from a legal perspective one does 
not need to rely on concepts such as hostis humani generis or the gravity of the offence.  
That said, Bassiouni argues that there are two different approaches to the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction based on the notion of the international community and the interests 
adopted by the international community. First, the idealist position is based on core values 
(overriding international interests) accepted by the international community.46 Secondly, the 
policy-oriented approach recognises that certain commonly shared interests of the international 
community require an enforcement mechanism which transcends the interests of one State.47 
According to Bassiouni, the two positions disagree over the sources and interests which give 
rise to universal jurisdiction and over what constitutes the international community and its 
members, and the nature of the legal rights and obligations incumbent upon States.48  
As contended earlier, the moral or legitimate values as acknowledged by States can be 
derived from customary law. It was contended that not all customary rules give rise to 
community interests, which are internalised to the third-degree by States (ie are legitimate), 
and that some customary rules are based on the accumulation of States’ shared interests. That 
said, it was asserted that international crimes in customary law, due to their multilateral 
dimensions, give rise to obligations erga omnes as legitimate norms. This position does not 
rely on a metaphysical or a philosophical conception to carve out the interests of the 
international community.  
Moreover, a State-centric notion of the international community was adopted. The 
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interests of the international community should be objectively identifiable and be subjectively 
made by the States in the international community.49 The interests of the international 
community could be made by States through customary law, which could include both norms 
on the self-interests of States and norms which are also perceived as legitimate.  
While a State-centric notion of community was adopted, the role of individuals and 
other actors in the formation of States' interests and actions was emphasised in the socialisation 
processes. Hence, States were held to be central to the notion of the international community, 
and that the interests of the international community are not a set of predetermined criteria or 
natural principles. Moreover, the notion of the international community proposed here is 
different from the policy-oriented approach50 since this study, at least from a legal perspective, 
has situated the interests of the international community in the context of the rules of customary 
international law. 
The answer to the availability of universal jurisdiction in respect of acts which give rise 
to universal concern lies in the formation process of international law.51 It has already been 
proposed that crimes, which have developed in customary international law (ie give rise to dual 
responsibility), can give rise to obligations erga omnes and that international crimes not only 
represent the shared interests of States but are are based on the legitimacy of these norms. This 
chapter situates the right of States to exercise universal jurisdiction in the context of the rules 
of jurisdiction based on violations of erga omnes obligations and proposes that the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction on the basis of erga omnes obligations does not infringe the duty of non-
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intervention.  
States can exercise jurisdiction if it does not infringe the duty of non-intervention or 
other prohibitive rules under international law (Section 2). It is contended here that the dual 
responsibility of crimes, coupled with the exercise of universal jurisdiction based on certain 
conditions proposed here, ensures that the duty of non-intervention would not be breached. 
This is because the State with a closer link has failed to abide by its obligation under 
international law (ie to prevent the commission of crimes or prosecute offenders), thus 
undermining its claim of the breach of the duty of non-intervention, if its nationals are 
prosecuted by foreign States. 
3.2. Universal Jurisdiction and the Duty of Non-Intervention 
According to the interpretation proposed, the traditional bases of jurisdiction52 strike a 
balance between the right of the forum State to exercise jurisdiction and the right of other States 
and their nationals not to be subject to the jurisdiction of other States (Section 2). The exercise 
of jurisdiction may infringe the duty of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, 
while the traditional bases of jurisdiction seek to prevent the infringement of the duty of non-
intervention in the affairs of other States (Section 2).  
This section proposes that the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States based on 
violations of erga omnes obligations may not infringe the duty of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of other States. First, the duty of non-intervention should be read in light of the 
interests that these crimes enshrine. It is generally argued that States can exercise jurisdiction 
if they have legitimate interests which justify their interference in the affairs of the other State 
concerned.53 The arguments proposed by legal authorities in favour of universal jurisdiction 
                                                 
52 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 652–72; Restatement of the Law, 
Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (American Law Institute 1987) s 402. 
53 Kenneth C Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’ (1987) 66 TexLRev 
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are generally based on the notion of community interests,54 which overrides the right or interest 
of the State with a closer link.55 It has already been noted that international crimes represent 
the interests of the international community.56  
The Cairo-Arusha Principles assert that the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of States should be interpreted in light of the fact that it is ‘the well-established and 
generally accepted principle that gross human rights offences are of legitimate concern to the 
international community, and give rise to prosecution under the principle of universal 
jurisdiction’.57 
The common interests rationale is drawn from Kant’s writings of Perpetual Peace, in 
which he asserted that the “universal community” has developed to a point where a violation 
of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.58 Thus, the core basis of the common 
interest justification is in line with the assertions made in Chapter 1 of this thesis, in which it 
was argued that the third-degree internalisation reflects the interests of the States, which are 
also legitimate.59 
The common interests rationale ‘acknowledges that the conduct of those who perpetrate 
serious international crimes in one State has an impact on other States; such conduct poses a 
potential threat to all States and thus all States have an interest in prosecuting the wrongdoer’.60 
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Crimes under international law are directed against the interests of the international community 
as a whole and hence every State is entitled61 as a trustee of the international community (on a 
subsidiary basis) to prosecute and punish these crimes, regardless of who committed them and 
against whom they were committed.62 There is also support for this proposition that the 
common interests of States and universal jurisdiction are intertwined in national judgments63 
and other legal authorities.64 
Secondly, the duty of non-intervention should be viewed in the context that most States 
exercise prescriptive universal jurisdiction in respect of war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide and crimes under certain conventions which oblige States to criminalise and 
prosecute65 (Appendix). International courts have expressed views in support of the right of 
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States to exercise universal jurisdiction in relation to international crimes.66 For instance, the 
ICJ has found that Article VI of the Genocide Convention does not entail any territorial 
limitation of the respective obligation under international law to punish the crime of genocide,67 
thereby implicitly recognising that State may have a right to exercise universal jurisdiction in 
international law with respect to the crime of genocide. 
The ICTY has also held that ‘international crimes being universally condemned 
wherever they occur, every State has the right to prosecute and punish authors of such crimes’.68 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone in Lomé Accord Amnesty repeatedly referred to the right of 
States to exercise universal jurisdiction over international crimes in support of the claim for its 
own jurisdiction to exercise jurisdiction69.  
The right to exercise jurisdiction by international courts over international crimes is 
different from the right of States to exercise universal jurisdiction based on erga omnes 
violations. The right of the international tribunals to exercise jurisdiction over international 
crimes can be attributed to a mandate granted to these tribunals by the international 
community70 (eg resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter71). In the case of the 
ICC, States exercise their jurisdiction collectively through the tribunal72. Moreover, the 
violation of erga omnes obligations, ie the failure of the State to prevent and prosecute the 
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Amnesty, SCSL 2004 15 AR72 (E) p 1236 [67–70]. 
70 Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction) SCSL-
2003-01-I, App Ch (31 May 2004) [51]. 
71 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic A/K/A ‘Dule’ (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction) ICTY IT-94-1 (2 October 1995) [28–31]. 
72 Dapo Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Over Nationals of Non-
Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’ (2003) 1 JICJ 618, 621–22; Michael P Scharf, ‘The ICC’s Jurisdiction 
over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position’ (2001) 64 LCP 67, 98. 
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alleged offenders, which give rise to a right of States to exercise universal jurisdiction are not 
limited to crimes prosecuted only in international courts (Chapter 2, Sections 3.3-3.6). 
Regional institutions73 and courts74 have also held that States are entitled to exercise 
universal jurisdiction. Given that the exercise of universal jurisdiction on the basis of erga 
omnes violations is a right rather than duty, the low number of prosecutions by States on the 
basis of universal jurisdiction can be justified by the fact that States can select not to exercise 
this right75. 
Neither rules of customary law nor erga omnes obligations, which create only a right, 
support the claim that States are obliged to prosecute offenders on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction.76 There does not seem to be a consensus regarding the obligatory status of the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction in international law. Generally, government authorisation is 
                                                 
73 Council of Europe (Directorate of Legal Advice and Public International Law), ‘Observation 
on the Scope and Application of the Universal Criminal Jurisdiction in the Work of the Council of 
Europe’ (20 Sep 2012) s I; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Resolution on Trial for 
International Crimes’ (24 October 2003) Resolution No 1/03; African Union, ‘Decision on the Report 
of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’, Doc Assembly/AU/14(XI), 
2008 Sharm El-Sheik, Assembly/AU/ Dec 199 (XI) para 5 (i–iii); African Union Model National Law 
on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes, Executive Council Decision, EX.CL/731(XXI) c 
2001 art 4; African Union, ‘Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’, Doc 
EX.CL/731(XXI) Assembly/AU/Dec4 20(XIX) 2012; UNGA Sixth Committee (66th Session), 
‘Summary record of the 12th meeting’ (16 Nov 2011) A/C.6/66/SR.12 (Non-Aligned Movement’s 
[NAM] representing 120 States) endorsing the concept of universal jurisdiction but warning against its 
abuse specifically with respect to immunities of incumbent high-ranking officials; Jeßberger (n 62) 162, 
164; Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers Within the Courts of Senegal Created to Prosecute 
International Crimes Committed in Chad Between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1998 art 3, Jan 30, 
2013, 52 ILM 1028 (2013) the temporal jurisdiction of the Chambers extends beyond the obligations 
of Senegal under the Torture Convention since the crimes covered under the jurisdiction of the 
Chambers are between 1982-1990 (as the ICJ noted, Senegal was only obliged under the Torture 
Convention from 1987). 
74 Jorgic v Germany (ECtHR) (12 July 2007) 148 ILR 234 [67–9]; Ould Dah c France, Requête 
no 13113/03, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 17 March 2009 [15–6]. 
75 Antonio Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of 
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’ (1998) 9 EJIL 2, 5; Langer (n 43) 4; Eugene Kontorovich, 
‘The Inefficiency of Universal Jurisdiction Symposium: Public International Law and Economics’ 
(2008) 2008 UIllLRev 389, 396. 
76 Bassiouni initially favoured a duty to prosecute offenders on the basis of erga omnes 
obligations, however, in a later article Bassiouni articulated the application of universal jurisdiction in 
respect of jus cogens and international crimes; see the following articles for more detail: M Cherif 
Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes’ (1996) 59 LCP 63; 
Bassiouni (n 36) . 
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necessary for prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction; and there is a low number of 
prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction (although it is slowly increasing).77 
Additionally, due to practical difficulties associated with the exercise of universal jurisdiction, 
it is difficult to conceive how such a duty can develop in customary international law without 
first addressing the practical challenges related to the prosecutions based on universal 
jurisdiction (ie access to evidence and witnesses, etc).78 
Thirdly, certain safeguards can ensure that the exercise of universal jurisdiction would 
not become a political tool to endanger the political integrity of other States, such as increasing 
the procedural legitimacy of the exercise of universal jurisdiction. As the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction is based on community interests, and the State prosecuting the offender is acting 
as a trustee of the international community, the international community must have recognised 
the commission of that crime or crimes as a matter of fact. This prevents different allegations 
regarding the facts of the offence or offences that occurred in the territory of another State. 
States may present different claims about a situation; thus, a communal consensus in this regard 
is also necessary. 
Langer’s empirical research of the number of cases or complaints considered by States 
on the basis of universal jurisdiction demonstrates that only one-third of cases or complaints 
considered led to prosecutions, and that these prosecutions were mostly related to Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, and Nazi-rule crimes.79 These prosecutions demonstrate that there was a conscious 
decision on the part of the States to prosecute individuals associated with the atrocities of 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda and Nazi Germany. The atrocities committed had received wide 
condemnation and recognition in international fora and several of the individuals involved in 
                                                 
77 See further in this section for the requirement of governmental authorisations for the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction and also see generally Langer’s empirical research on the number of 
prosecution on the basis of universal jurisdiction; Langer (n 43). 
78 Richard Dicker, ‘A Few Reflections on the Current Status and Future Direction of Universal 
Jurisdiction Practice’ (2013) 107 ASIL PROC 233, 233–34. 
79 Langer (n 23) 8. 
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those atrocities were prosecuted in international tribunals (ICTY, ICTR, and the Nuremberg 
tribunals80). 
Put differently, when a State is asserting universal jurisdiction, then an objective 
assessment of facts is needed. Without this, the State claiming to exercise universal jurisdiction 
on the basis of erga omnes violations has a weaker claim in terms of acting as the trustee of the 
international community and may risk breaching the duty of non-interference towards the State 
with the closer link to the crime. 
The objective of establishing a proper venue for punishing offenders must be balanced 
with the well-established notions of State sovereignty, justice, and procedural fairness.81 It has 
been argued elsewhere that this balance cannot be achieved by allowing individual States to 
exercise universal jurisdiction since there is a danger that the legitimacy of international law 
will be undermined as a result.82 That said, if the international community recognises the 
commission of the crimes through international institutions, then a State's exercise of universal 
jurisdiction in respect of those crimes enjoys a higher claim to procedural legitimacy.  
On the contrary, if the international community endorses amnesty of offenders for 
achieving peace or other ulterior political objectives, then prosecutions on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction in cases which the international community has endorsed amnesties lack 
procedural legitimacy83. The UN has participated in various amnesty negotiations granted by 
                                                 
80 Robert Kurt Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law: With a Postlude on the 
Eichmann Case (2nd edn, Stevens 1962) 42–43, arguing that Nuremberg was a genuine international 
court; Lyal S Sunga, Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights 
Violations (Brill Nijhoff 2012) 32–33 see for a different view on Nuremberg as an international tribunal; 
Formulation of Nuremberg Principles, UNGA Res 488, A/RES/489(V). 
81 Gene Bykhovsky, ‘An Argument Against Assertion of Universal Jurisdiction by Individual 
States’ (2003) 21 Wis Int’l LJ 161, 162. 
82 ibid. 
83 Charles P IV Trumbull, ‘Giving Amnesties a Second Chance’ (2007) 25 Berk J Intl L 283, 
286, 298; Kontorovich (n 75) 402–3; ibid 407, Subpart B: Argues that State practice supports amnesties 
for jus cogens violations; Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global 
Justice (The New Press 2013) 292–310: The amnesties granted by the international community are to 
be differentiated with amnesties granted by national authorities. 
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States84. Nonetheless, the recognition of amnesties granted only by national authorities in cases 
of violations of international crimes risks undermining these crimes as legitimate interests 
recognised by the majority of States85, while recognition of amnesties is inconsistent with the 
non-derogability of many of international crimes which are jus cogens86. In this way, 
recognition of amnesties endorsed by the international community balances the aim of ensuring 
future repression of the crime with the creation of stability and maintenance of peace in certain 
States87. 
Prosecutions in the absence of factual recognition of potential erga omnes violations 
by the international community may lead to incoherent applications of these norms, especially 
if such prosecutions are only carried out by more powerful States against those less so. 
Additionally, the legitimacy of the exercise of universal jurisdiction would also be enhanced if 
an international institution recognised the unwillingness and inability of a State with a closer 
link to prosecute the accused.88 This way an international body can ‘alleviate some of the 
international tensions related to the perceived abuses of the exercise of universal jurisdiction’.89 
The legitimacy of the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States could be enhanced by 
the recognition of the potential commission of crimes from a factual perspective by 
international institutions, their organs or offices within them. For instance, this could include 
the resolutions of the UNGA and UNSC or resolutions or reports of other relevant international 
bodies (including their organs) which have a widespread membership. These could also 
                                                 
84 Trumbull (n 83) II.A(2)(b). 
85 Diane F Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of 
a Prior Regime’ (1991) 100 YaleLJ 2537, 2585–93: Customary law prohibits amnesties granted by 
States; UNCHR Res 2002/79 (25 April 2002); Prosecutor v Kallon & Kambara (Decision on Challenge 
to Jurisdiction: Lome Accord Amnesty) SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72 [6–9]; 
Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija (n 68) [155]. 
86 Ronald C Slye, ‘The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General 
Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible’ (2002) 43 VaJInt’l L 173, 175. 
87 Orentlicher (n 85) 2542. 
88 Kreß (n 7) 584. 
89 Fannie Lafontaine, ‘Universal Jurisdiction — the Realistic Utopia’ (2012) 10 JICJ 1277, 
1292. 
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include, for example, the findings of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC (an independent 
organ of the ICC and its Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor are elected by the Assembly of 
States Parties90), the Committee against Torture, Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Committee on Enforced Disappearance, annual reports of the Human Rights 
Council and reports of the Working Groups, Independent Rapporteurs and Special Rapporteurs 
of the Human Rights Council. There are indications that, in practice, when ‘international or 
national bodies do not know or officially acknowledge the criminal acts, specific allegations, 
and factual substance of criminal allegation against a suspect, prosecutorial authorities are 
unlikely to take action against a temporarily present’ suspect.91 
That being the case, any exercise of universal jurisdiction by the international 
community must be accompanied by the recognition of the potential commission of those 
crimes and the inability/unwillingness of the State with the closer link to prosecute the accused. 
These factors not only ensure the legitimacy of the exercise of universal jurisdiction and limit 
the abuse of power to exercise universal jurisdiction, they also safeguard the forum State 
against any potential claim by the State with a closer link. The burden of proof lies with the 
State which is prosecuting a foreign national on the basis of universal jurisdiction to show that 
its proceedings are justified under international law92 in a proceeding brought by a State with 
a closer link to the crime as a result of the exercise of jurisdiction by its courts. 
Moreover, many States require the authorisation of their governments (generally a 
minister) or top prosecutors at various stages of proceedings (varying from the initiation of 
proceedings/investigations to issuing arrest warrants) on the basis of universal jurisdiction.93 
Within this context, the requirement of the consent of the authorities to initiate proceedings 
                                                 
90 ‘Office of the Prosecutor’ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp> accessed 22 November 2016. 
91 Wolfgang Kaleck, ‘From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008’ 
(2008) 30 MichJInt’l L 927, 960. 
92 Reydams (n 1) 21–22. 
93 See generally Amnesty International, ‘Universal Jurisdiction’ (n 65). 
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seems to have been incorporated in domestic legislation to effectuate the desire of States to 
limit prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction. The primarily objective of the 
requirement of the consent of the authorities is to avoid causing disruption in the foreign 
relations of States94 rather than viewing the exercise of universal jurisdiction as an infringement 
of the duty of non-intervention95.  
The requirement of ministerial or government approval may not necessarily work 
against procedural legitimacy.96 As the contours of the exercise of universal jurisdiction are not 
clearly defined under international law, governmental oversight might initially strengthen the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, as it will prevent the abuse of the system by limiting criminal 
proceedings on the basis of universal jurisdiction.97 In this respect, governmental authorisation 
strengthens the exercise of universal jurisdiction in the long term as members of governments 
are better positioned to appraise cases individually from an international law perspective.  
Governmental authorisation can preclude the exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
national courts when such exercise could be inconsistent with a State’s obligations under 
international law. Governmental authorisation is especially important in situations where the 
national law has not yet incorporated the rules of international law which may be pertinent to 
a State’s exercise of universal jurisdiction. For instance, this could be so in cases which assert 
that universal jurisdiction might undermine the peace process in the home State of the accused98 
through the non-recognition of amnesties granted by the international community99.  
                                                 
94 Afua Hirsch, ‘Ministers Move to Change Universal Jurisdiction Law’ The Guardian (30 May 
2010) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/may/30/change-universal-jurisdiction-law> accessed 21 
January 2016. 
95 Langer (n 23) 2–6. 
96 Florian Jeßberger and Julia Geneuss, ‘“Litigating Universal Jurisdiction” — Introduction’ 
(2015) 13 JICJ 205, 3: see also for the potential abuse of the exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
interested parties which may hinder the development of prosecution of offenders in national courts. 
97 Rephael Ben-Ari, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Chronicle of a Death Foretold’ (2014) 43 
DenvJInt’l L& Pol’y 165 see generally. 
98 Kontorovich (n 75) 390–91. 
99 ibid 402–3. 
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Fourthly, the duty of non-intervention is owed to foreign States, and international 
crimes giving rise to obligations erga omnes are prohibited for both the State and the 
individual.100 It is inconceivable how a State could infringe its duty of non-intervention by 
prosecuting foreigners on the basis of universal jurisdiction if the exercise of jurisdiction does 
not involve coercion or is not targeting the political integrity of another State, which could 
amount to direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of another State. When a State 
has failed to prevent the commission of the crime and subsequently fails to prosecute the 
alleged perpetrators of international crimes, this would inevitably weaken its claim regarding 
the breach of this duty since it has failed to abide by its obligations under international law. If 
the State with a closer link is willing and able to prosecute the offenders, then arguably that 
State is not in breach of the duty to prevent and prosecute the alleged offenders.  
This is in contradiction to the belief of some that the subsidiarity of the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction is not a requirement in international law.101 The contention here is not 
that a separate rule of customary international law in respect of subsidiarity has emerged; 
rather, subsidiarity is inherent in erga omnes obligations and the duty of non-intervention.102 
The principle of subsidiarity does not create a hierarchy among jurisdictional bases, as it is 
based on the concept of erga omnes obligations and the duty of non-intervention. Other 
jurisdictional bases are also subject to the duty of non-intervention.  
Moreover, the exercise of universal jurisdiction is distinct from the aut dedere aut 
judicare principle, as the source of the obligation of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare is 
only conventional law.103 As aut dedere aut judicare creates a duty and erga omnes create a 
right, the obligation to prosecute or extradite does not collide with the right to prosecute or 
                                                 
100 Reydams (n 2) 155 summarising Public Prosecutor v. Sokolovic, Oberstes Landesgericht 
Dfisseldorf, Nov. 29, 1999; BGH, Feb. 21, 2001, reprinted in part in Neue Zeitschrift fur Strafrecht 658. 
101 Lafontaine (n 89) 1286. 
102 Cassese, ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality: A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal 
Jurisdiction’ (n 2) 593; Kreß (n 7) 578. 
103 Lafontaine (n 89) 1287–1291. 
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extradite. 
The subsidiarity of the exercise of universal jurisdiction is supported by the fact that 
most of the States which have incorporated universal jurisdiction primarily prefer the 
prosecution to be conducted by the State with the territorial link, but are at the same time 
willing to exercise universal jurisdiction if the State with the closer link to the crime is 
unwilling or unable to prosecute (eg, Australia,104 Spain,105 Switzerland,106 South Africa,107 
Argentina,108 Italy,109 Belgium,110 New Zealand,111 UK112, Cuba,113 and Vietnam114). There is 
also support in legal authorities for this proposition.115  
                                                 
104 UNGA Sixth Committee, ‘Australian Views on the Scope and Application of the Principle 
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of 13 April 2011. 
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114 ibid 41. 
115 Arrest Warrant (n 5) Separate Opinion of Judge Rezek [4]; ibid Separate Opinion of 
President Guillaume [12–16]; see also Center for Constitutional Rights et al v Donald Rumsfeld et al 
(Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart) Case No 5 Ws 109/05, Decision of 13 September 2005; Kreß (n 
7) 562; Carnegie (n 28) 403–5; Geoff Gilbert and Anna Magdalena Rüsch, ‘Jurisdictional Competence 
Through Protection to What Extent Can States Prosecute the Prior Crimes of Those to Whom They 
Have Extended Refuge?’ (2014) 12 JICJ 1093, 1110–12; Council of Europe (European Committee on 
Crime Problems), ‘Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction Council of Europe, European Committee on 
Crime Problems’ (1992) 3 Criminal Law Forum 441 452; Institute of International Law (1st 
Commission), ‘Universal Civil Jurisdiction with Regard to Reparation for International Crimes: 
Rapporteur M. Andreas Bucher’ (30 August 2015) art 2. 
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The subsidiarity principle116 in doctrine also supports the argument here that States are 
entitled to exercise universal jurisdiction on the basis of erga omnes violations. According to 
the subsidiarity principle, ‘the decision to prosecute is not taken in isolation by the State 
claiming jurisdiction, but requires a certain understanding, if not agreement, by the other State 
which is more directly concerned, for instance, the State where the offence has been 
committed’.117 De Vattel, for example, argued that, if the State where the crimes have been 
committed reclaims the perpetrators to bring them to punishment, they ought to be surrendered 
to that State and that the trial in that State is more likely to provide procedural justice.118 
In this sense, the proposed entitlement of States to prosecute on the basis of erga omnes 
violations is differentiated with the understanding of the universality principle, which places 
universal jurisdiction at a philosophical level. Universal jurisdiction from a philosophical 
perspective ‘does not supply an inadequacy of another more competent jurisdiction to avoid 
impunity, but is an independent and primary right’.119 However, the similarity between the 
universality principle and the entitlement of States to prosecute offenders on the basis of erga 
omnes violations is that when a State exercises universal jurisdiction it protects the interests of 
the international community and the prosecuting State is acting on behalf of the international 
community.120 
                                                 
116 Cassese, ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality: A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal 
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Committee on Crime Problems’ (n 115) 452. 
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Further, the rules of jurisdiction strike a balance of rights between the State wishing to 
exercise jurisdiction and the State affected as a result of that exercise of jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, from the perspective of the rules of jurisdiction, the subsidiarity enshrined in the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction based on erga omnes violations proposed here strikes the right 
balance between the rights of the two competing States by taking into account the rights and 
obligations of the State affected.121  
On that basis, the breaches of the duty of non-intervention are justified in relation to 
the State whose national is being implicated in a foreign court, since it has failed to prevent the 
crime and has also failed to prosecute the offender. In conventional law, there is no requirement 
to extradite to the State with a territorial link (or to a State with a closer link) for prosecution. 
Generally, these conventions only require the State to extradite to another State signatory, 
which requests the extradition if it does not prosecute the accused.122  
3.3 Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and Universal Civil Jurisdiction 
First, universal civil jurisdiction in respect of crimes is supported on the basis of 
community interests, ie erga omnes obligations, since community interests’ rationale does not 
differentiate between civil and criminal proceedings. The argument that States lose their right 
of non-intervention in their domestic affairs if they fail to prevent or prosecute the alleged 
offenders is not limited to criminal proceedings and could be applied to civil proceedings, as it 
is based on the interests of the international community. This argument entails that ‘the 
lawfulness of universal tort jurisdiction over gross human rights violations could be based on 
the acquired lawfulness of universal criminal jurisdiction over the same violations’.123 On that 
basis, it could be argued that ‘if universal criminal jurisdiction is permissible under 
                                                 
121 Lafontaine (n 89) 1290. 
122 See for example, the Torture Convention; other conventions mentioned in Chapter Two also 
have similar provisions on the obligation to prosecute or extradite; Torture Convention (n 65) art 5(2), 
7(1) and 8(4). 
123 Ryngaert (n 9) 38, 127; Stephens (n 62) 51–53. 
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international law, universal civil jurisdiction is also permissible’.124 The fact that only the 
United States exercises universal civil jurisdiction does not entail that such a right does not 
exist in international law. 
Secondly, the differences between criminal and civil proceeding (ie the lower level of 
interference, generally initiated by private parties, etc) hold that civil proceedings could be 
considered as less intrusive in the affairs of other States thereby avoiding infringement of the 
duty of non-intervention. Civil cases are less prone to political influence, as governments play 
no role other than adjudicating the suit between private parties. In comparison to criminal 
proceedings, where authorities have the power to initiate proceedings or halt them in certain 
cases, civil suits are usually ‘instigated and largely controlled by private individuals and groups 
who may be undeterred by considerations relating to the damaging impact of such proceedings 
on international relations’.125 Thus, the likelihood of protests by States for the politicisation of 
suits is less. 
However, the New Zealand High Court in Fang rejected the plaintiff’s claim on the 
assumption that, since third parties (eg NGOs, victims, families of victims and other 
individuals) could initiate proceedings against a former or incumbent foreign official, this 
could 'impede the foreign relations of a State as the State will have less authority over civil 
proceedings’. 126 This statement is inconsistent with the general belief that what ‘applies to 
criminal jurisdiction applies to some extent mutatis mutandis for civil jurisdictions because the 
latter is considered less intrusive’.127  
Furthermore, ‘the criminal courts of many nations combine civil and criminal 
                                                 
124 Reydams (n 1) 3; Ryngaert (n 9) 38. 
125 Joanne Foakes, Position of Heads of State and Senior Officials in International Law (OUP 
2014) 143; Fang and Others v Jiang Zemin and Others (New Zealand High Court) (2006) 141 ILR 702 
[59–64]. 
126 Fang v Jiang Zemin (n 125) [59–64]; Kate Parlett, ‘Immunity in Civil Proceedings for 
Torture: The Emerging Exception’ [2006] EHRLR 49, 49.  
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proceedings, allowing those injured by criminal conduct to be represented and to recover 
damages’.128 From this perspective, the procedural differences between civil and criminal 
proceedings do not entail that civil suits could impede foreign relations or are considered as 
undue interference in the affairs of other State any more than criminal prosecution on the basis 
of universal jurisdiction.  
Moreover, when there is a widespread acknowledgement by the international 
community of the crimes committed in a State, a State may wish to distance itself from past 
actions (eg a new administration, which may not want to be linked to the previous 
administration). Thus, even if such a proceeding is viewed as undue interference, a State may 
not formally complain.  
Thirdly, the aim of universal jurisdiction is to end impunity for the crimes of greatest 
concern to the international community of States. The primary aim of the civil suits is to 
provide damages to the victim/s, rather than punishment of the perpetrators, which will 
ultimately depend on the enforcement powers of any foreign court in terms of the property 
recoverable in its jurisdiction; thus, the stakes for the defendants are lower in civil cases.129  
Fourthly, there is support for the idea that the legal implication of international crimes 
also seems to extend to the civil responsibility of perpetrators.130 The African Union (AU) 
Model National law on Universal Jurisdiction provides that convicted persons can be ordered 
to make appropriate reparations to the victims. 131 The Institute of International Law, in its 2015 
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Resolution, noted that criminal prosecution provided only partial satisfaction to the victims and 
confirmed that victims of international crimes have a right to appropriate and effective 
reparation from persons liable for the injury.132 Likewise, Judge Loucaides in Al Adsani stated 
that ‘the rationale behind the principle of international law that those responsible for atrocious 
acts of torture must be accountable is not based solely on the objectives of criminal law’ but ‘it 
is equally valid in relation to any legal liability whatsoever’.133 It has been noted that,  
when an individual can be prosecuted and convicted for the commission of a 
certain crime because the crime is not an act of State but an act also attributable 
to the individual personally, he can necessarily be ordered to pay damages from 
his personal estate to indemnify the victims of crimes in civil proceedings.134  
 
The individual civil responsibility in international law has, for example, found 
expression in the Statute of the ICC135 and the Torture Convention which obliges States to 
ensure that the victims of torture obtain redress and have an enforceable right to fair and 
adequate compensation.136 Taking into account the object and purpose137 of the Torture 
Convention and the fact that States can prosecute offenders present in their territories, there is 
a strong argument that the provision of an enforceable right of compensation to victims of 
torture is not limited to acts only committed in the territory of a State.138  
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4. In Absentia Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction 
4.1. Presence in the Territory of the Forum State 
The approach adopted to the rules of jurisdiction in international law and the existence 
of a right to exercise universal jurisdiction ultimately determines whether investigations in 
absentia or even issuing arrest warrants are legal under international law. This depends on 
whether one adopts a broad interpretation of the Lotus judgment,139 or the interpretation 
proposed here in relation to the rules of jurisdiction in international law.  
Additionally, consideration should not be given to a specific prohibitive rule of 
jurisdiction; rather, it should include prohibitive rules of international law. This is necessary 
for clarifying the legal status of different forms of jurisdiction when a State exercises universal 
jurisdiction, as each form of jurisdiction (prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement) should 
be individually subject to the applicable prohibitive rule of international law. 
First, many States which exercise prescriptive jurisdiction require the presence of the 
offender in their territory.140 National courts and the individual opinions of judges of national 
courts suggest that the presence of the accused is a necessary condition for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction (adjudicative jurisdiction).141 Other legal authorities also support this 
proposition.142 Although there is opposition to the fact that the presence requirement is 
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established in customary international law,143 Chapter 2 illustrated that customary law can be 
created when there is a consensus regarding norms in the international community, as the 
evidence above illustrates. 
In this context, the requirement of the presence of the perpetrator in the territory of the 
forum State for the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction will avoid conflict between different 
legal systems which otherwise have authority, and avoids the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
which may have disruptive consequences, such as creating instability in the international legal 
order.144 Properly read, the requirement of presence of the offender in the territory of another 
State (or habitual residence) is akin to the connections between the prosecuting State and the 
offender in other types of jurisdiction (ie territorial, nationality, passive personality and 
protective principles).  
The connection to the forum State not only prevents conflicting adjudicative 
jurisdiction over the offender but also establishes a link between the offender and the 
prosecuting State. This puts the exercise of universal jurisdiction in the same context as other 
types of jurisdiction and avoids breaching the duty of non-intervention by the prosecuting 
State.145 A State with a closer link to the crime or the offence has a less compelling claim where 
the suspect has left the jurisdiction of the State and has voluntarily entered another State.146 The 
prosecution of offenders present in the territory of the forum States should also be viewed from 
the fact that every State has the right not to allow its territory to be a safe haven for offenders 
of international crimes.147  
Notwithstanding the fact that prohibition of the exercise of adjudicative universal 
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jurisdiction in absentia is disputed as customary law, it could be argued that, on the basis of 
the considerations made here, the duty of non-intervention (or rules of immunity) can be 
breached by a State if it exercises adjudicative universal jurisdiction in absentia.148 Moreover, 
the absence of the abused in the trial could also undermine the legitimacy of the proceedings149 
and, as discussed earlier, is an important element in such prosecutions since they are based on 
community interests. 
The requirement of the presence of the offender in the territory of the forum State could 
also be applicable in civil proceedings. The United States Torture Victims Protection Act does 
not require the presence of the offender and the only restrictions in the Act are the statute of 
limitations and exhaustion of remedies in the place where the alleged conduct occurred.150 That 
said, the US Supreme Court in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum held that ‘the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the [Alien Tort Statute], and that nothing in 
the statute rebuts that presumption’.151 The Supreme Court, in fact, recognised the right to 
exercise universal civil jurisdiction152 but strictly limited such claims. The Court asserted that 
when claims touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force the 
presumption against extraterritoriality can be displaced.153 One could argue that, on the basis 
of the presence/residence of the victim in the United States, the case sufficiently touches and 
concerns the US; however, the test adopted by the Court is whether the claim touches and 
concerns the US, and not whether the parties do so.154  
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4.3. Investigations in Absentia  
In legal authorities, there is support for the idea that investigations in absentia could be 
conducted on the basis of universal jurisdiction specifically if the presence of the accused on 
the territory of the forum State is anticipated.155 One of the few national cases156 which 
addressed the issue of adjudicative jurisdiction (investigation part) of States under international 
law is Southern Africa Human Rights Litigation Centre.157  South Africa’s Constitutional Court, 
in that case, held that South Africa had a duty to investigate torture as a crime against humanity 
for crimes committed in Zimbabwe with no link to South Africa.158 The Court argued that South 
Africa had a close connection to Zimbabwe and that an investigation in absentia was justified 
on the basis that there was some likelihood that the accused would be present in South Africa 
at some point.  
In any event, the Court held that the ICC Implementing Act requirement of the presence 
of the accused in South Africa was only relevant for the purposes of prosecution before South 
African courts and not for investigation.159 Both the prosecution and investigation of a crime 
are part of the adjudicative jurisdiction. In terms of the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction 
(prosecution), as noted, many States require the presence of the offender in their territory. 
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The South African Constitutional Court held ‘that the predominant international 
position is that presence of the suspect is required at a more advanced stage of criminal 
proceedings, when a prosecution can be said to have started’.160 Accordingly, States are allowed 
to conduct in absentia investigations and even issue arrest warrants which are not automatically 
obligatory for other States (for non-officials or when official immunity is not applicable), since 
such acts do not impinge on the right of non-intervention of the State whose nationals are 
implicated in the investigation or the arrest warrant. 
Investigations in absentia can be beneficial from a practical perspective in the sense 
that the temporary presence of a suspect is seldom investigated by the authorities, and some 
cases are ‘only brought to the attention of authorities by investigating NGOs, victims, or 
victims' communities, who lack resources to conduct their own investigations’.161 This would 
give NGOs and other interested parties the opportunity to file their petitions if the presence of 
the accused in the territory of the forum State is anticipated.  
Moreover, investigations in absentia are likely to play in ‘favour of inter-State 
cooperation and comity in the fight against international crimes’, taking into account that, ‘in 
most if not all cases effectively brought forward on the basis of universal jurisdiction, there 
was ample cooperation between the prosecuting and territorial State’.162 
Kreß argues that, as far as investigations in absentia are concerned, ‘to the extent that 
a customary title to true prescriptive universal jurisdiction has been proven to exist, States may 
exercise adjudicative universal jurisdiction by investigating alleged crimes in absentia, because 
of the absence of a prohibitive customary rule’.163 Kreß further contends that there is 
‘insufficient State practice to assert the creation of a rule that would specifically prohibit any 
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investigative act in the absence of a suspect based (only) on universal jurisdiction’.164 However, 
as noted earlier, a prohibitive rule does not need to be specifically related to the rules of 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive how investigations in absentia could 
violate the duty of non-intervention. 
Judges Guillaume and Rezek, who opposed the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
(prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement), did so on the basis that the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction could lead to judicial chaos and would be open to abuse by the more powerful 
States.165 To the extent that these assertions concern trials in absentia, the contentions are not 
disputed; however, investigations in absentia do not infringe the duty of non-intervention,166 
and if the practice of universal jurisdiction is limited to situations which have been recognised 
by the international community, thus providing that practice with legitimacy, these concerns 
may not arise.  
Moreover, the argument here is based on the assumption that the State concerned has 
not only failed to prevent the crime, but has subsequently failed to prosecute the alleged 
perpetrators, and that the prosecuting State is acting as a trustee of the international community 
on the basis of protecting common interests.167 Accordingly, in the absence of infringement of 
any prohibitive rule of international law (eg the duty of non-intervention and rules of immunity) 
investigations in absentia are permitted in international law for the commission of international 
crimes. 
4.3. Arrest Warrants 
In spite of the fact that investigations are not per se prohibited, the conduct of the 
investigation may be indirectly prohibited by other rules of international law, such as rules of 
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(personal) immunity if they can lead to a binding arrest warrant. According to this reading, 
States are entitled to initiate investigations and are also allowed to issue non-binding arrest 
warrants for offenders of international crimes subject to rules of immunity.  
If the rules of immunity are not applicable, it can be concluded that States are allowed 
to initiate investigations or proceedings which do not have the potential to be enforced (ie lead 
to a binding arrest warrant whilst the official is enjoying personal immunity). This is in contrast 
to trials in absentia; the adjudicative (not the investigation part) and enforcement exercise of 
universal jurisdiction are dependent on the presence of the perpetrators in the territory of the 
forum State. 
Belgium, in Arrest Warrant, had argued that the arrest warrant had no legal status 
outside Belgium;168 -ie without further steps taken by third States, it could not have been 
implemented.169 Moreover, the arrest warrant issued in Belgium had made an exception in the 
case of an official visit by Yerodia to Belgium.170  
The ICJ, in Arrest Warrant, held that the arrest warrant was illegal notwithstanding the 
legal effect of the international arrest warrant itself171 because the official in question enjoyed 
personal immunity.172 The fact that the incumbent foreign minister of Congo had to travel 
abroad in the performance of his functions and that the arrest warrant could have resulted in 
the arrest of Yerodia was sufficient for the ICJ to find that the arrest warrant constituted a 
violation of Belgium's obligations, because it infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
enjoyed by Yerodia (personal immunity).173  
Belgium had jurisdiction to issue a non-binding arrest warrant which was subject to the 
rules of immunity and the duty of non-intervention. The mere issuance of the arrest warrant 
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was deemed as sufficient intervention in the affairs of Congo, notwithstanding the fact that ICJ 
did not consider the issue of intervention from the perspective of the rules of jurisdiction. The 
duty of non-intervention is also applicable in relation to the rules of jurisdiction. In Arrest 
Warrant, the accused, according to the ICJ, enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction, but the 
situation may not necessarily have been the same if the accused had not enjoyed immunity.  
It could be argued accordingly that on the basis of consideration of the rights of the 
States involved and erga omnes obligations, a State can issue arrest warrants which are not 
automatically binding unless accepted by the receiving State, subject to the recognition of 
immunities of officials and other prohibitive rules of international law. If it is argued that 
immunities (eg foreign nationals who are non-officials or have functional immunity) do not 
apply with respect to international crimes, then it could be argued that, without a prohibitive 
rule of international law, the State can exercise adjudicative jurisdiction in absentia by issuing 
a non-binding arrest warrant for the offender. 
With that said, in their Dissenting Opinion, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal asserted that the ICJ should have considered the issue of jurisdiction first as the 
two concepts are linked.174 They further added that an arrest warrant could be issued in 
absentia: the commencing of an investigation on the basis of which an arrest warrant issued in 
absentia does not violate the principles of fair trial and recognition of the immunities.175 This 
was ultimately based on the recognition that the implementation of the arrest was at the 
discretion of the State concerned. Therefore, exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia, 
which may lead to an international arrest warrant (non-binding on third States) does not 
transgress any prohibitive rule of international law (without a binding international arrest 
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warrant on third States).176 
States are entitled to issue non-binding arrest warrants, eg issuance of arrest warrants 
and their international circulation through Interpol have no legal impact unless validated by 
receiving States177 for suspects who do not enjoy personal immunity. The responding States are 
equally entitled to accept or reject arrest warrant requests since they are also not under an 
obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction (assuming that both the respondent and the 
requesting State are not party to a convention which obliges States to prosecute/extradite).  
The legality of international arrest warrants, which are of a voluntary nature for 
international crimes based on the exercise of universal jurisdiction, depend on whether the 
voluntary arrest warrant breaches the rules of immunity as prohibitive rules of international 
law. The issue of non-binding arrest warrants with regard to the duty of non-intervention is the 
same as investigations in absentia discussed above. Non-binding arrest warrants do not breach 
the duty of non-intervention. The functional and personal immunities of officials are 
considered in the next two chapters. 
5. Criticism of Universal Jurisdiction 
Criticisms of the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States revolve around a few 
specific issues. First, there is the view that the ICC’s Statute does not support the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction by States and that this undermines the right of States to exercise universal 
jurisdiction in international law. Secondly, there is the argument that disagreement over the 
conditions of the exercise of universal jurisdiction in international law may lead to the 
incoherent application of universal jurisdiction. Thirdly, the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
may lead to the incoherent application of the rules of immunity. Fourthly, there is the view that 
disparity over recognition of the crimes, which give rise to the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
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may lead to the incoherent interpretation of universal jurisdiction. Fifthly, there is the 
possibility that the exercise of universal jurisdiction could be subject to political considerations. 
This section considers these criticisms in the context of the proposed conditions to the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction.  
5.1. The ICC’s Statute 
First, under the Rome Statute which has received near universal accession, the ICC 
cannot exercise universal jurisdiction178. The drafting history of the ICC’s Statute demonstrates 
that the views of States ranged from the proposal on universal jurisdiction179 to ‘the restrictive 
mandatory consent of all interested States’180 (including the consent of the State of the 
nationality of the accused181). Some States which were originally in favour of the universal 
jurisdiction approach – ie drafts proposed by Germany or South Korea, opted for the proposal 
which limited the jurisdiction of the ICC to the consent of the State of nationality or the 
territorial State for practical purposes; mainly to make the Statute appealing to more States182. 
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As a result, the final draft of Article 12 is considered as a compromise between the two 
viewpoints183; ie Article 12 neither incorporates universal jurisdiction nor the consent of all 
interested States. Under Article 12 of the ICC Statute, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over 
nationals of non-States Parties when the crime has been committed in the territory of a State 
Party184 or referrals by the UNSC185.  
The exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over nationals of non-States Parties for crimes 
committed in the territory of States Parties or nationals of States Parties who have committed 
crimes in the territory of other States Parties can be construed as a delegation of the power of 
States to the ICC to exercise jurisdiction. In other words, States have simply delegated their 
power to prosecute individuals for the commission of crimes committed in their territories to 
the ICC and have shared their right to exercise jurisdiction under international law with other 
States parties186. Accordingly, the delegation of the power to the ICC to exercise jurisdiction 
or other States Parties when either the crime is committed in the territory of a State Party or 
when the accused is a national of a State Party justifies the exercise of jurisdiction over 
nationals of non-States Parties.  
Moreover, the jurisdictional provisions of the ICC’s Statute187 do not make the 
jurisdiction of the Court dependent on the crime, as, for instance, the Torture Convention does. 
The Torture Convention provides that a State can exercise its jurisdiction if the alleged offender 
is found in its territory.188 In this way, the ICC’s Statute does not support the argument based 
on the exercise of universal jurisdiction as the Torture Convention does. The jurisdiction of the 
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ICC over nationals of States Parties or nationals of non-States Parties for crimes committed in 
the territory of States Parties supports the argument based on a delegation of the power of the 
States Parties to exercise jurisdiction.      
That said, the ICC Statute does not regulate the jurisdiction of national courts or oblige 
States to prosecute offenders as States only have an obligation to cooperate with the ICC189. 
The duty of States to prosecute offenders of international crimes is a general provision 
reiterated in the Preamble of the Statute, which should be considered in the context of the 
complementarity of the ICC’s jurisdiction190. Investigations and prosecution by the ICC are 
based on the complementarity principle191 and the failure of a State Party which has jurisdiction 
over the crime, ie to investigate or prosecute the offender, may result in an investigation and 
prosecution by the ICC.  
Nevertheless, the ICC’s Statute can be construed to support the right of States to the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction to prosecute nationals of other States Parties or nationals of 
other States for crimes committed in the territory of other States Parties.192 This interpretation 
is in line with the duty of States to prosecute offenders of international crimes and the object 
and purpose193 of the ICC Statute which calls for ending impunity of offenders of international 
crimes194. Moreover, Some States in their implementing legislations allow for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties for crimes committed outside the 
territory of the States Parties195. The inclusion of universal jurisdiction in the implementing 
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legislations goes above and beyond the jurisdiction provisions of the ICC’s Statute196.  
Moreover, the rejection of the proposals by States to include universal jurisdiction in 
the ICC’s Statute can also be considered in the light of the fact that the ICC’s Statute revokes 
personal immunities of officials197. Accordingly, the exercise of universal jurisdiction by the 
ICC in situations which would have included officials of non-States Parties enjoying personal 
immunity for crimes committed outside the States Parties could have been inconsistent with 
Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)198.  
Perhaps, from a broader perspective, the rejection of the duty to the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction by the ICC can also be explained because the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction would have obliged the ICC to prosecute offenders and would have created parallel 
obligations for States Parties to cooperate with the ICC. Put differently, the obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC to prosecute offenders would have been an elevation of the rules of 
universal jurisdiction, in contrast to the right of States to exercise universal jurisdiction based 
on violations of erga omnes obligations.  
In light of the considerations mentioned above, it can be concluded that the ICC’s 
Statute is neutral with regards to the argument justifying the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
by States based on violations of erga omnes obligations. This chapter only proposes the right 
of States to exercise universal jurisdiction based on violations of erga omnes obligations and 
does not argue that States are obliged to exercise universal jurisdiction.199  
As discussed, some States Parties’ implementing legislations allow their courts to 
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exercise universal jurisdiction. Accordingly, there are calls to subject the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by the States Parties to a Review Board to overcome the incoherent application of 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction by national authorities200. The task of the Review Board 
would be to oversee the exercise of universal jurisdiction by the States Parties according to 
pre-determined conditions, while it can also issue binding decisions for States.201 This proposal 
undoubtedly is a positive step towards formulating a more coherent exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by at least the States Parties. However, in practice, this proposal is unlikely to be 
endorsed by States as it would require an amendment to the Rome Statute and an increase in 
the ICC’s budget. The ICC is set up on the complementarity principle and considering the 
resources made available to the ICC, it can only try a limited number of cases202. The practical 
hurdles of this proposal are not only limited to a budgetary increase for the ICC but also include 
a comprehensive agreement on the factors to be taken into account by the Review Board in 
delivering its binding decisions regarding the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States. 
5.2. Incoherent Application of Universal Jurisdiction by National Authorities 
One may argue that since there is disagreement over the ambit of the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction (ie in absentia exercise of universal jurisdiction or issuance of 
international arrest warrants) (Section 4.1) this may lead to inconsistent application of the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts. In other words, since the application and 
interpretation of the exercise of universal jurisdiction are at the discretion of national 
jurisdiction authorities rather than an international court delegated to exercise jurisdiction 
based on its statute203 this may lead to the incoherent application of universal jurisdiction. The 
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incoherent applications could include the conditions attached to the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction, the crimes which give rise to universal jurisdiction, and the inapplicability of 
personal immunity of officials. 
That said, the examples of Belgium, Spain, and the UK, indicate that States will 
ultimately adopt an understanding of the exercise of universal jurisdiction which is widely 
shared by the majority of States. With regards to the rule of jurisdiction this shared 
understanding is ultimately dependent on two sets of rules in international law, ie the duty of 
non-intervention and the rules of immunity. 
Under UK law, the courts can prosecute offenders on the basis of universal jurisdiction 
when the perpetrator is present in the territory of the UK.204 The governmental authorisation 
(attorney general) was required for the prosecution of offenders on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction.205 However, in England and Wales individuals were permitted to initiate criminal 
proceedings and apply for arrest warrants.206  
In respect of the exercise of universal jurisdiction, this entailed that private parties could 
have applied directly to courts to institute criminal proceedings. This prompted a series of in 
absentia proceedings leading to the issuance of arrest warrants against Israeli officials who 
enjoyed either functional or personal immunity207. Subsequently, the law was amended, 
primarily due to the political ramifications of the arrest warrants issued as a result of the 
proceedings initiated by private parties. Accordingly, proceedings based on the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction are now subject to the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions208. 
Moreover, as a matter of fact, both Belgium and Spain, which had allowed their courts 
to exercise an unconditional form of universal jurisdiction, have repealed their laws to allow 
                                                 
204 International Criminal Court Act 2001 (n 195) s 51 and 68. 
205 Geneva Conventions Act 1957 s 1(A)(3); Criminal Justice Act 1988, c 33 s 135; War Crimes 
Act, 1991, c. 13, s 1(3); International Criminal Court Act 2001 (n 195) s 53(3). 
206 Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985, c. 23, s 6(1). 
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for a conditional exercise of universal jurisdiction209. Both Belgian and Spanish courts had held 
that universal jurisdiction could be exercised in absentia.210 Accordingly, had the requirement 
of the presence of the offender in the territory of the forum State been observed, the proceedings 
initiated in Spain and Belgium targeting Israeli and US officials would have been struck out of 
these courts. 
In the case of Belgium, the 1993 Belgian law did not even require the presence of the 
accused in Belgium to initiate criminal investigation proceedings (genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes) and it did not recognise the immunities of officials under 
international law.211 Both points mentioned above (presence of the perpetrator in the territory 
of Belgium212 and personal immunities213) have been addressed in the 2003 Belgian law. The 
2003 Belgian law requires the habitual residency of the accused in its territory and that the 
federal prosecutor could only initiate the proceedings.214  
Likewise, the repealed Spanish law also allows for the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
by Spanish courts if the perpetrator is present in Spain215 which includes crimes of genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.216 The correct interpretation of Spain’s and Belgium’s 
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practice is that both states adopted a conditional approach to the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction which adheres to an understanding of the exercise of universal jurisdiction shared 
by the majority of States, rather than abolishing the exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
repealing their laws. 
As the example of Belgium illustrates, the fact that the disputable nature of universal 
jurisdiction in international law may lead to violations of rules of personal immunity217 or lead 
to other violations of international law may not necessarily be the case in the long run as States 
are reminded of their obligations under international law. This was the case regarding a dispute 
over immunity of the incumbent Foreign Minister of Congo between Belgium and Congo, 
where Belgium was held to be in violation of its international obligations by the ICJ for issuing 
a non-binding international arrest warrant against an official who enjoyed personal 
immunity218. As discussed, Belgium repealed its law on universal jurisdiction to recognise the 
personal immunity of officials.219  
Accordingly, if a State aims to exercise universal jurisdiction, it is the responsibility of 
the State to ensure that its procedures and rules are compatible with the requirements of 
international law220. If there are disagreements over the application of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction over international crimes, there are avenues through which State may resort to 
settle their disputes. 
There is also the argument that since there is disagreement as to the crimes which give 
rise to universal jurisdiction221, the exercise of universal jurisdiction may lead to inconsistent 
application of international crimes in different national courts. As contended, the interpretation 
and application of the rules of universal jurisdiction by States may initially lead to some 
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inconsistent practice in their application. The same argument is also applicable with respect to 
crimes recognised by States as those which can give rise to universal jurisdiction. Chapter Two 
considered the creation of international crimes in customary international law from a 
constructivist perspective. Although Chapter Two did not propose a list of recognised 
international crimes in customary law, it enumerated some crimes which have a strong claim 
to be recognised as customary law. 
However, the inconsistency in application and interpretation of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction may not necessarily arise if the exercise of universal jurisdiction, as proposed here, 
is based on the proposed conditions to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The proposed 
criteria for the recognition of crimes which entitle States to exercise universal jurisdiction, 
recognition of amnesties endorsed by the international community and the recognition of the 
potential commission of crimes by international bodies to some extent rectify the deficiencies 
of the exercise of universal jurisdiction considered here. As discussed, States are permitted to 
exercise universal adjudicative jurisdiction over offenders for violations of international crimes 
if the perpetrator is present in the territory of the forum State and States can issue non-binding 
international arrest warrants for violations of international crimes subject to the rules of 
immunity of officials in international law.  
Finally, there is the argument that the disparity of power between States could lead to 
the abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction. In other words, weaker States may utilise it 
as a political tool for retaliation against the more powerful States while the more powerful 
States may utilise it as a political tool to achieve their political objectives by pressuring the 
weaker States, thereby creating instability in inter-State relations222.  
The fact that a power disparity between States could induce States to utilise the exercise 
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of universal jurisdiction to achieve political objectives does not provide a sound argument 
against the right of States to exercise universal jurisdiction based on erga omnes violations. 
The exercise of universal jurisdiction expounded here is based on the interests of the 
international community, which are perceived as legitimate and can be identified in customary 
rules giving rise to obligations erga omnes.  
Inevitably there is the likelihood of the politicisation of any legal right or obligation; 
however, the requirement of the recognition of the potential commission of international crimes 
by international organs as a condition on the exercise of universal jurisdiction precludes 
violations of international law (ie duty of non-intervention). Accordingly, even if there are 
political motives behind the exercise of universal jurisdiction, the conditions proposed here 
ensure that that exercise is conducted within a boundary permitted by international law. 
The proceedings against Israeli officials initiated in Belgium and Spain did not fulfil 
the conditions on the exercise of universal jurisdiction proposed here, yet, these proceedings 
did not destabilise inter-State relations to an unmanageable level which could justify the 
abolishment of the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The protests were mostly limited to verbal 
disagreements by Israeli politicians with the proceedings in the case of Spain or refraining from 
travelling to the UK in the case of proceedings in the UK rather than actions by Israel which 
would have endangered international peace and security223.  
Moreover, since the exercise of universal jurisdiction arising from the violations of erga 
omnes obligations is a right rather than a duty, which has been made subject to governmental 
approval by many States, a level of inconsistency may nevertheless occur. States may choose 
to prosecute offenders from less powerful States as they have fewer resources to impose 
political costs on the forum State. However, the fact that universal jurisdiction may be subject 
to this kind of selectivity cannot be used to rebut the right of States to exercise universal 
                                                 
223 Ben-Ari (n 97) 184, 188–89. 
 175 
jurisdiction since when States choose to exercise universal jurisdiction they have to do so 
within the limits imposed by international law. Indeed, the position of the AU illustrates the 
selectivity which may arise in exercising universal jurisdiction by States. In this regard, 
although the AU has called on States to relinquish the practice of universal jurisdiction over 
African nationals, it has recognised the universal jurisdiction as a principle of international 
law224. 
6. Conclusion  
The exercise of jurisdiction by States should be subject to prohibitive rules of 
international law such as the duty of non-intervention and rules of immunity. The prohibitive 
rules of international law apply individually to all three forms of jurisdiction – ie prescriptive, 
adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction. Both the prohibitive approach which only takes into 
account the prohibitive rules of jurisdiction and the permissive approach to the rules of 
jurisdiction were rejected (Section 2). The exercise of universal jurisdiction on the basis of 
erga omnes violations is justified if it does not violate the duty of non-intervention and other 
prohibitive rules of international law (Sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
The entitlement of States to assert universal jurisdiction over violations of erga omnes 
obligations is the fact the State with a closer link to the offence not only has failed to prevent 
the crime but also subsequently failed to prosecute the offenders (Section 3.2). The entitlement 
of States arising from erga omnes violations is similar to the subsidiarity principle and is the 
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by many States (Section 3.2).  
The exercise of universal jurisdiction should be subject to an interpretation of the duty 
of non-intervention which takes into account the interests of the international community 
(Section 3.1). Accordingly, the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States should take into 
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account procedural legitimacy factors, on the basis that a State is acting as a trustee of the 
international community, protecting the interests of the international community (Section 3.2). 
It is on this basis that the recognition of a potential commission of a crime by an international 
organisation or institution enhances the claim of the prosecuting States and weakens the claim 
of the duty of non-intervention by the State with the closer link to the offence or the offender 
(Section 3.2). By the same token, national courts should recognise the amnesties endorsed by 
the international community (3.2). 
The presence of the accused in the territory of the forum State for the purpose of the 
exercise of the adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction establishes a link between the 
prosecuting State and the accused. This link prevents the violation of the duty of non-
intervention but is still subject to other prohibitive rules under international law such as rules 
of immunity of officials (Section 4.1). States are allowed to exercise prescriptive and 
adjudicative (ie issuing non-binding arrest warrants) universal jurisdiction in absentia subject 
to the rules of immunity of officials. However, States are not allowed to exercise adjudicative 
and enforcement jurisdiction, ie trial, in absentia (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). 
This chapter also argued that community interests (the legitimacy of norms) justify the 
exercise of universal civil jurisdiction. States will not violate the duty of non-intervention under 
international law if they exercise universal civil jurisdiction (Section 3.3). The exercise of 
adjudicative jurisdiction in criminal proceedings is subject to the presence of the offender in 
the territory of the forum State to prevent the duty of non-intervention. Accordingly, civil 
proceedings should also be subject to a link between the forum State and the offender (eg assets 
in the forum State or presence in the forum State) (Section 4.1).  
The arguments put forward against the exercise of universal jurisdiction were also 
considered here (Section 5). This chapter did not argue that the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction does not have deficiencies; rather, it proposed that if the exercise of universal 
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jurisdiction by States is in line with the proposed conditions this will reduce some the risks 
involved in the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The proposed conditions include the presence 
of offender in the territory of the forum State for the purpose of adjudicative and enforcement 
jurisdiction, the application of the rules of immunity, recognition of amnesties endorsed by the 
international community to the exercise of universal jurisdiction and the requirement of 
recognition of potential commission of crimes by international organisation and institutions.  
As discussed, States’ exercise of jurisdiction is subject to the prohibitive rules of 
international law, and these conditions are to prevent the breach of the prohibitive rules of 
international law (eg the duty of non-intervention). The coherent application of universal 
jurisdiction by States is primarily dependent on the incorporation of the proposed conditions 
in the domestic laws of States. As discussed, the examples of Belgium and Spain indicate that 
States may initially apply universal jurisdiction in ways which are inconsistent with the 
requirements of the international law but they will eventually adopt laws which are in line with 
the requirements of international law. 
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Chapter Four: Functional Immunity and International Crimes 
1. Introduction 
This chapter contends that functional immunity is not available to officials in respect 
of international crimes. This discussion is limited to the prosecution of officials on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction1 and the crimes under customary international law which give rise to the 
dual responsibility of States and individuals.2 This chapter begins by considering the link 
between the exercise of (universal) jurisdiction and the rules of functional immunity, ie that 
rules of jurisdiction do not necessarily determine the outcome of functional immunity and vice 
versa (Section 2).  
International crimes justify withholding the functional immunity of officials who have 
committed acts which gave rise to both State and individual responsibility (Section 3.1). The 
rebuttal of functional immunity can be justified because functional immunity in international 
law is granted to officials, both for the benefit of their home State and officials (Sections 3.2 
and 3.4). A strand of State practice which exempts the commission of international crimes from 
the operation of the rules of functional immunity supports this finding (Section 3.3).  
States intervention in proceedings against their officials in terms of discerning private 
from official conduct can be influential. However, this is not sufficient to justify that functional 
immunity is solely owed to the State, as this would overlook the official's right to be protected 
under functional immunity as a separate entity from their home State (Section 3.2). The 
arguments made in this chapter with respect to functional immunity of officials are different 
from those based on jus cogens status of some crimes in international law (Section 3.1). 
Rules of attribution do not necessarily determine the outcome of the functional 
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immunity of officials (Section 4). First, on the basis of legal (limitations on the applicability of 
the rules of attribution to functional immunity) and non-legal considerations it is argued that, 
the commission of international crimes by officials cannot be categorised as private acts 
(Section 4.1). Secondly, application of the rules of attribution to functional immunity of 
officials excludes the possibility that both States and their officials could be held accountable 
under international law for the same acts (Section 4.2).  
Thirdly, application of the rules of attribution to functional immunity cannot justify the 
absence of functional immunity for crimes committed in the territory of the forum State under 
the authority of their home State (Section 4.4). Finally, rules of attribution make an artificial 
distinction between civil and criminal proceedings and cannot justify the unavailability of 
functional immunity to officials in civil proceedings with respect to international crimes 
(Section 4.5). 
2. Immunity of Officials and Universal Jurisdiction 
This section argues that while there is a connection between the rules of jurisdiction 
and immunity, they are intrinsically distinct. The traditional bases of jurisdiction seek to 
achieve a balance between the right of the State seeking to exercise jurisdiction and the right 
of the other State, which might be affected as a result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
former (Chapter 3). Similarly, the rules of immunity seek to achieve the same balance between 
States but from the opposite perspective.3 From this perspective, rules of jurisdiction and 
immunity are related but different,4 and if 
jurisdiction is concerned with the exercise by a State of its competence to 
prescribe, adjudicate or enforce laws, the concept of immunity seems to seek to 
achieve a reverse outcome, namely the avoidance of the exercise of jurisdiction 
and a refusal to satisfy an otherwise legally sound and enforceable claim in a 
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proper jurisdiction.5  
Hence, the rules of immunity and jurisdiction share the same rationale by seeking to balance 
the rights of the States involved.  
Despite the fact that the concepts of jurisdiction and immunity are closely related in 
international law due to their function, the rules of jurisdiction always precede immunity.6 It 
was contended in Chapter 3 that, to consider the operation of the rules of jurisdiction, one has 
to consider the prohibitive rules of international law, such as the duty of non-intervention and 
the rules of immunity. This is the second link between the rules of immunity and jurisdiction. 
In other words, the existence of (universal) jurisdiction does not necessarily entail the absence 
of immunity.  
To consider the link between the rules of immunity and rules of jurisdiction, one should 
take into account different forms of jurisdiction, ie prescriptive, adjudicative and enforcement. 
This should be done for two reasons. First, the level of intervention in the affairs of the State 
implicated is tied to the form of the exercise of jurisdiction. Secondly, the form of jurisdiction 
has different implications for the rules of immunity of officials. 
It was argued that States are entitled to exercise adjudicative and enforcement universal 
jurisdiction on a subsidiarity basis if the accused is present in the territory of the forum State, 
subject to the rules of immunity. It also proposed that States are entitled to exercise prescriptive 
and adjudicative universal jurisdiction in absentia over foreign officials if the exercise of 
jurisdiction does not have the potential to lead to an arrest warrant (ie pre-trial investigations).7 
In the same vein, States are entitled to exercise prescriptive and adjudicative universal 
jurisdiction in absentia to issue non-binding arrest warrants in the absence of the application 
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of the rules of immunity.  
The second link between the rules of immunity and jurisdiction indicates that the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction is partially dependent on the rules of immunity. Put 
differently, the exercise of prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction (in the initial stages) does 
not mean the absence of immunity8 but that the right to exercise adjudicative (trial) and 
enforcement jurisdiction entails the absence of immunity.9 In other words, the rules of 
immunity control the operation of the rules of adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction. This 
is in line with the contention of the ICJ in Arrest Warrant. In other words, the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in no way affects the immunities under customary international law and 
that the existence of a right to exercise universal jurisdiction does not conclude the absence of 
immunity.10  
Similarly, the absence of immunity does not also lead to the existence of jurisdiction. 
An official enjoying immunity may not enjoy immunity for the acts in question, but it does not 
follow that all States have jurisdiction over the official for those acts. Simply put, the issue of 
the immunity of a State or its officials does not arise if jurisdiction cannot be established;11 ie 
there is a nexus between the forum State and the offence or offender which is governed by the 
rule of non-intervention. In respect of universal jurisdiction, it was asserted that the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction is subject to certain conditions to avoid a breach of the duty of non-
intervention.  
If it is held that the exercise of jurisdiction does not infringe the duty of non-
intervention, only at that point will the rules of immunity have to be considered. There can be 
‘no rejection of an immunity in international law by the forum State's court without a prior 
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assertion of adjudicative competence by that court’.12 The non-consideration of the rules of 
jurisdiction prior to consideration of the rules of immunity is referred to as one of the 
misconceptions on the law of State immunity that has unnecessarily contributed to the 
complexity of understanding the immunity of officials.13  
The fact that jurisdiction partly precedes immunity has led some to contend that the 
existence of jurisdiction translates to the absence of immunity and, in respect of international 
crimes, the existence of the right/duty to exercise universal jurisdiction translates to the absence 
of immunity of foreign officials.14 For instance, Akande and Shah argue that a newer rule in 
international law which provides for (universal) jurisdiction overrides the older rule of 
(functional) immunity in international law, as the rules of immunity and jurisdiction are co-
extensive. In other words, the proper legal effect cannot be given to the newer rule providing 
for (universal) jurisdiction if immunity persists.15 They argue that the ‘principle of universal 
jurisdiction over certain international crimes is inconsistent with immunity ratione materiae; 
it follows that type of immunity does not exist in relation to those crimes whether in civil or 
criminal cases’.16  
Moreover, Orakhelashvili views the rules of State immunity through the prism of the 
rules of jurisdiction, contending that there is no specific rule of international law which defines 
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the scope of the acts for which immunity should be granted.17 According to this understanding, 
jurisdiction persists unless a separate rule as an exception to the rules of jurisdiction is shaped 
to rebut the presumption of immunity.18 As discussed, there is a connection between the rules 
of immunity and jurisdiction with regards to their function. Both seek to achieve a balance 
between the rights of the States involved, but consideration of the rules of immunity only 
succeeds consideration of the duty of intervention with respect to the rules of jurisdiction. 
There is a third aspect in relation to the rules of immunity and jurisdiction which might create 
misunderstanding as to their connection. 
The rules of immunity must be considered separately and are only considered once it 
has been established that the form of the exercise of universal jurisdiction does not infringe the 
duty of non-intervention. This, as will be shown in this chapter, is because the rationales behind 
universal jurisdiction and the absence of functional immunity are quite similar; crimes in 
customary law give rise to the obligations erga omnes. Consequently, if it is accepted that the 
rules of universal jurisdiction in some respects are coextensive with the rules of immunity, this 
could be because there may be an indirect link between them. The operation of both the rules 
of jurisdiction and immunity may be dependent on the status of the act in question: as an act 
which has reached the status of a crime in customary international law, rather than being linked 
together directly. This is important since the act is inherent in both, and that identification of 
an act as a crime is central to both. The ILC has argued that if ‘immunity is incompatible with 
the [adjudicative and enforcement exercise of] universal jurisdiction, then it is not fully clear 
why this should not relate not only to functional but also to personal immunity’.19 The rationale 
which applies to functional immunity does not apply to the personal immunity of high-ranking 
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officials and States (Chapter 5). 
On the basis that jurisdiction at least partially precedes immunity and that they have 
similar underlying rationales (balancing the rights of the different States involved), it is 
contended that the operation of the rules of jurisdiction is partially dependent on the rules of 
immunity. The link between the existence of the right to exercise adjudicative and enforcement 
universal jurisdiction is the status of the act as a crime in customary law which gives rise to the 
dual responsibility of the State and individual. Accordingly, neither the approach which ties 
immunity to jurisdiction, nor the approach that views the operation of rules of immunity and 
jurisdiction as completely separate can be accepted as a valid description of their link and 
operation.  
3. Functional Immunity of Officials 
3.1. Functional Immunity and International Crimes 
It is argued that functional immunity is based on two rules: first, on the distinction 
between official and non-official conduct;20 and secondly, on the prohibitive rules of 
international law.21 Prohibitive rules of international law in the context of the rules of immunity 
include rules of non-intervention and international crimes. While both rules of jurisdiction and 
immunity seek to achieve a balance between the rights of the States involved, the rules of 
immunity also have an aspect in relation to officials which must be taken into consideration.  
Functional immunity is based on the notion that one State may not sit in judgment of 
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‘Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar: A United States Government Perspective’ (2011) 44 
VandJTransnat’l L 1141, 1153. 
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another State’s acts (State aspect)22 and that States refrain from attributing personal 
responsibility (whether in criminal or civil proceedings) for the acts of officials carried out in 
an official capacity (individual aspect).23 The objective of the rules of functional immunity is 
not only to protect the State from non-intervention in their affairs, but also to protect individuals 
associated with the State from being held personally accountable for conduct carried out in the 
course of their official duties. In this respect, even if the act is conducted under the authority 
of the home State – ie part of official functions – functional immunity can be rebutted if the act 
is prohibited both for States and individuals.  
If the act is committed in the territory of the forum State and is prohibited by 
international law or, in another word, it breaches the duty of non-intervention in the affairs of 
the forum State, which generally refers to criminal acts under the domestic law of the forum 
State24 without the consent of the forum State (eg kidnapping or murder),25 functional immunity 
is not available. On the other hand, if the act is committed outside the territory of the forum 
State, then generally the duty of non-intervention in the affairs of the forum State is 
inapplicable. In those situations, the illegality of the act both for the individual and the State 
must emanate from international law (ie international crimes which give rise to obligations 
                                                 
22 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd 
edn, CUP 2010) 537; Pinochet (No 3) (n 14) Lord Browne-Wilkinson (201), Lord Millet (268); Rosanne 
Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and 
International Human Rights Law (OUP 2008) 117; ILC, ‘Fourth Report on the Immunity of State 
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: by Special Rapporteur Escobar Hernández’ (29 May 
2015) A/CN.4/686 para 23. 
23 ILC, ‘Fourth Report on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’ 
(n 22) para 105; Alebeek (n 22) 156; Douglas (n 9) 324. 
24 Akande and Shah (n 3) 827: ‘immunity ratione materiae is a device which balances the 
competing interests of states involved by preventing undue interference in the affairs of other states’. 
25 The legality or illegality of a conduct in domestic law does not necessarily determine the 
outcome of the functional immunity of officials; Jaffe v Miller and Others (Ontario Court of Appeal) 
[1993] 95 ILR 446460; Zhang v Jiang Zemin and Others (2010) 148 ILR 555 (Australia, New South 
Wales Court of Appeal); Fang and Others v Jiang Zemin and Others (New Zealand High Court) (2006) 
141 ILR 702; Estate of Late Kazemi and Hashemi v Islamic Republic of Iran and Others (Quebec 
Superior Court) (2011) 147 ILR 318; United States of America, et al v Luis R Reyes, et al, GR No79253 
(Supreme Court of the Philippines, 1 March 1993); Pinochet (No 3) (n 14) Lord Millet 270; ibid Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson 203. 
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erga omnes) to revoke the immunity of the official. Hence, it could be contended, contrary to 
the belief of some, that the operation of rules of functional immunity does not impede the 
operation of international crimes.26 
To prove these assertions, the claims that acts, even if conducted in an official capacity, 
do not enjoy immunity in those two circumstances are proved by two main arguments. First, 
the unavailability of functional immunity in respect of international crimes is consistent with 
the nature of functional immunity, which is to provide protection to the official and prevent 
interference in the affairs of the home State of the official. Since both the State and individuals 
are beneficiaries of the rules of functional immunity, the prohibition which can rebut the plea 
of functional immunity should address both aspects of functional immunity. Secondly, the 
outcome of judicial decisions regarding crimes committed inside and outside the territory of 
the forum State27 supports these assertions. Finally, the rules of attribution do not justify the 
operation of the rules of the functional immunity of officials in certain instances (Section 4). 
3.2. Functional Immunity Embodies Dual Beneficiaries (States and 
Individuals)  
It must be noted that whether the home State revokes or invokes the immunity of its 
official enjoying functional immunity should not be considered as a sufficient factor for 
rebuking functional immunity. Functional immunity is granted to officials both for the 
protection of the rights of the State (non-intervention) and the official as an individual, and 
thus the State cannot, on its own, revoke the functional immunity of its official. Additionally, 
the act is prohibited both for States and individuals. This does not negate the fact that a State 
might intervene in a proceeding to provide evidence as to whether the conduct of the official 
                                                 
26 Alebeek (n 22) 163. 
27 Yang argues that, as far as ‘State immunity is concerned, however, judicial decisions are now 
not a subsidiary but a principal means for the determination of rules of law’: Xiaodong Yang, State 
Immunity in International Law (CUP 2012) 28. 
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was conducted in an official capacity or a private capacity.28 Such evidence is, arguably, not 
determinative in relation to the functional immunity of officials, as international crimes do not 
attract functional immunity whether committed in a private or official capacity.29 This also has 
to be differentiated, with the power of States as the primary subjects of international law, to 
create exceptions to the rules of immunity in international law and to waive the immunities of 
their officials.30 The idea here is that domestic courts consider the plea of functional immunity 
of officials regardless of the intervention of the home State. 
Some have considered that immunity ratione materiae belongs to the State and that 
officials do not have the right to invoke immunity ratione materiae on their own, since 
immunity only vests in the foreign State.31 However, the invocation of immunity on behalf of 
the official by the home State, or the home State joining the proceeding, does not necessarily 
determine the outcome of the plea of functional immunity.32 National courts may nevertheless 
consider a plea of immunity by the official regardless of the intervention of the home State of 
the official either in joining the proceedings or issuing a statement in defence of the official’s 
actions.33 It may be sufficient that the accused official raises the plea of immunity in the 
                                                 
28 Alebeek (n 22) 131: the presumption of immunity which can be rebutted by the home State 
of the official. 
29 Antonio Cassese, ‘When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some 
Comments on the Congo v Belgium Case’ (2002) 13 EJIL 853, 870–72. 
30 UNGA, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (last amended 2010); 
UNGA International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
(adopted 30 November 1973, entered into force 18 July 1976) A/RES/3068 (XXVIII); UNGA 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 
10 December 1985, entered into force 26 June 1986) 1465 UNTS 85 arguably implied a waiver of 
functional immunity; Pinochet (No 3) (n 14). 
31 Douglas (n 9) 287. 
32 Hilao v Marcos (n 21) [12–29]: although the Philippines had waived the immunity of the 
defendant, the US Court did not entirely base its decision on that waiver; Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F 3d 
232 (2d Cir 1995) 104 ILR 136; Zhang v Jiang Zemin (n 25) [4–9]: China had not intervened in the 
against its former president -nevertheless the Australian Court considered the issue of functional 
immunity; Swarna v Al-Wadi, Al-Shaitan and State of Kuwait (Court of Appeals, 2nd Cir) (2010) 152 
ILR 617; Yoram Dinstein, ‘Diplomatic Immunity from Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae’ (1966) 15 ICLQ 
76, 88–89. 
33 Alebeek (n 22) 131. 
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proceeding.34 This practice of national courts also supports the contention that the rules of 
immunity are for the benefit of the State and officials. 
 Moreover, the ICJ's judgment in Belgium v Senegal and the House of Lords’ decision 
in Pinochet III illustrate that invocation of immunity by the home State of the offender does 
not necessarily determine the outcome of the rules of immunity. In Belgium v Senegal, Belgium 
had requested the extradition of a former head of State from Senegal,35 Mr Habré, who was the 
president of Chad from 1982 to 1990 and had allegedly committed large-scale of violations of 
human rights, including torture,36 during his tenure. Chad had lifted all immunities of its former 
head of State but Senegal had still declined to prosecute or extradite Mr Habré.37 Although the 
ICJ found Senegal’s ratification of the Torture Convention date as determinative of the 
initiation of Senegal’s obligations under the Convention, the ICJ based its decision neither on 
the ratification of the Convention by Chad nor the waiver of immunity by Chad.38 Moreover, 
Chad had not ratified the Torture Convention until 1995,39 which was after the period which 
the alleged crimes occurred (1982-1990).  
In Pinochet III, the Chilean government had not waived the immunity of its former 
official and, by intervening in the proceeding against Pinochet, it had argued that Pinochet as 
a former head of State enjoyed immunity in respect of official acts, contrary to domestic or 
international law.40 Three Law Lords, in this case, held that the relevant date for loss of 
immunity of a former head of State was when all of the three States (Spain, UK and Chile) 
                                                 
34 Israeli courts considered the issue of immunity of Eichmann regardless of the fact that 
Germany had not intervened in the proceedings; Attorney General of the Government of Israel v Adolf 
Eichmann (District Court of Jerusalem) (1961) 39 ILR 5; Attorney General of the Government of Israel 
v Adolf Eichmann (Supreme Court of Israel) (1962) 39 ILR 277; Dinstein (n 32) 87–88. 
35 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) [2012] 
ICJ Rep 422. 
36 ibid 16. 
37 ibid 20–22, 101–3: the ICJ found that Senegal was in violation of its obligation under the 
torture convention and did not tie these obligations to the lifting of immunities by Chad. 
38 ibid 101–3. 
39 Torture Convention (n 30). 
40 Pinochet (No 3) (n 14) Lawrence Collins QC for the Government of Chile 174. 
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involved had ratified the Torture Convention (8 December 1989).41 
The Torture Convention can only be read implicitly to waive the functional immunity 
of officials. The Torture Convention does not make any explicit reference to the revocation of 
functional immunity of officials in respect of torture. It only makes reference to torture 
committed by officials42 but does not define the scope of immunities of officials. The majority 
of Law Lords drew this inference on the basis of the obligation to prosecute or extradite under 
the Torture Convention, which the Law Lords interpreted as implicitly waiving the functional 
immunities in respect of crimes of torture.43 In other words, the relevant date was the date when 
the three States had recognised torture as a crime and impliedly waived the immunity of their 
officials. 
Accordingly, whether the home State upholds the plea of immunity of an official or 
revokes the functional immunity of its official would not be a sufficient determinative factor 
in proceedings against officials enjoying functional immunity for international crimes. The 
purpose of functional immunity is to give protection to the individual as well as the State for 
official acts. However, if the forum court reaches the conclusion that functional immunity 
applies to the proceedings commenced ‘against the foreign State's officials (or former officials) 
then it follows that the proper defendant to the proceedings is the foreign State’.44 The course 
of action for the forum court in such cases is to reject the claim against the official ‘as against 
the wrong defendant and simultaneously to decline jurisdiction against the foreign State on the 
basis of its immunity from that jurisdiction’ (if State immunity is applicable).45 
3.3. State Practice 
There is also support for this approach in domestic judgments to immunity ratione 
                                                 
41 ibid Lord Browne-Wilkinson 205-206, Lord Hope 248. 
42 Torture Convention (n 30) arts 1, 10, 16 and art 2(3) outlaws any defence of superior orders. 
43 ibid, arts 5 and 7; Pinochet (No 3) (n 14) Lord Browne-Wilkinson 247, Lord Hutton 262. 
44 Douglas (n 9) 287. 
45 ibid. 
 190 
materiae in criminal proceedings46 but this has been mostly rejected in relation to immunity 
ratione personae47. There is also considerable evidence of other indicia of State practice that 
immunity ratione materiae is not applicable to international crimes.48 Legal authorities have 
also supported the idea that officials do not enjoy immunity ratione materiae in respect of 
international crimes.49  
                                                 
46 Pinochet (No 3) (n 14) Lord Hutton 259-62, Lord Millet (277), Lord Phillips (289); Ferrini 
v Federal Republic of Germany (Supreme Court of Cassation) (2004) 128 ILR 659 [9.1] (immunity 
ratione personae); Vanessa Klingberg, ‘(Former) Heads of State Before International (Ized) Criminal 
Courts: The Case of Charles Taylor Before the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ [2003] Germ Yrbk Intl 
L 537, 522–56; Xuncax v Gramajo, 886 F Supp 162 (D Mass. 1995); Cabiri v Assasie Gyimah, 921 F 
Supp 1189 (SDNY 1996); Enahoro v Abubakarr (n 21); Eichmann (1961) (n 34) [14(d)]; Auto de 
solicitud de extradición de Pinochet Madrid, 3 November 1998 157; L Barnhoorn, ‘Netherlands Judicial 
Decisions Involving Questions of Public International Law, 1999–2000’ (2001) 32 NYIL 233, 277; 
Ould Dah (Assize Court of Gard, 1 July 2005); Ould Dah c France, Requête no 13113/03, Council of 
Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 17 March 2009. 
47 Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Another (Secretary of 
State for Constitutional Affairs and Another Intervening) (House of Lords) (2006) 129 ILR 630 (aspect 
of immunity related to Saudi Arabia); Hwang Geum Joo, et al, v Japan, 332 F 3d 679 (DC Cir 2003) 
(Japan’s immunity in respect of allegation of sexual slavery and torture); Al-Adsani v Government of 
Kuwait and Others (1996) 107 ILR 536. 
48 Some States which have implemented the ICC Statute have not retained the immunities of 
officials non-state party to the ICC (South Africa, Congo, Croatia); Croatia: Law on the Application of 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court and on the Prosecution of Criminal Acts Against the 
International Law on War and Humanitarian Law of 4 November 2003, art 6(3); South Africa: 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 2002, Act No 27 s 4; 
Pinochet (No 3) (n 14) Lord Hutton 259-62, Lord Millet (277), Lord Phillips (289); A v Attorney 
General and Others (Switzerland) 25 July 2012 the Swiss Federal Criminal Court refused to uphold a 
claim of immunity in a criminal case against an Algerian national for war crimes, including acts of 
torture, committed in Algeria. 
49 Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic (Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for 
Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II) (ICTY, the Appeals Chamber) IT-95-14-AR108 [41]; 
Kadic v Karadizc (n 32) 151-56; Arrest Warrant (n 6) Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Buergenthal 
and Kooijmans [128], Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wyngaert [36]; African Union, ‘The Report of the 
Committee of Eminent African Jurists on the case of Hissène Habré’ (July 2006) para 12; ILC Yearbook 
2001, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2)/Corr 1 27 [6] of the commentary to art 7; Institute of 
International Law (13th Commission), ‘Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of Heads of State 
and of Government in International Law: Rapporteur Mr Joe Verhoeven’ (2001) arts 12 and 13(2); 
International Law Association, ‘Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of 
Gross Human Rights Offences: Report of the 69th Conference held in London, 25-29 July 2000’ 
(London, 2000) 423; Andrea Bianchi, ‘Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case’ (1999) 10 
EJIL 237, 259; Adam Day, ‘Crimes Against Humanity as a Nexus of Individual and State 
Responsibility: Why the ICJ Got Belgium v Congo Wrong’ (2004) 22 Berk J Intl L 489, 499; Klingberg 
(n 46) 522; Cassese (n 29) 864; Salvatore Zappalà, ‘Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from 
Jurisdiction for International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation’ (2001) 
12 EJIL 595, 602–3; Paola Gaeta, ‘Official Capacity and Immunities’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta 
and John RWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 
(OUP 2002) 129; Mathias Reimann, ‘A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some 
Thoughts on Princz v Federal Republic of Germany’ (1994) 16 MichJInt’l L 403, 421–23. 
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Cases, whereby foreign courts have upheld the plea of functional immunity in respect 
of international crimes, have only concerned a few States, which are as follows: China, Israel, 
and the United States. It is possible to view the availability of functional immunity to US 
officials in foreign courts due to the United States’ global influence. As a result, such State 
practices may not necessarily form the basis of a lasting State practice and may only persist 
until an agreement over the definition of international crimes is reached and the instances of 
revoking immunity are made clearer by more consistent State practice. Most cases where the 
immunity of US officials were upheld were in European States’ courts, and concerned officials 
in a previous US administration, where allegations of torture and war crimes were attributed to 
the officials concerned.50 
Other prominent instances include Chinese51 and Israeli52 officials and ex-officials.53 
The inconsistent State practice in relation to prosecution on the basis of international crimes 
against Israeli officials could be explained on the basis that the State of Israel enjoys political 
support in States which have been pioneers of the prosecution of foreign officials in respect of 
international crimes. Moreover, this inconsistent State practice could also be explained on the 
basis that Israel is involved in an ongoing conflict and that other States have not been inclined 
to initiate proceedings which would essentially last as long as there is instability in the 
relationship between Israel and its neighbours. Additionally, allowing proceedings in respect 
of Israeli officials would be equivalent to making a political statement with regard to the 
conflicts in which Israel is involved. As noted, State practice has not always been consistent in 
relation to foreign officials and functional immunity has, in certain circumstances, been upheld 
                                                 
50 Center for Constitutional Rights et al v Donald Rumsfeld et al (Higher Regional Court of 
Stuttgart) Case No 5 Ws 109/05, Decision of 13 September 2005; Donald Rumsfeld Case, (Decision of 
the Public Prosecutor, Paris Court of Appeal, 28 February 2007) 2007/09216/SGE. 
51 Fang v Jiang Zemin (n 25); Zhang v Jiang Zemin (n 25). 
52 Belhas v Ya’Alon, 515 F 3d 1279 (DC Cir 2008) [22–23]. 
53 Joanne Foakes, Position of Heads of State and Senior Officials in International Law (OUP 
2014) 158. 
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even in respect of allegations of international crimes.54 Granting functional immunity to those 
accused of committing international crimes could be explained by non-legal considerations. 
3.4. Individual Criminal Responsibility 
Despite the fact that State practice and other legal authorities support the general idea 
that functional immunity is not available to officials for international crimes, their doctrinal 
approach to this idea is not always similar. The approach that functional immunity cannot be 
used as a shield for officials accused of committing international crimes even if committed in 
an official capacity is based on the fact that such acts cannot be considered as sovereign acts 
for which functional immunity is available55 (prohibited acts both for the State and individuals). 
Consequently, this approach generally treats the question of State responsibility separately.  
These approaches also generally share the idea that prohibited acts for individuals 
cannot protect officials for international crimes. For instance, Alebeek submits that acts for 
which the irrelevance of the official capacity of individuals has developed in international law 
are exempt from the operation of the rules of functional immunity.56 Despite the fact that the 
development of irrelevance of official capacity (or individual criminal responsibility) may be 
related to the development of States’ responsibility in international law to prevent the crime 
and prosecute the alleged offenders, there is, nonetheless, a legal distinction between the 
argument proposed here on the basis of dual responsibility of States and individuals and the 
argument which only emphasises the prohibition of the act for individuals or officials.  
The arguments on the basis of irrelevance of official capacity or individual criminal 
                                                 
54 Fang v Jiang Zemin (n 25); Zhang v Jiang Zemin (n 25); Belhas v Ya’Alon (n 52) [22–3]; 
Rumsfeld (2005) (n 50); Donald Rumfeld Case (n 50); Bouzari v Bahremani, 2015 ONCA 275; Al-
Adsani v United Kingdom (2001) 34 EHHR 11; Jones v Saudi Arabia (n 47); ILC, ‘Immunity of State 
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’ (2008) (n 5)104. 
55 Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (OUP 2006) chapter on 
immunity of officials. 
56 Alebeek (n 22) 131 and Chapter 3; Rosanne van Alebeek, ‘National Court, International 
Crimes and the Functional Immunity of State Officials’ (2012) 59 NILR 5. 
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responsibility overlook the dimension of the function of rules of functional immunity, which 
is also to protect foreign States from the right of non-intervention.57 This view puts the 
emphasis on a rule of international law which has recognised the irrelevance of official capacity 
in relation to an act; thus, the customary status of the crime is ignored. Instead, the attention is 
shifted to the irrelevance of the official capacity aspect of an act or the concept of individual 
criminal responsibility in international law. There is a legal difference between the two as far 
as the creation of a customary rule or an international rule is concerned. The emphasis on 
individual criminal responsibility has another disadvantage, as it has the potential to limit the 
unavailability of functional immunity to the “core crimes”, as individual criminal responsibility 
has mostly been associated with crimes prosecuted by international tribunals and courts.58 
The absence of functional immunity of officials with respect to international crimes is 
also justifiable from the perspective of balancing the rights of the States involved. It was argued 
in Chapter Two that, the prohibition of international crimes is based on the legitimacy of these 
norms rather than the self-interest of States. International crimes protect interests which have 
been fully internalised by States. The argument that functional immunity should not be 
available to officials or ex-officials for the commission of international crimes in effect changes 
the competing interests of the States involved by adding the interests of the international 
community into the equation. The assertions made here are in line with those of Parlett, who 
holds that there is increasing recognition that States’ sovereign interests must yield to the 
protection of the common interests of the international community; hence, there is hope that 
the unavailability of functional immunity in respect of international crimes becomes part of 
                                                 
57 Douglas (n 9) argues that functional immunity is not available if the act is prohibited only for 
the individuals. 
58 See generally Arsanjani’s article on the Rome Statute and ‘core crimes’ Mahnoush H 
Arsanjani, ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 93 American Journal of 
International Law 22; see also Fred Grünfeld Alette Smeulers, International Crimes and Other Gross 
Human Rights Violations: A Multi- and Interdisciplinary Textbook, vol 32 (Brill) 162; Steffen Wirth, 
‘Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s Judgment in the Congo v Belgium Case’ (2002) 13 European 
Journal of International Law 877. 
 194 
general international law.59 
Legal authorities that claim international crimes cannot rebut the functional immunity 
of officials are in the minority,60 and generally have a different understanding of the 
relationship between State immunity and functional immunity. Akande and Shah, for instance, 
propose that international crimes cannot override the functional immunity of officials on an 
understanding that assimilates State immunity (acta jure imperii) with the functional immunity 
of officials.61 The difference between functional immunity and State immunity is considered in 
detail in Chapter 5 where it is argued that the two immunities cannot be assimilated in this way. 
The argument here is not that a general rule of customary international law has developed to 
allow States to withhold functional immunity. Hence, States are/were, nonetheless, allowed to 
withhold the functional immunity of officials on the basis of the status of these acts as 
international crimes because of dual responsibility and the fact that these crimes represent the 
interests of the international community. 
4. Functional Immunity and Rules of Attribution 
4.1. Rules of Attribution and Distinction between Private and Official Acts 
Many legal authorities support the idea that the rules of functional immunity depend on 
the rules of attribution.62 The assimilation of the rule of functional immunity with the rules of 
attribution inherently invites ambiguity in determining the rules of immunity of officials. For 
instance, in its commentary on Article 4 of Internationally Wrongful Act of a State, the ILC 
                                                 
59 Parlett (n 8) 66. 
60 Day (n 49) 502 expresses doubt as to whether such a rule has emerged in international law; 
ILC, ‘Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’ (n 7) 61. 
61 Akande and Shah (n 3) 829. 
62 ibid 827; Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic (n 49) [38]; Jones v Saudi Arabia (n 47) [76–78]; 
Hans Kelsen, ‘Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to 
the Punishment of War Criminals’ (1943) 31 CLR 530, 539–44; Douglas (n 9) 281; Hans Kelsen, Peace 
Through Law (Lawbook Exchange 1944) 81–84; Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 
(Transaction Publishers 2006) 355; Josef L Kunz, ‘Privileges and Immunities of International 
Organizations’ (1947) 41 AJIL 828, 828–38; HF van Panhuys, ‘In the Borderland Between the Act of 
State Doctrine and Questions of Jurisdictional Immunities’ (1964) 13 ICLQ 1193, 1192–1208. 
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noted that, when an individual acts in an official capacity or under the authority of a State (as 
opposed to purely private conduct), the actions in question will be attributable to the State.63 
The ILC further observed that cases where ‘officials acted in their [official] capacity, albeit 
unlawfully or contrary to instructions, must be distinguished from cases where the conduct is 
so removed from the scope of their official functions that it should be assimilated to that of non-
officials, not attributable to the State’.64  
Not only is this a paradox, which goes against the application of the general rule of 
attribution to determine the operation of functional immunity, this approach also introduces an 
exception to the general rules, which is so vague that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
make proper inference of the kind of conduct for which officials do not enjoy functional 
immunity. In this respect, it could be argued that the concepts of attribution of conduct to State 
and functional immunity are not coterminous; in another words, attribution of conduct to the 
State does not necessarily determine the availability of functional immunity, and thus 
functional immunity is distinct from State responsibility.65 
The application of the rules of attribution would inevitably lead to the recognition of 
immunity for the commission of most international crimes, which is against the State practice. 
This is unless one accepts that international crimes are committed in a private capacity. First, 
it is contended that the operation of the rules of immunity66 should be seen in light of the fact 
that most instances of violations of international crimes occur under the authority of a State or 
its organs, in charge of swathes of territory and populations. In fact, some international crimes, 
such as crimes against humanity and genocide, can only be committed by individuals who have 
                                                 
63 A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2)/Corr 1 (n 49) 40; ILC, ‘Fourth Report on the Immunity 
of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’ (n 22) paras 78–87, 111–15. 
64 A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2)/Corr 1 (n 49) 46 para. 7, commentary to art 7 (emphasis 
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65 Dinstein (n 32) 82–90. 
66 ‘Par in Parem Non Habet Imperium - Oxford Reference’ 
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the resources of a State and exercise authority over a defined territory and population 
(‘systematic and widespread’ factors67). According to the rules of attribution, an official enjoys 
immunity unless such acts are categorised as private acts, but, in most cases, the application of 
the rules of attribution to functional immunity in respect of international crimes will resemble 
an artificial construction of reality. 
Secondly, the recognition of the commission of international crimes as private acts will 
essentially preclude the possibility of State responsibility. The categorisation of international 
crimes as private acts68 ‘by their very nature may be difficult to reconcile with the principle 
that a State is to be held responsible for crimes under international law committed by its 
organs’.69 Hence, legitimacy and coherency concerns70 have persuaded legal authorities to 
adopt a different interpretation of this principle by categorising international crimes, even if 
committed under the authority of States, as acts, which do not attract functional immunity. The 
argument that international crimes, even if committed in an official capacity,71 do not attract 
functional immunity is consistent with the fact that most international crimes are precisely 
committed as part of State policy under the authority of State institutions and high-ranking 
                                                 
67 Arrest Warrant (n 6) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wyngaert [36]. 
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Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’, Memorandum by the Secretariat, (2008) A/CN.4/596 
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AustrianJPubIntl L 195, 229; ibid 227–28; Arrest Warrant (n 6) Joint Separate Opinion [58]. 
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officials.72 
The ICJ, in Arrest Warrant, held that a former foreign minister does not enjoy immunity 
if the acts in question were committed in a private capacity.73 The ICJ did not explicitly refer 
to international crimes in the four conditions it suggested with respect to the unavailability of 
functional immunity. There could be two interpretations regarding the ICJ’s position on 
functional immunity with respect to international crimes. First, the ICJ intended to convey that 
officials enjoyed immunity in respect of international crimes, unless such crimes were 
committed in a private capacity, which, as explained above, concern at least some international 
crimes that cannot by nature be committed in a private capacity or are generally committed in 
an official capacity (a literal understanding of para 61 of the judgment). Secondly, due to the 
fact that the ICJ was mainly concerned with the immunity of high-ranking officials (personal 
immunity) and paid only marginal attention to the functional immunity of officials in the 
context of the immunity of high-ranking officials, one could assume that the proposed 
conditions by the ICJ for lifting of immunity are not exhaustive.74 Thus, the ICJ’s position 
cannot be interpreted to convey that international crimes can only be committed in a private 
capacity, or that if an international crime is committed in an official capacity, the official enjoys 
immunity.  
Accordingly, the following factors undermine viewing rules of attribution as a 
sufficient factor for the determination of rules of functional immunity. First, State practice and 
many legal authorities have held that functional immunity is not available to officials, even if 
committed in an official capacity. Secondly, the second interpretation of the ICJ’s dicta in 
                                                 
72 Jan Wouters, ‘The Judgement of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant 
Case: Some Critical Remarks’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 253, 263; Pinochet (No. 
3) (n 14) Lord Goff. 
73 Arrest Warrant (n 6) [61]. 
74 Akande and Shah (n 3) 839: the list was non-exhaustive and does not preclude the possibility 
that there is a rule removing immunity ratione materiae in relation to prosecutions for acts amounting 
to international crimes,. 
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Arrest Warrant illustrates that the list proposed by the ICJ was not exhaustive. Finally, the 
categorisation of international crimes as private acts will preclude States’ responsibility, which 
undermines the justifiability of relying only on the rules of attribution to determine the 
functional immunity of officials.  
4.2. Rules of Attribution and Dual Responsibility  
The application of the rules of attribution to functional immunity rejects the possibility 
of dual responsibility for the State and its officials. In Jones v Saudi Arabia, the House of Lords 
relied on the rules of attribution to hold that the Saudi official in question enjoyed immunity. 
This approach was not based on a doctrinal basis relating to the rules of functional immunity 
per se but, rather, on the misconception that the rules of functional immunity are only 
dependent on the rules of attribution,75 and consequently, the attribution of conduct to the State 
necessarily implies the existence of immunity.76 Despite the fact that the rules of functional 
immunity partly depend on the differentiation between private and official conduct, and for 
official conduct, the rules of attribution could be helpful from a practical perspective, this test 
is not determinative, and the rules of attribution are legally distinct from the rules of functional 
immunity. 
Moreover, in Jones, one of the Law Lords contended that,  
international law does not require, as a condition of a State’s entitlements to 
claim immunity for the conduct of its servant or agent, that the latter should have 
been acting in accordance with its instructions or authority … [and a] State may 
claim immunity for any act for which it is, in international law, responsible, save 
where an established exception applies.77  
 
Consequently, it could be argued that the application of the rules of attribution to 
                                                 
75 Jones v Saudi Arabia (n 47) [12, 76, 78]. 
76 Finn Seyersted, ‘Jurisdiction Over Organs and Officials of States, the Holy See and 
Intergovernmental Organisations (2)’ (1965) 14 ICLQ 493, 493–525. 
77 Jones v Saudi Arabia (n 47) [12]. 
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functional immunity has the potential to assimilate State immunity with functional immunity,78 
an idea which is rejected in Chapter 5. 
The rules of attribution apply in determining whether the conduct of a State amounts to 
an internationally wrongful act. The ‘rules of attribution make no distinction as to the function 
underlying the exercise of public powers by the State official or State organ in question’.79 
Even State immunity does not depend on the attribution of conduct to the State. In this regard, 
Douglas asserts that rules of State immunity have been developed, 
 to reconcile a conflict between the right of the forum State to exercise 
adjudicative competence and the right of the foreign State to exercise sovereign 
rights without interference from the forum State … [Further, unlike] the rules of 
attribution, the law of State immunity is concerned with the function underlying 
the exercise of public powers because this is essential to the reconciliation of the 
competing interests of the forum State and the foreign State.80 
In the commentary of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the ILC emphasised 
that the prosecution of officials ‘certainly does not exhaust the international responsibility 
incumbent upon the State for internationally wrongful acts which are attributed to it in such 
cases by reason of the conduct of its organs’.81 Moreover, in the preliminary and second report 
on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, the ILC asserted that 
immunity and State responsibility are two different issues.82 The ILC asserted that the 
individual responsibility of officials and States could be concurrent; ie the attribution of 
                                                 
78 See generally, Michael Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1972) 46 BYBIL 145; 
Ingrid B Wuerth, ‘Foreign Official Immunity: Invocation, Purpose, and Exceptions’ (2013) 23 
SwissRIntl & EL 214. 
79 Douglas (n 9) 294. 
80 ibid. 
81 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (Nov 
1997) Supplement No 10, chp.IV.E.1, A/56/10 114, art 19 and its commentary. 
82 ILC, ‘Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’ (n 
7) fn 51; ILC, ‘1996 Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (1996) 51 UN 
GAOR Supp. (No 10) at 14, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.532, corr 1, corr 3: art 4 provides that the responsibility 
of individuals for crimes against the peace and security of mankind is without prejudice to any question 
of the responsibility of States under international law. 
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conduct to the State does not necessarily connote to the existence of immunity of officials.83 
Similarly, in Bosnia v Serbia the ICJ noted that individual and State responsibility are distinct 
and may arise simultaneously.84 It has been asserted that ‘the difference is that imputability is 
a necessary but not sufficient requirement for the qualification of an act as in law the act of the 
State’.85  
4.3. Rules of Attribution and Crimes Committed in the Territory of the Forum 
State 
This claim that rules of attribution are not necessarily determinative of the operation of 
the rules of functional immunity is also supported by the fact that officials have been held 
personally accountable for acts committed in the territory of the forum States. The acts for 
which functional immunity was rebuked were acts conducted in an official capacity. The 
position taken here is that attribution and functional immunity are not the same and could occur 
concurrently. In other words, State responsibility and individual responsibility could occur 
concurrently. While the attribution of conduct to the State is a relevant factor in determining 
the availability of functional immunity, it cannot be determinative, as it can play no role in 
balancing the competing interests of the States involved.86 
While the rule of attribution cannot justify the absence of functional immunity for 
ordinary crimes committed in the territory of the forum State, the absence of functional 
immunity can be explained by the breach of the duty of non-intervention in the affairs of the 
                                                 
83 ILC, ‘Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’ (n 
7) fn 51; ILC, ‘1996 Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (n 82): art 4 
provides that the responsibility of individuals for crimes against the peace and security of mankind is 
without prejudice to any question of the responsibility of States under international law. 
84 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 43 [171–74]. 
85 Alebeek (n 22) 146, 117, emphasis added. 
86 Dinstein illustrates that the rules of attribution are not applicable in relation to diplomats 
enjoying functional immunity: rather, functional immunity only covers official functions, Dinstein (n 
32) 82–84. 
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forum State. In other words, if the acts conducted by the official are acts, which the forum or 
the receiving State has not consented to, the official does not enjoy immunity regardless of the 
fact that they were conducted in an official or private capacity.87 This is especially applicable 
when the act is committed under the authority of the home State of the officials, but without 
the consent of the forum State. That is when the act is a criminal offence under the law of the 
forum State and/or is illegal under international law (eg kidnapping in the territory of the forum 
State88)89. 
State practice also indicates that, in the absence of the consent of the territorial State to 
the acts in question, the forum State has no obligation to recognise the functional immunity of 
the officials.90 In Khurts Bat91 the appellant, a former Head of the Office of National Security 
of Mongolia, was arrested in the UK pursuant to a European arrest warrant in connection with 
charges in Germany (kidnapping and false imprisonment of a Mongolian national). The 
appellant challenged the extradition request made by Germany. The English High Court held 
that the appellant did not enjoy immunity ratione materiae.92 The Court also noted that ‘there 
                                                 
87 ILC, ‘Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’ (2008) (n 5) para 163; 
see also Sanger (n 16) 217; Dinstein (n 32) 88; Foakes (n 53) 161; Alebeek (n 22) 119–24. 
88 Khurts Bat v Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court (High Court) (2011) 147 ILR 
633; R v Lambeth Justices Ex p Yusufu, Also known as: R v Governor of Brixton Prison Ex p Yusufu 
[1985] Crim LR 510; Alebeek (n 22) 119–24; Sanger (n 16) 209. 
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during an international armed conflict, where lawful combatants had acted in compliance with 
international humanitarian law are immune from the local criminal jurisdiction of the State; Robert Y 
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as long as they do not violate the laws and customs of war. 
90 The Staschynskij Case, 18 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen 87 (Federal 
Republic of Germany, Bundesgerichtshof, 1962); Public Prosecutor at the Tribunal of Milan v Adler 
(Monica Courtney) and others (First instance judgment) No 12428/09, ILDC 1492 (IT 2010), 1st 
February 2010, Court of First Instance; R v Lambeth Justices Ex p Yusufu (n 88); Foakes (n 53) 163; 
Alebeek (n 22) 125. 
91 Khurts Bat v Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court (n 88) 633-35, 655 and paras. 
61-105. 
92 ibid. 
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is a dearth of cases which have decided that an official acting on behalf of a State is entitled to 
immunity from criminal prosecution in respect of offences committed in the forum State’.93  
In R v Mafart and Prieur94 two French nationals had participated in sinking a ship called 
the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour on the orders of the French government. The New 
Zealand High Court convicted the two agents of manslaughter. The Court therefore did not 
consider whether the orders were carried out in the performance of their official functions and 
functional immunity was not considered.95 Further, it asserted that ‘the fact that the defendants 
acted under orders [of the French government] is not a matter upon which I place any great 
weight’. The defendants were convicted of manslaughter and wilful damage.96  
Accordingly, when a crime has been committed in the territory of the forum State or a 
crime has been committed in the territory of a State requesting extradition of the accused, 
national courts have held that acting under the order or authority of a foreign government is 
not the only legally determinative factor.97 Just as the denial of functional immunity for acts 
committed in the territory of the forum State cannot strictly be justified on the basis of ‘acts 
committed in an official capacity’, the same argument applies to the denial of immunity to 
officials for the commission of international crimes outside their territory. 
4.4. Rules of Attribution with Respect to Civil and Criminal Proceedings 
The following arguments support the idea that civil and criminal proceedings should 
not be differentiated on the basis of the rules of attribution. First, if a State can deny functional 
immunity to an official on the basis of discerning official from non-official conduct and in 
consideration of the prohibitive rules of international law, there would be no reason to 
differentiate between civil and criminal proceedings. Consequently, the assimilation of State 
                                                 
93 ibid. 
94 R v Mafart and Prieur (New Zealand, High Court) (1985) 74 ILR 241 241–51. 
95 ibid. 
96 Mafart and Prieur (n 94). 
97 Sanger (n 16) 218. 
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responsibility and functional immunity has the potential to lead to incoherent legal outcomes 
in relation to civil and criminal proceedings.  
For instance, in Pinochet III it was asserted that had Pinochet been sued in a civil 
proceeding, he would essentially have enjoyed immunity in respect of the crimes in question, 
as the acts would have been attributed to Chile. This conclusion was reached by Lord Hutton 
and Lord Phillips.98 The same acts would be treated differently, not on the basis of the 
differences between criminal and civil proceedings or the nature of the act as a crime in 
international law; but rather, on the fact that a civil suit against an official may be attributed to 
the State.99 If the test is to distinguish between private and official conduct, then it is not clear 
why one has to differentiate between civil and criminal proceedings in this way.100 Moreover, 
the international responsibility of the State does not distinguish between civil and criminal 
responsibility and ‘it is a single undifferentiated concept of responsibility’.101 
It is also often contended that ‘the foreign State is indirectly impleaded when civil 
proceedings are brought against one of its officials so that, for instance, the State would be 
expected to satisfy any judgment of damages awarded against the official’.102 That said, States 
have no obligation under international law ‘to indemnify their functionaries in respect of 
judgments rendered against them by [foreign] national courts’.103 Moreover, there is no factual 
evidence that officials sued in foreign courts have been reimbursed by their home State for the 
damages awarded.104  
However, if the proceedings are brought on the basis of the same acts, ie international 
                                                 
98 Pinochet (No 3) (n 14) [264 and 286]. 
99 Pinochet (No 3) (n 14) Lord Hutton 264, Lord Phillips 286, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 254; 
See also, Elizabeth Franey, Immunity, Individuals and International Law: Which Individuals Are 
Immune from the Jurisdiction of National Courts Under International Law (Lap Lambert Academic 
Publishing 2011) 204. 
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101 ibid. 
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crimes which create responsibility both for the State and the individual, it is difficult to argue 
that a State violates its duty of non-intervention in the affairs of the other State by initiating a 
civil proceeding against a foreign official. Accordingly, from this perspective, neither 
criminal105 nor civil proceedings106 can be conceived of an act which amounts to an 
infringement of the duty of non-intervention. 
Individual liability could arise from international law (ie international crimes) or the 
domestic law of the forum State. As noted in the previous section, individual liability in the 
domestic law of the forum State could arise when an official is acting in an official capacity 
but that the actions in question are in violation of the duty of non-intervention in the affairs of 
other States (ie conducted without the consent of the forum State). This test does not 
differentiate between civil and criminal proceedings and is consistent with State practice in 
relation to crimes committed in the territory of the forum State. 
Secondly, State practice in relation to the rules of functional immunity of officials in 
civil proceedings with respect to international crimes should be seen in light of the rules of 
jurisdiction. In the case of Jones, the House of Lords granted immunity ratione materiae to 
Saudi Arabian officials in a civil suit in respect of allegations of torture.107 This case was based 
on the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction in absentia, as the defendant was a Saudi official 
and residing in Saudi Arabia. On this basis, civil proceedings ‘do not depend upon the physical 
presence of the defendant official and may proceed (particularly where former officials are 
involved) without the official's home State even being aware of the proceedings’.108 As noted 
                                                 
105 Foakes (n 53) 142. 
106 Parlett (n 8) 63; Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Another 
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in Chapter 3, the United States Supreme Court in Kiobel held that the requirement of nexus (ie 
sufficiently “touch and concern”) to the United States was essential to rebut the presumption 
against the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction109 for cases brought under the Alien Claims 
Tort Act.  
As the chapter on jurisdiction argued, one of the conditions for the exercise of 
adjudicative universal jurisdiction over international crimes is the presence of the perpetrator 
on the territory of the forum State. In respect of criminal proceedings, the most important nexus 
was the presence of the perpetrator in the territory of the forum State. This nexus between the 
offence or the offender and the forum State in respect of civil proceedings against a foreign 
official could also translate to the possession of assets and properties in the territory of the 
forum State or the presence of the offender in the territory of the forum State for the exercise 
of adjudicative civil universal jurisdiction. 
It was also argued that criminal universal jurisdiction must be exercised on a 
subsidiarity basis. In other words, the foreign State must have failed to prevent the commission 
of the crime, as well as to prosecute the offenders. In this respect, one could argue that there 
may be situations in which it would be disproportionate to grant functional immunity in civil 
proceedings to foreign officials in relation to international crimes; further, one condition to 
ascertain when considering ‘proportionality is whether there is an effective domestic remedy 
for the [international crime] within the foreign state’.110 
There is also support for this approach in the practice of the United States in relation to 
the unavailability of immunity ratione materiae in civil proceedings for international crimes.111 
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US law and practice suggest that a subsidiarity basis and the nexus between the forum State 
and the offender or offence could also be applicable in civil proceedings. For example, the 
United States Torture Victim Act (s2(b)) provides that a ‘court shall decline to hear a claim 
under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the 
place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred’.112 Thus, there is good argument 
both in theory and in practice (Kiobel and the United States Torture Victim Act) for the 
applicability of the conditions of the exercise of universal jurisdiction to civil proceedings. In 
this respect, it is not surprising that, due to the artificial difference between civil and criminal 
proceedings, other States are slowly beginning to award damages to victims of international 
crimes by foreign officials.113  
It must also be noted that, in other cases, in which States have accepted the pleas of 
functional immunity of officials,114 the invocation of the defence of immunity would not have 
arisen had the courts considered the issue of jurisdiction. In all of these cases whereby the plea 
of functional immunity was upheld, the officials or ex-officials were not even present in the 
territory of the forum State and that there was not any evidence that these officials had personal 
properties in the territories of the forum State for the purposes of civil proceedings against 
them. First, in those cases the upholding of immunity was based on the misconception about 
the relationship between the rules of immunity and jurisdiction. Secondly, it could be attributed 
to the belief that international law does not allow universal civil jurisdiction in respect of 
international crimes. The recognition that civil proceedings also require a nexus to the offence 
or the offender is important, as in most cases where the civil suits against officials have been 
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rejected, national courts would not have had adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction. This is 
supported by the fact that neither the foreign officials were present in the territory of the forum 
State, nor was there any evidence that they had assets or properties in the territory of the forum 
State115 or at any point were present in their territories. 
Thirdly, allowing civil suits against officials for the commission of international crimes 
is in line with the interests that these norms protect. If the objective of prosecution of those 
accused is to uproot such international crimes in the community of States, then civil suits could 
also dissuade officials from committing such acts and provide damages to the victims (which 
is at the core of civil suits).116 This is particularly important as the commission of mass 
violations of human rights generally occurs in failed States and/or States with high levels of 
financial corruption.117 Civil suits are used for punitive purposes, and there is no sound 
doctrinal justification for their inapplicability in relation to international crimes.  
The arguments here can be summarised as follows. First, functional immunity depends 
on the differentiation between official and private conduct and is not necessarily dependent on 
the attribution of conduct to the State. Secondly, State practice in relation to the rules of 
functional immunity in civil proceedings should be viewed in light of the rules of universal 
jurisdiction. Thirdly, civil suits have been used as punitive measures and could be effective in 
fighting impunity, as there is a correlation between corruption and the commission of 
international crimes. Fourthly, there is evidence in legal authorities that the legal consequences 
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of international crimes should also extend to the civil responsibility of individuals and that 
victims of international crimes should be compensated. Finally, civil proceedings in relation to 
international crimes against foreign officials do not amount to interference in the internal 
affairs of other States more than criminal proceedings (Chapter 3). 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter also considered that the existence of universal jurisdiction does not 
automatically lead to the revocation of officials’ immunity and that the absence of immunity 
does not lead to the existence of universal jurisdiction (Section 2). It also argued that the 
existence of adjudicative and enforcement universal jurisdiction is dependent on the absence 
of the functional immunity of officials (Section 2). The rules of jurisdiction precede the rules 
of immunity and for the ascertainment of the rules of jurisdiction the rules of immunity should 
be considered (Section 2). Both the rules of immunity and jurisdiction seek to achieve a balance 
between the rights of the States involved (Section 2). Whilst the absence of functional 
immunity in respect of international crimes is based on dual responsibility of the crimes, the 
existence of the right of universal jurisdiction was argued to be based on the erga omnes 
character of international crimes (Section 3.1 and Chapter 3, Section 3). 
Functional immunity benefits both the State and its officials; thus, if functional 
immunity is to be rebutted for an act, that act must be prohibited both at the State and individual 
level (Section 3.1). This chapter also argued that functional immunity is not necessarily 
dependent on the rules of attribution of State responsibility (Section 4). The rules of attribution 
cannot give proper weight to the part of the function of the rules of functional immunity which 
gives protection to officials, as individuals are differentiated from the protection that functional 
immunity grants to States (Section 4.3). This view is also supported in the legal literature and 
many of the national decisions are not in line with the assertion that the attribution of conduct 
to the State entails the availability of functional immunity (Section 4.4). The fact that officials 
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have been held personally responsible for crimes committed in the territory of the forum State, 
even if the conduct was attributed to the State when the actions in question amounted to 
infringement of the duty of non-intervention in the affairs of the forum State, illustrates that 
the rules of attribution can be determinative in ascertaining functional immunity (Section 4.4).  
It was argued that the rules of attribution lead to an artificial distinction between 
criminal and civil proceedings and that instead the emphasis should be on the act as a crime in 
international law, rather than the mode of proceedings (Section 4.5). This was justified on the 
basis that functional immunity depends on discerning official from private conduct, unless an 
act is prohibited both for the State and individuals, and does not depend on the attribution of 
conduct to the State (Section 4.5). This chapter also proposed that State practice in relation to 
the rules of functional immunity in civil proceedings should be viewed in light of the rules of 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction (Section 4.5).
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Chapter Five: Personal Immunity of States and Officials and 
International Crimes 
1. Introduction 
Chapter Four argued that functional immunity is not available for international crimes 
as they create obligations both for States and their officials. As functional immunity is available 
both for the benefit of the State and its officials, its revocation can be justified if both the State 
and the official concerned breach their obligations under international law. That said, if the 
operation of personal immunity is similar to functional immunity, then this will undermine the 
justification regarding the unavailability of functional immunity for the commission of 
international crimes (Chapter Four).  
The rationale for the absence of functional immunity of foreign officials is not 
applicable to the personal immunity of officials because the operation of personal immunity of 
officials is different from the functional immunity of officials under international law (Section 
2). A general rule of customary international law has emerged which requires an explicit 
exception to the rules of personal immunity of officials and States, either in conventional law 
or customary law (Sections 2 and 3.1) 
First, the functional immunity of officials is different from the restrictive immunity of 
States (Section 2). Functional immunity is discerned by distinguishing official from non-
official functions, but State immunity comprises exceptions in international law (acta jure 
gestionis) (Section 2.1). It argues that, for determining the availability of functional immunity, 
the judicial authorities exercise discretion in discerning official from non-official conduct, 
whereas in determining State immunity, it is merely the consideration whether the facts of a 
case fall within one of the accepted exceptions to State immunity (Section 2.2). In other words, 
it is the recognition of the exceptions to personal immunity in international law which 
determine the availability of personal immunity of States.  
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Secondly, the nature of the rules of personal immunity with respect to States and their 
officials is essentially the same (Section 3.1). In other words, an explicit waiver of (personal) 
immunity by the home State of official or the existence of an exception is needed to rebut the 
personal immunity (Section 3.1). This chapter considers the State practice on personal 
immunity of officials and the rationales behind such immunity. First, personal immunity is 
granted to high-ranking officials on the basis of the duty of non-intervention, which is 
expressed as the function theory (Section 3.1). Secondly, the primary beneficiary of immunity 
ratione personae is the State, which is ultimately entitled to waive an official’s immunity since 
personal immunity is based on the status of officials to perform the essential tasks of the State 
(Section 3.1).  
The contention that a rule of customary international law has developed in relation to 
personal immunity is supported by the fact that the personal immunity of officials is absolute 
and has only been rebuked if there is an exception (Section 3.1). The development of an 
exception to rules of the personal immunity of officials in customary law is also considered in 
light of the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Section 3.2). An exception 
to the rules of personal immunity in respect to crimes under the ICC Statute for crimes 
committed in the territory of other States is under development in international law (Section 
3.2). There are also circumstances in which a State may be able to reject pleas of personal 
immunity of foreign officials on the basis of the plea of necessity in international law (Section 
3.2). Accordingly, a State can, under international law, justify such non-compliance with its 
international obligations in certain factual circumstances based on the plea of ‘necessity’ in 
international law (Section 3.2).  
Thirdly, the justifications based on the conflict of norms in relation to international 
crimes - some which have gained the status of jus cogens - and the rules of immunity are not 
based on sound legal justifications (Section 4). More specifically, the arguments based on the 
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bifurcation of the rules of immunity to substantive and procedural rules are not sound (Section 
4). This is contended on the grounds that the procedural basis of the rules of immunity relates 
to their function rather than their status in international law (Section 4). The status of rules of 
immunity in international law is based on their customary law status1. This section also 
suggests that substantive/procedural-based arguments cannot properly account for other 
principles of international law and State practice (Section 4).  
2. Functional Immunity and Personal Immunity 
This section demonstrates that there is a difference between the functional immunity of 
officials and the personal immunity of States, both in State practice and in doctrine. If the 
operation of the rules of personal immunity and functional immunity are indistinguishable, one 
cannot propose that a rule of customary law has developed in relation to personal immunity 
that rules of personal immunity can be rebutted only when specific exceptions to personal 
immunity are recognised under international law. 
This section considers whether assimilation of the immunity of States with the 
immunity of officials is justified by both doctrine and practice. The discussion is based on the 
fact that State immunity and the immunity of officials are constructed by a similar principle, 
and that there is some overlap between the two regarding their justifying rationale (ie the duty 
of non-intervention)2. That said there are also some distinctions between personal and 
functional immunity which need to be taken into account as they affect the operation of these 
rules. 
2.1. Acta jure imperii and Immunity ratione materiae 
This section considers the link between ‘official conduct’ and acta jure imperii. One 
prominent view assimilates personal immunity with functional immunity by assimilating acta 
                                                 
1 See generally the immunities chapter Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn, CUP 2010). 
2 ibid 531–34. 
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jure imperii/acta jure gestionis differentiation with officials/private acts.3 This approach 
considers that acta jure imperii necessarily give rise to immunity ratione materiae. 
At least in the judgments of national courts, this could be attributed to the terminology 
adopted, rather than an actual belief that the functional immunity of officials is similar to the 
restrictive immunity of States. For instance, in Holland,4 where the plaintiff was a US citizen 
teaching at a US military base in the United Kingdom, who was sued for libel,5 Lord Hope 
stated that ‘it is the nature of the act that determines whether it is to be characterised as jure 
imperii or jure gestionis’. 6 Lord Hope further asserted that at first sight writing a memorandum 
'by a civilian educational services officer in relation to an educational programme provided by 
civilian staff employed by a university seems far removed from the kind of act that would 
ordinarily be characterised as something done jure imperii’.7 Hence, although the terminology 
adopted seems to suggest that the immunity of States and functional immunity are 
indistinguishable, the House of Lords reiterated that the fact that the official enjoyed immunity 
was because the act was performed in an official capacity.8 
For determining the functional immunity of an official one has to consider whether the 
acts were conducted in an official capacity and if such acts infringe the prohibitive rules of 
international law. The prohibition of the act in international law (international crimes) or in the 
domestic law of the forum State, if the act amounts to a breach of the duty of non-intervention, 
justify revoking the functional immunity of officials (Chapter Four). 
The availability of State immunity invokes a determination of whether the alleged acts 
                                                 
3 Holland v Lampen-Wolfe (House of Lords) [2000] 119 ILR 364, 364–65; ILC ‘Immunity of 
State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’, Memorandum by the Secretariat, (2008) 
A/CN.4/596 161; Lozano v Italy (Appeal Judgment) Case No. 31171/2008, ILDC 1085 (IT 2008); 
Holland v Lampen-Wolfe, Lord Hope 371-72. 
4 Holland v Lampen-Wolfe (n 3). 
5 ibid 365. 
6 ibid 371–72. 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid 365; see also 369, 372, 373, 376, 377-378. 
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fall within the exceptions; the courts have been rigid in conducting this particular exercise, and 
reluctant to allow other substantive rules of international law to expand on these.9 Indeed, 
national and international courts have been reluctant to recognise any exception to the rules of 
State immunity outside the exceptions in the UN Jurisdictional Immunities Convention 
(UNCJIS), which are widely representative of customary international law.10 These exceptions 
mainly relate to personal injury and death or to the economic activities of States, which have a 
link to the forum State (generally territorial but also including passive and active personality).11 
The tort liability under the European Convention is more limited than the UNCJIS, as it 
excludes the liability of a State’s armed forces.12 The ILC13 and ICJ14 have also noted that the 
tort exception does not apply to armed conflicts. The ICJ affirmed that this rule was supported 
by State practice and opinio juris of States.15 
National and international courts when discussing the personal immunity of States refer 
to the fact that State immunity is procedural by nature; however, they concomitantly note that 
no exception to State immunity has emerged in international law for the commission of 
                                                 
9 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) [2012] ICJ Rep 
99. 
10 Siderman de Blake v Argentina, 965 F2d 699 (9th Cir 1992) 103 ILR 455; Al-Adsani v Kuwait 
(QB, 3 May 1995) 103 ILR 420; Al-Adsani v Government of Kuwait and Others (1996) 107 ILR 536; 
Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2001) 34 EHHR 11 [55]; Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and Another (Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Another Intervening) 
(House of Lords) (2006) 129 ILR 630; Case of Jones and Others v The United Kingdom (App no 
34356/06 and 40528/06) ECHR 14 January 2014 [79]; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 9) [59–
77 and 84]; Margellos and Others v Federal Republic of Germany (Greece, Special Supreme Court) 
(2002) 129 ILR 525526-33; Bouzari and Others v Iran (ONCA) (2004) 128 ILR 586 586. 
11 Letelier v Republic of Chile, 488 F Supp 665 (DC 1980) 63 ILR 378, 378-79; Liu v Republic 
of China 892 F 2d 1419 (9th Cir 1989) 110 ILR 520; Bouzari and Others v Iran (n 10) [45-47]. 
12 European Convention on State Immunity of 16 May 1972 (European Treaties, N 74) (opened 
for signature on 16/5/1972, entered into force on 11/6/1976) arts 11 and 31; Margellos v Germany (n 
10)533; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 9) [62-3 and 67]; McElhinney v Ireland (ECtHR) 
(2001) 123 ILR 73 [38]. 
13 ILC Yearbook 1991, A/CN.4/SER.A/199l/Add.l (Part I) 45 [10]: the ILC has noted that the 
art 12 of the UNCJIS does not apply to ‘situations involving armed conflicts’. 
14 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (n 9) [62–64]. 
15 ibid 77. 
 215 
international crimes (Section 4)16. This reasoning conveys that, unless an explicit exception 
exists, personal immunities will be upheld. Considering this strict approach by national and 
international courts, it becomes apparent the procedural notion to which legal authorities refer 
has been mainly used to denote the way these norms interact with other norms of international 
law. The reference to the procedural nature of personal immunity conveys an implicit 
acknowledgement that personal immunities are upheld unless there is an explicit exception in 
international law, rather than it being strictly their “procedural nature” which conveys their  
function (Section 4). 
Moreover, there are also examples of State practice which have first differentiated 
between acta jure imperii/gestionis and official acts on the basis that there needs to be a 
recognised exception to State immunity and which have also held that illegal acts in 
international law remove the cloak of functional immunity but not the personal immunity of 
States.  
In Khurts, the English High Court held that the defendant, a Mongolian official, did not 
enjoy ratione materiae in respect of crimes committed in Germany for kidnapping and false 
imprisonment.17 The High Court differentiated this from State immunity, holding that the 
prohibition of torture in international law did not enable the United Kingdom to assert 
jurisdiction since there was no accepted exception to State immunity from civil jurisdiction.18 
Additionally, Lord Hutton in Pinochet III stated that, ‘under international law Chile is 
responsible for acts of torture carried out by Pinochet, but Chile could claim State immunity if 
sued for damages for such acts in a court in the United Kingdom’.19 Moreover, on the basis of 
                                                 
16 Bouzari and Others v Iran (n 10) [18–37]; Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (n 10) [52–6]; 
Kalogeropoulou and Others v Greece and Germany (ECtHR, 2002) 120 ILR 537. 
17 Khurts Bat v Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court (High Court) (2011) 147 ILR 
633. 
18 ibid [72]. 
19 Regina v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) (House of 
Lords) (24 March 1999) [2000] 1 AC 147, 119 ILR 136 Lord Hutton 264; Robert Jennings and Arthur 
Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol 1 Peace (9th edn, Longman 1992) 545. 
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the findings in Chapter Four, it could be argued that General Pinochet would not have enjoyed 
functional immunity in a civil proceeding either. 
Similarly, in Hilao v Marcos,20 the relatives of alleged victims of torture, summary 
execution and enforced disappearance, claimed damages against the former President of the 
Philippines, his daughter, and the former head of military intelligence in the Philippines. The 
US Court of Appeals differentiated this case from Siderman v Blake.21 In Siderman the Court 
of Appeals held that, while the official acts of torture were in violation of international law, 
they, nevertheless, attracted State immunity.22 The US Court of Appeals in Hilao stated that 
the proceedings in Siderman were brought against the State itself, which was clearly within the 
ambit of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (ie it had to be considered within the 
enumerated exceptions in the Act), whereas in the present case, the proceedings were against 
an individual official who was accused of performing acts outside the scope of his authority.23  
The US Court of Appeals held that the acts complained of were clearly outside the 
authority of the President and had no official mandate.24 In this respect, ‘an examination of the 
law of State immunity shows that any restrictive rule of State immunity, although based in 
principle on the distinction between sovereign and private acts, is the subject of limited 
enumerated exceptions’.25 In line with the approach of the Court, it would ‘difficult to argue 
that a general rule exists for distinguishing between sovereign and private acts without 
reference to particularised exceptions, and no human rights exception has gained broad 
support’.26 
                                                 
20 In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation Hilao and Others v Estate of 
Marcos, 25 F 3d 1467 (9th Cir 1994) 104 ILR 120. 
21 ibid 122–25. 
22 Siderman v Argentina (n 10): did not fall within the exceptions of FSIA, however, State 
immunity was not granted to Argentina on a different legal basis (ie waiver of immunity). 
23 Hilao v Marcos (n 20). 
24 ibid. 
25 Kate Parlett, ‘Immunity in Civil Proceedings for Torture: The Emerging Exception’ [2006] 
EHRLR 49, 65. 
26 ibid. 
 217 
The distinction between functional and State immunity is also supported in national 
judgments. In Bouzari v Iran, the appellant initiated a proceeding in Canada against Iran for 
damages for charges, including kidnapping and torture amongst others.27 The reasoning of the 
Court of Appeal illustrated that, for determining the existence of State immunity (ie acta jure 
imperii), courts seek to identify whether any specific exception with regard to the immunity of 
States exists and the examination is not based on categorising the conduct as official or private 
conduct.28  
Two judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Al Adsani and 
Jones confirm the distinction made above between exceptions to personal immunity and the 
application of functional immunity of officials. The Court in Jones referred to State immunity 
as a procedural bar29 and the community of nations should accept any limitation to the doctrine 
of State immunity.30 In fact, the Court in Al Adsani explicitly distinguished the immunity of 
officials from the immunity of States and reiterated that the immunity ratione materiae of 
officials did not affect the immunity ratione personae of foreign States in respect of torture.31  
However, Orakhelashvili criticised the decision of the ECtHR in Al-Adsani, contending 
that the court did not make the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign acts in 
upholding the immunity of Kuwait.32 Further, he takes issue with the fact that the ECtHR 
                                                 
27 Bouzari v Iran, CanLII 64216 (ONCA 2003); Bouzari and Others v Iran (n 10). 
28 Bouzari and Others v Iran (n 10) [18–37] the Court of Appeal merely relied on the 1985 
Sovereign Immunities Act to ascertain whether the State enjoyed immunity. 
29 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (n 10) [52–6]; Kalogeropoulou v Greece and Germany (n 16); 
also see Case of Jones and Others v The United Kingdom (n 10) [191–205]: the Court differentiated 
between State immunity and the functional immunity of officials but reached the conclusion that 
functional immunity was available to officials in civil proceedings. 
30 Case of Jones and Others v The United Kingdom (n 10) [52–6]. 
31 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2 December 2004) 
A/RES/59/38 2004 art 3(2); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 3 
[51,53,57]; Affaire Kadhafi (France, Court of Cassation) (13 March 2001) Judgment No 1414, 125 ILR 
490 [508–10]; Pinochet (No 3) (n 19)509, 592, 642, 651 (Lords Millet, Hutton and Saville); Tatchell v 
Mugabe [2004] 53 ICLQ 769, 769-70; ILC, ‘Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction’ (2008) (n 3), at 61 fn 238; Devi v Rajapaksa, No 11 Civ 6634, 2012 WL 3866495 (SDNY 
2012) 3; Arrest Warrant [55]. 
32 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘State Immunity in National and International Law: Three Recent 
Cases Before the European Court of Human Rights’ (2002) 15 LJIL 703, 707. 
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recognised that the existence of a general rule of State immunity in international law, which is 
only subject to specific exceptions rather than consideration based on the official or non-
official capacity in which the act was committed.33 
Orakhelashvili’s criticism is rooted in the belief that under international law there is not 
a generally recognised legal principle on State immunity which is supported by customary 
international law.34 It must be mentioned that such a proposition is not necessarily correct. In 
spite of the fact that there may be differences in the practice of States regarding the exceptions 
to State immunity, it does not follow that “some” exceptions to State immunity have not 
crystallised in customary international law. In other words, the recognised exceptions to State 
immunity represent the exceptions acknowledged by almost all States or the majority of States. 
Thus, in a sense, one could argue that there is consensus around the accepted exceptions 
(Chapter Two). Moreover, it is the way that the rules of State immunity are understood that is 
crucial here. Whether such a specific exception has been recognised or not,35 or is in the process 
of development, is another matter. 
In line with the contention made here, Alebeek dismisses the views that assimilate the 
functional immunity of officials with State immunity (acta jure imperii)36 and proposes that 
the ‘act of State’ in functional immunity is an ‘autonomous concept unrelated to the concept 
of the sovereign act of State that controls the rule of State immunity’.37 Sanger also questions 
the assimilation of State immunity with functional immunity and argues that if the rationale for 
immunity (ratione materiae) is that acts performed by State organs or officials in an official 
capacity are acts of the State, why is it necessary to distinguish between acta jure imperii and 
                                                 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid 710. 
35For instance, only the US and Canada recognise a terrorism exception to State immunity. 
36 Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal 
Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2008) 2 and Chapter Three. 
37 ibid 7: reformulates the rules of state immunity, functional immunity and personal immunity 
of officials respectively as lack of special competence, absence of personal responsibility and immunity 
from jurisdiction. 
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acta jure gestionis?38 This criticism illustrates the inconsistency of the approach which 
assimilates the two immunities. In other words, discerning the immunity of officials cannot be 
based on two tests: it is either the same as the immunity of States (ie determined by the 
exception to State immunity – acta jure gestionis or it is determined by the distinction of 
official from non-official conduct. It is the exception to State immunity as acta jure gestionis 
that adumbrates the rules of State immunity and not the distinction between official and non-
official conduct.  
Parlett notes that an exception to State immunity in respect of international crimes 
which are also jus cogens can be achieved by developing a discrete exception to State immunity 
for violations of jus cogens human rights.39 The underlying reason why State immunity for 
international crimes has not been developed when compared to the individual responsibility of 
international crimes may have to do with State sovereignty. The difficulties which may arise 
include ‘defining appropriate remedies, and the establishment of necessary institutional 
procedures and safeguards’.40 Institutional issues ‘concern the availability of competent organs 
to determine whether or not a State is guilty of an international crime and the existence of 
credible enforcement procedures’.41 
There is, nonetheless, the possibility that an exception to the personal immunity of 
States and their officials for international crimes may be developed in international law 
(Section 3.2). For instance, a terrorism exception to the personal immunity of officials may 
emerge (as discussed earlier). In relation to the personal immunity of States, whilst traditionally 
exceptions to State immunity have been limited to the actions of States committed in the 
territory of the forum State, there are indications that an exception to State immunity may be 
                                                 
38 Andrew Sanger, ‘Immunity of State Officials from the Criminal Jurisdiction of a Foreign 
State’ (2013) 62 ICLQ 193, 212. 
39 Parlett (n 25) 66, emphasis added. 
40 Theodor Meron, ‘Is International Law Moving Towards Criminalization?’ (1998) 9 EJIL 18; 
Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 265. 
41 Meron, The Humanization of International Law (n 40) 267. 
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emerging for acts committed abroad. For instance, victims of terrorism (an act of torture, 
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking) and torture can initiate proceedings in 
the US against foreign States.42 Similarly, in Canada, victims can sue foreign States for terrorist 
acts committed abroad.43 In both cases, exceptions to immunity are applicable only if the State 
concerned has been nominated by the governments of the US44 and Canada45 respectively as 
the State sponsor of terrorism. 
2.2. Exercise of Discretion in Ascertaining Functional Immunity 
In ascertaining whether an official enjoys functional immunity, national courts exercise 
discretion to determine whether an act is exercised as part of the official function of the 
defendant or is a private act. That discretion does not apply to the personal immunity of States. 
In the case of immunity of States national courts consider whether the facts of a case fall within 
one of the accepted exceptions to State immunity.  
In Boyer,46 the plaintiff brought an action for libel against the Consul of Panama. The 
Consul-General had written a defamatory letter (about the plaintiffs) which was published in a 
newspaper in Panama.47 The Civil Court of Marseille held that the wording of the letter showed 
that the defendant intended to act in the exercise of his functions as Consul-General.48 
Functional immunity was granted to the defendant since those actions were considered to be 
part of the official functions of the Consul. In this case, the official was acting in an official 
capacity yet the State also would have enjoyed immunity as it was not an official activity for 
                                                 
42 28 USC 1605a - Terrorism Exception to the Jurisdictional Immunity of a Foreign State a 
(2)(ii)(I)-(III). 
43 Canada: Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act SC 2012, c 1, s 2 Assented to 2012-03-13 ss 
4(1) and 4(2) ‘if the action has a real and substantial connection to Canada or the plaintiff is a Canadian 
citizen or a permanent resident’; Canada: Criminal Code RSC, 1985, c C-46 pt II (1) s 83.01 defines 
terrorism which includes all of the terrorism conventions. 
44 28 USC 1605a (n 42) s 2(A)(i). 
45 Canada: State Immunity Act (RSC, 1985, c S-18) s 6(1). 
46 Boyer and Another v Aldrete (France, Tribunal Civil de Marseille) (1956) 23 ILR 445, 445-
47. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid 446. 
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which a State immunity exception had been established. 
In Bigelow,49 a US consul was sued for libel because he informed the press that the visa 
application of the plaintiff was rejected on the basis that the applicant was considered to be a 
spy. The French Court of Appeal stated that the ‘remarks made after the refusal of a visa of the 
passport of Zizanoff, appear quite materially distinct from the administrative act’ and that ‘the 
comments released to the press were not necessary to or indispensable to his official 
functions’.50 The Court further stated that the comments were a serious wrong susceptible of 
injuring private interests and had a personal character which was unconnected with the 
performance of the official duties of the defendant.51 The acts were thus considered to be of a 
private nature.  
These two examples illustrate that courts exercise discretion when making a distinction 
between official and non-official acts in order to determine the functional immunity of officials. 
There are some similarities between the two cases. In both cases, the officials concerned came 
across the information as a result of their official functions, disseminated the information to 
the media, and could not have done so if it not had been for their official positions. They were 
not actions of a purely private nature, for instance, as one related to a dispute regarding a 
commercial contract in which the official was a party in his individual capacity. Accordingly, 
the proper defendant in Bigelow should also have been the State had it not been for the 
discretion exercised by the court to discern official from non-official conduct. Thus, functional 
immunity is not as straightforward as determining whether the facts of a particular case fall 
within one of the enumerated exceptions to State immunity. 
2.3. UN Jurisdictional Immunities Convention 
The analysis of the UNCJIS is also necessary as the Convention might lend force to the 
                                                 
49 Bigelow v Princess Zizanoff (Court of Appeal of Paris) 23 AJIL 172, 172–79. 
50 ibid 177. 
51 ibid 179. 
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idea that the immunity of States and the functional immunity of officials are indistinguishable. 
First, the UNCJIS makes the exceptions to State immunity applicable to officials. ‘State 
representative’ in the Convention is defined as a representative of the State acting in the 
capacity of a representative of the State.52 It also covers additional entities and agents of the 
State when they are performing acts in the exercise of the sovereign authority of the State.53 
Accordingly, an official does not enjoy immunity in respect of certain acts considered as acta 
jure gestionis in civil proceedings.  
In Samantar v Yousef, the US Supreme Court held that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (which is similar to the provisions of the UNCJIS) covers the immunity of 
officials only in certain circumstances. 54 The Supreme Court held that the Act applies only 
where the term ‘official’ has been specifically used in the Act (eg acts causing injury or death), 
but the official concerned may still enjoy functional immunity in common law.55 The Supreme 
Court specifically held that term ‘organs of the State’ does not refer to individuals.56 
Moreover, the fact that the Convention is not yet in force does not add to the obligatory 
status of the provisions of this convention among those signatory States which are not part of 
customary international law. This is specifically relevant to the provisions relating to the 
representatives of States, in light of the fact that there is considerable State practice 
differentiating between the official acts of officials and acta jure imperii. The exceptions which 
are generally believed to represent customary international law are those relating to State 
immunity57 rather than the functional immunity of officials.  
Secondly, the exceptions in the Convention cannot cover questions of an official’s 
                                                 
52 UNCJIS (n 31) art 2 (1)(b)(vi). 
53 ibid art 2(1)(b)(iii). 
54 Samantar v Yousuf, 130 S Ct. 2278 (2010) [571]. 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid [569]. 
57 Jones v Saudi Arabia (n 10) [26] Lord Bingham; David P Stewart, ‘The UN Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property’ (2005) 99 AJIL 194. 
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immunity in civil proceedings, whether acting in a private or official capacity, against officials, 
which are not included within the exception in the Convention. The Convention applies to the 
economic activities of States, with the exception of Article 12, which relates to personal injuries 
and damage to properties. The acts which an official could commit in a private capacity for 
which the official does not enjoy immunity are limited to the exceptions which also apply to 
State immunity.  
Accordingly, the provision on State representatives can be interpreted as creating an 
explicit exception for acts, even those committed in an official capacity between signatory 
States, rather than assimilating the immunities of States and officials. These exceptions do not 
necessarily reflect the customary status of the rules of functional immunity. For instance, the 
ILC in its Second Report on Immunity of Officials suggested that an official performing an act 
of a commercial nature, if performed in an official capacity, enjoys immunity from foreign 
jurisdiction, but that the State itself, in respect of such an act, does not.58 
Foakes argues that the notion that functional immunity can apply to an official even 
when the State itself is not immune is ‘at odds with the orthodox theory that it is merely an 
aspect of the immunity of the State itself and exists to benefit the State, not the individual’.59 
While the assertion that immunity is primarily owed to the State is correct, as proposed in 
Chapter Four, the operation of functional immunity is also to protect officials from actions 
carried out in the performance of their duties. It was further noted that national courts consider 
the functional immunity of officials even if the State does not intervene in the proceedings.  
Thirdly, the Convention explicitly provides that it does not cover criminal proceedings 
                                                 
58 ILC, ‘Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: by 
Special Rapporteur Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin’ (10 June 2010) A/CN.4/631 para 28; ILC, 
‘Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction’ (2008) (n 3) para 161. 
59 Joanne Foakes, Position of Heads of State and Senior Officials in International Law (OUP 
2014) 141. 
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which can only relate to officials and specifically officials enjoying functional immunity.60 The 
UNCJIS covers acts of a foreign official which lead to bodily injury or death in the territory of 
the forum/receiving State. While the official does not enjoy immunity in a civil proceeding; 
the home State of the official is also responsible and does not enjoy immunity. The official 
may not enjoy criminal immunity from jurisdiction when the act is committed in the territory 
of the forum State if it is considered to be in breach of the duty of non-intervention in the affairs 
of the forum State (eg assassination or kidnapping).  
However, the official will enjoy criminal immunity if these conditions are not met. The 
approach, which assimilates functional immunity with that of State immunity, creates 
discrepancies between the functional immunity of officials in civil and criminal proceedings. 
In other words, the official may enjoy immunity in a criminal proceeding unless the act is 
considered as a breach of the duty of non-intervention, but loses his or her immunity in a civil 
proceeding in relation to the same act. The provision of the Convention can be interpreted to 
create an exception to the functional immunity of officials in civil proceedings rather than 
assimilating functional immunity with State immunity. 
As a result, the fact that there is some overlap between the functional immunity and 
State immunity in terms of the scope of acts covered does not justify assimilating the two. First, 
the purpose behind State immunity is the sole protection of the rights of the State. Secondly, 
the existence of the overlap between State immunity and functional immunity does not 
necessarily mean that they have arisen from the same rationale in international law. Rather, 
this overlap can arise by specific rules which control the operation of State immunity and 
functional immunity for certain acts. Functional immunity is based on discerning official from 
non-official functions, and State immunity is based on ascertaining whether the particular facts 
                                                 
60 UNCJIS (n 31), Preamble, art 2 and see art 3(2), which provides that that the provisions of 
the Convention are without prejudice to personal immunities enjoyed by heads of State. 
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of a case fall within an already accepted exception to State immunity in international law. States 
can create exceptions to the rule which otherwise controls the operation of functional immunity 
under international law. 
Moreover, State practice suggests that the test for determining functional immunity in 
civil proceedings as in criminal proceedings does not depend on the distinction between acta 
jure imperii and acta jure gestionis. When considering the immunity of officials enjoying 
functional immunity, national courts draw comparisons between the immunity of diplomats 
(Article 39 of the VCDR)61 and the functional immunity of officials. There are suggestions that 
State immunity is also distinct from diplomatic immunity.62  
The US Court of Appeals in Swarna, in relation to Article 39 of the VCDR, stated that 
‘immunity applies to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions … and it 
does not apply to actions that pertained to his household or personal life and that may provide 
at best an indirect rather than a … direct benefit to the diplomatic function’.63 The plaintiff in 
Swarna had alleged trafficking, involuntary servitude, forced labour, assault and sexual abuse 
and the Court held that the defendant’s employment and treatment of the plaintiff did not 
constitute official acts.64 It was thus held that the plaintiff was employed to meet private needs 
and not for any mission-related functions.65  
In a similar factual case, Baonan, which again involved a house servant employed by a 
former diplomat and the housewife of a diplomat,66 the Court held that the claimant did not 
                                                 
61 Pinochet (No 3) (n 19) Lord Browne-Wilkinson 152-157 and 202-203, Lord Hope 192-202, 
and Lord Saville 219-22: maintained that if s 20 of the State Immunity Act is read together with art 
39(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations then the effect would be that a former head of 
State is entitled to immunity in respect of acts which he had performed in the exercise of his functions 
as a head of State. 
62 ibid 173, Alun Jones QC, Christopher Greenwood, James Lewis and Campaspe Lloyd-Jacob 
for the appellants. 
63 Swarna v Al-Wadi, Al-Shaitan and State of Kuwait (US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit) 
(2010) 152 ILR 617, 629. 
64 ibid 619 and 632–35. 
65 ibid. 
66 Baonan v Baja and Others (Southern District of New York) (2009)152 ILR 596, 597. 
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enjoy immunity regarding human trafficking and forced labour as they were private rather than 
official acts.67 Accordingly, these cases suggest that the test in civil proceedings for 
determining functional immunity is the same as in criminal proceedings and does not depend 
on the distinction between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis. 
Furthermore, it was proposed that functional immunity should not be available to 
officials if the action is prohibited, both for the individuals and the State, when the action that 
is committed in the territory of the forum State amounts to a breach of the duty of non-
intervention. The exercise of authority in the territory of another State through agents of a State 
without the permission of the forum State is deemed as a breach of the duty of non-intervention 
in the affairs of the forum State. It should also be noted that acts which are not contrary to the 
law of the forum State that are conducted without the permission of the forum State are not 
deemed as a breach of the duty of non-intervention. Thus, even for crimes committed in the 
territory of the forum State, there is an obligation for both the State (duty of non-intervention) 
and the official (adhering to the laws of the forum State).  
The development of exceptions to the rules of State immunity may have contributed 
towards a misunderstanding of the relationship between the immunity of States and their 
officials. The contention that State immunity and the immunity of officials are distinct is 
supported, first, by State practice and other legal authorities, including remarks made by the 
ECtHR. Secondly, it must be noted that discerning official/non-official conduct inherently 
involves a discretion which is not applicable in relation to determining State immunity, which 
is only dependent on discovering whether the particular acts of a case fall within a recognised 
exception to State immunity. Thirdly, the reference to State representatives in the UNCJIS 
should not be read to give support to the idea of assimilating the personal immunity of States 
and the functional immunity of officials. Finally, functional immunity is for the benefit of both 
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the States and officials and the absence of State immunity does not necessarily follow the 
absence of immunity of officials.  
3. Personal Immunity of Officials 
3.1. Personal Immunity of Officials and International Crimes 
Today it is widely accepted that the immunity of State officials in international law is 
based on a combination of representative theory68, function theory,69 and the principle of non-
intervention.7071 Watts asserts that, while the earlier conception of immunity for heads of States 
made no distinction between the State and heads of State,72 today the immunity of a head of 
State is not coterminous with that of States.73 The purpose behind the personal immunity of 
States could best be explained as a tool for maintaining international relations by obligating 
States to respect the duty of non-intervention and abstain from undue interference in the affairs 
of other States,74 thereby allowing officials to perform their duties75 and maintain cooperation 
and peace through the participation of their representatives in inter-State affairs.76 
It has been contended elsewhere that the State is the primary beneficiary for immunities 
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ratione materiae and ratione personae and that ultimately the State is entitled to waive an 
official’s immunity, whether this is immunity ratione personae or immunity ratione 
materiae.77 This view was rejected in relation to functional immunity as it was argued in 
Chapter Four that the purpose of functional immunity is both to protect the officials as 
individuals and the State from the duty of non-intervention. As personal immunity is granted 
to an official because of the office that the individual holds to perform a State's most essential 
tasks, it can be revoked by the State concerned. The reasoning (ie whether the act is committed 
in an official capacity or not), which justifies the abrogation of immunity ratione materiae in 
respect of international crimes, is not applicable to the immunity ratione personae of officials, 
which is inherently attached to their status rather than their acts.78  
It is argued that the nature of the rules of personal immunity with respect to States and 
their officials is essentially the same. In other words, an explicit waiver of (personal) immunity 
by the home State of the official, or the existence of an exception, is needed to rebut the 
personal immunity which is justifiable on the basis of State practice and the rationales of 
personal immunity.79 Immunity ratione personae from foreign criminal jurisdiction covers all 
acts carried out by the official concerned during the period in office, both in his official or 
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private capacity, and includes conduct preceding his term of office.80 State practice has not 
contradicted the personal immunities enjoyed by high-ranking officials;81 in fact, there is a 
strong claim that there is consensus among States that high-ranking officials enjoy absolute 
immunity.82 However, the exercise of prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction (at the initial 
stages of proceedings, not including the trial) does not infringe the personal immunity of high-
ranking officials (eg investigations).83  
3.2. Development of Exceptions to Personal Immunity 
In conventional law the explicit exceptions to personal immunity enjoyed by heads of 
States and other high-ranking officials appear within the treaty establishing the ICC. Whilst 
subsection (1) of Article 27 (ie official capacity cannot exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility entailing the unavailability of functional immunity84) finds numerous precedents 
in international law,85 subsection (2) of Article 27 which revokes personal immunities enjoyed 
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by high-ranking officials in customary international ‘is without precedent in international 
criminal law instruments’.86  
It could be argued that, just as absolute State immunity morphed into a restrictive 
immunity by recognising exceptions to State immunity, there is the possibility that exceptions 
to the personal immunity of officials might arise in international law. Doctrines about 
international law and concepts of international law, such as the duty of non-intervention, are 
determined through the process of socialisation;87 thus, their contents are subject to be 
influenced by new norms and shared understandings. In this context, the establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court sheds light on the way in which the shared 
understanding of States on the personal immunities of officials may undergo modifications to 
include an exception to customary rules on the personal immunities of officials; specifically, 
with respect to officials who have committed crimes under the ICC Statute in the territory of 
other States.  
States Parties to the ICC have waived the immunities of their officials (whether 
personal or functional)88 for crimes enshrined in the ICC Statute in proceedings before the ICC 
or national courts of the States Parties89. The waiver of personal immunity in relation to crimes 
under the ICC Statute according to some is to be interpreted to have an effect not only in 
relation to States Parties and the ICC but also between the State Parties90.  
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The complete waiver of immunities under Article 27 does not apply to officials of non-
States Parties because States cannot revoke the immunities of officials of non-States Parties91. 
This position is in line with the fact that the application of rules of immunities of non-States 
Parties’ officials by the States Parties is governed by international law and is primarily derived 
from customary law rather than the ICC Statute. This is justified by Article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which holds that contracting States cannot create 
obligations for States that are not party to a Convention92. Simply put, officials of non-States 
Parties may still enjoy personal immunity in international law, because the State Parties to the 
Rome Statute cannot revoke immunities of officials of non-States Parties93.  
Having said that, personal immunities may not necessarily be applicable in proceedings 
before the ICC, as under its Statute, the immunities of officials have been completely revoked94; 
that is when the ICC has jurisdiction over an alleged offender95. Most States are party to the 
ICC Statute96, and the result of the provisions on jurisdiction and immunity of officials97 entails 
that the non-recognition of personal immunities of non-States Parties’ officials in two 
situations: One is when States Parties’ officials have committed crimes (under the ICC Statute) 
in a State Party98 while the other is when there is a referral by the UNSC which concerns 
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officials of non-States Parties99.  
The interpretation that holds that Article 27 applies to non-States Parties when the ICC 
has jurisdiction is supported by some domestic instruments implementing the ICC Statute. 
Some domestic instruments have not excluded the provisions of their implementing 
instruments from non-States Parties’ officials.100 As discussed, this may be inconsistent with 
Article 34 of the VCLT. However, if a rule has developed in customary law to recognise an 
exception to personal immunity of officials for the commission of crimes under the ICC Statute 
in the territory of other States, then States’ non-recognition of personal immunity of officials 
will not infringe their obligations under Article 34. 
Moreover, the drafting history of the ICC does not rule out the application of Article 
27 to officials of non-States Parties101. One earlier proposed version of Article 27 by the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court excluded the 
application of rules of immunity in the internal law of States and international conventions and 
treaties. If this language had been adopted in the ICC Statute102, it would have essentially 
limited the operation of Article 27 with respect to customary rules on immunity.  
Put differently, the earlier proposed version would have obliged the ICC in its 
proceedings against officials to take into account the rules of customary international law in 
relation to both the officials of States Parties and non-States Parties. In the end, the second 
proposal put forward by the Preparatory Committee, which excluded the application of rules 
of immunity whether on the basis of international law or national law of States103, was 
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adopted104 and formed the final text of the ICC Statute.  
However, some commenters have relied on the Agreement Between the UN and the 
ICC (UNICC) and specifically refer to its provision on the immunity of UN personnel (Article 
19)105 to conclude that Article 27 does not rebut the immunity of non-States Parties officials.106 
Under Article 19 of the UNICC, the UN has waived the immunities of officials arising from 
the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and relevant rules of 
international law.107 This argument follows that if immunities had been waived by Article 27, 
the inclusion of Article 19 in the UNICC would have been unnecessary108. 
That said, the inclusion of Article 19 in the UNICC can be explained by Article 98 of 
the ICC Statute. Article 98 (1) obliges the ICC not to proceed with a request for surrender or 
assistance if it would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international law with respect to the rules of State and diplomatic immunity109. Article 98(2) 
requires the ICC not to proceed with a request for surrender if it would require the requested 
State to act inconsistently with its obligations under its international agreements110.  
Hence, the inclusion of Article 19 in the UNICC precludes the requested State to rely 
on its international obligations under customary international law or international agreements 
(ie Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations) to withhold cooperation 
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with the ICC. Article 19 of the UNICC does not modify the operation of Article 27 or Articles 
12-13, which concern the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. More precisely stated, had Article 
19 not been included in the UNICC, the ICC could still have exercised jurisdiction over the 
official concerned but may have faced legal restrictions in securing assistance from States, as 
ICC State Parties could have invoked Article 98 to refuse to cooperate with the ICC. 
Additionally, given that the UNSC resolutions cannot change the rules of immunity in 
the ICC Statute111, if the position that Article 27 only applies to officials of States Parties is 
adopted, then referrals by the UNSC concerning prosecution of high-ranking officials would 
be thwarted. Equally, the UNSC acting under Chapter VII by invoking Article 16 of the ICC112 
-which defers prosecutions of the ICC for a period of 12 months113, has granted immunity to 
individuals (including officials of non-States Parties) who are involved in peace operations 
authorised by the UNSC. Deferral of prosecutions would not have been necessary had Article 
27 of the ICC Statute not removed immunities of officials of non-States Parties.  
In similar fashion, the facts arising from the issuance of an arrest warrant for an 
incumbent head of State by the ICC114 pursuant to a UNSC resolution115 further reveal that the 
ICC Statute revokes immunities of officials, including officials of non-States Parties. The 
ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber in the case of Al Bashir, which concerned the incumbent president 
of Sudan, unequivocally held that immunities of officials are not applicable once the 
jurisdiction of the ICC is established.116 The Pre-Trial Chamber stated that rules of personal 
immunity are not applicable in ICC proceedings; that there is no lacuna in this regard in its 
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Statute117 and that the prosecution based on a referral by the UNSC under Article 13(b) of the 
ICC Statute takes place within the framework of the ICC Statute118.   
The Pre-Trial Chamber did not consider the immunities enjoyed by officials under the 
customary international law when considering the applicable rules on immunity. Nonetheless, 
any request for cooperation or surrender by the ICC which concerns officials of a non-State 
Party may be inconsistent with the ICC’s obligations under Article 98119 since the ICC has to 
apply the immunities of officials under the customary international law when requesting the 
assistance of a State Party120.  
Hypothetically, the ICC can prosecute a non-State Party official who enjoys personal 
immunity, if a State chooses to cooperate with the ICC voluntarily, and that State surrenders 
the offender to the ICC. In any event, the ICC is the arbiter of the application of Article 98121 
and could determine that a request from a State Party to surrender a non-State Party official 
enjoying personal immunity is not inconsistent with its obligations under Article 98.  
The referral of the situation in Sudan by the UNSC and the issuance of arrest warrants 
by the ICC for the sitting head of State of Sudan (Al-Bashir) instigated the AU to make 
numerous unsuccessful attempts against the inapplicability of personal immunity of high-
ranking officials for crimes under the ICC's Statute. First, the AU attempted to persuade its 
members to refuse to cooperate with the ICC and take a unified stance against the arrest 
warrant122. Secondly, the AU attempted to persuade the UNSC to defer the situation in Sudan 
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by utilising its powers under Article 16 of the ICC Statute123. However, the AU did not expect 
to prevent the prosecution of the incumbent president of Sudan and mainly hoped to defer the 
prosecution of Al Bashir as the main objective of securing peace in Sudan, as this was deemed 
necessary by the AU124.  
Thirdly, the AU sought to modify Article 16 of the ICC to permit UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) to defer ICC prosecution for up to 12 months.125 The modification was pursued to 
allow the AU to participate in the decision-making processes of the international community 
which concerned an incumbent head of State in Africa.126 Finally, the AU attempted to clarify 
the rules of immunity under the ICC Statute in relation to officials of non-States Parties127.  
Having failed to achieve its objectives, the AU then adopted a broader policy to make 
amendments to Articles 16 and 27 of the ICC Statute to allow the UN UNGA to defer 
prosecutions by the ICC and to exclude the scope of operation of Article 27 from incumbent 
heads of State128. In this regard, acting on the AU’s mandate, Kenya formally deposited a 
request for an amendment to Article 27 of the ICC Statute129.  
However, there was not a uniform position among AU member States regarding the 
arrest warrant issued by the ICC against Al-Bashir130. As a result, any attempt to modify rules 
of immunity under Article 27 may not receive the support of all African States in the Assembly 
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of States Parties to the ICC, which comprise of only just under one-quarter of the ICC State 
Parties131. In fact, when the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC in 2014 did not consider the 
amendments proposed by the AU132, the AU only expressed its concern that the Assembly did 
not consider their proposed amendments133.  
Subsequently, two observations can be proposed with respect to the rules of immunity 
under the customary law. These observations arise from the application of the rules of 
immunity under Article 27 of the ICC Statute, concerning officials of non-States Parties for the 
commission of crimes under the ICC Statute in the territory of a State Party in the absence of 
a UNSC resolution. First, prosecuting officials of non-States Parties who enjoy personal 
immunity for crimes committed in the territory of an ICC State Party by the ICC will infringe 
international law. The ICC will breach customary rules on personal immunity of officials and 
Article 98 of its Statute, which obliges the ICC to consider the customary rules on State 
immunity when it requests for assistance from a State Party134. Conversely, prosecutions of 
officials of non-States Parties by the ICC will ultimately lend force to the recognition of an 
exception to the rules of personal immunity by influencing State practice in that regard.  
The recognition of an exception to the rules of personal immunity receives support from 
the fact that the ICC State Parties have waived the personal immunity of their officials inter se 
for crimes under the ICC Statute whether committed inside or outside their territories.135 
Moreover, Article 27 can be interpreted to indicate an implicit consensus among most States 
with respect to an exception to the rules of personal immunity of officials for crimes committed 
in the territory of other States. The contextual interpretation of Articles 12, 13 and 27 supports 
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the implicit consensus among States. Finally, the claim for an exception to rules of personal 
immunity is supported by the fact that some States have waived the immunity of non-States 
Parties officials in their domestic instruments implementing the ICC Statute.136 That being the 
case, the shared understanding of States on the rules of personal immunity may change in 
respect of the crimes under the ICC Statute committed in the territory of other States by foreign 
officials enjoying personal immunity.  
Having said that, the operation of Article 98 with respect to the rules of personal 
immunity in customary international law depends on the jurisdictional basis of the ICC. The 
operation of Article 98 would be different when the ICC or a State exercises jurisdiction over 
an official of a non-State Party under a UNSC resolution under Chapter VII137. That is in 
comparison to a situation whereby the ICC or a State Party exercises jurisdiction over an 
official of a non-State Party when the crime is committed in the territory of an ICC State 
Party138.  
There are two main perspectives on the application of customary rules of personal 
immunity when the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNCH) refers a 
situation to the ICC139. The first viewpoint holds that Article 103 of the UNCH not only applies 
to international agreements but also to customary international law.140 In other words, 
obligations under Article 25 of the UNCH, which obliges States to carry out UNSC resolutions 
                                                 
136 Schabas (n 84) 450. 
137 ICC Statute (n 85) art 13(b). 
138 ibid art 12(2)(a). 
139 ibid art 13(b). 
140 Akande (n 121) 342–48; ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi’ (2006) A/CN.4/L.682 para 345; 
Claus Kreß and Kimberly Prost, ‘Article 98’ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd edn, Beck/Hart 2008) 
1610–12; Gaeta (n 94) 323: takes the position that art 103 takes priority over other international 
obligations but differentiates ICC with the ICTR and ICTR with respect to availablity of personal 
immunities. 
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passed under Chapter VII, take priority over customary rules of immunity141. The second 
viewpoint maintains that Article 103 of the UNCH only applies to international agreements142 
and accordingly obligations of States under Article 25 of the UNCH cannot take priority over 
customary rules of immunity.  
The prevailing opinion on the operation of Article 103 of the UNCH is that the UNSC 
resolutions passed under Chapter VII take priority over most rules of international law143 
including the rules of customary international law144. This reasoning generally maintains that 
the powers of the UNSC to pass resolutions under Chapter VII of the UNCH are not 
unrestricted as they are limited by jus cogens.145 On that basis, a UNSC resolution referring a 
case to the ICC can either explicitly or implicitly146 revoke the personal immunity of an official 
of a non-State Parties both for the proceedings before the ICC and States.  
In the legal literature, there is support for the idea that personal immunities are not 
applicable in proceedings of international criminal tribunals147 by generally relying on the 
judgments of international criminal tribunals. In this respect, the second perspective rather than 
                                                 
141 Akande (n 121) 342–48; ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (n 140) para 345; Kreß and Prost (n 140) 
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relying on the status of a tribunal as an international tribunal per se emphasises the mandate 
granted by the international community, which can clarify the legal obligations under 
international law with respect to proceedings of international tribunals.  
From this perspective, the inapplicability of the customary rules of personal immunity 
in international criminal tribunals can be justified by the mandate granted by the international 
community to the international tribunals to prosecute officials enjoying personal immunity and 
the binding nature of the UNSC resolutions148. The Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone stated that personal immunities are not available in tribunals which are not organs 
of a State but derive their mandate from the international community149. This could be 
expounded to refer to the mandate granted by the majority of the States to the UNSC - powers 
under Chapter VII of the UNCH and mandate granted to the ICC by the majority of States to 
the ICC -, which finds support in the ICJ’s judgment in Arrest Warrant. The ICJ with respect 
to personal immunity of high-ranking officials in Arrest Warrant stated that,  
“[these officials] may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain 
international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. Examples include the 
[ICTY], and the [ICTR], established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 
under Chapter VII of the [UN] Charter, and the future [ICC] created by the 1998 
Rome Convention. The latter’s Statute expressly provides, in Article 27, 
paragraph 2, that “[i]mmunities or special procedural … shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.”150 
 
Nevertheless, irrespective of the position adopted, the ICC can still exercise jurisdiction 
over the official enjoying personal immunity considering the referral procedures granted to the 
UNSC and inapplicability of immunity of officials under the ICC Statute. However, if Article 
103 is only applicable to international agreements, then it would be unlawful under customary 
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international law for States to surrender an official of a non-State Party who enjoys personal 
immunity to the ICC pursuant to a referral by the UNSC. Moreover, the ICC’s exercise of 
jurisdiction may also be unlawful under customary law, and the ICC may breach its obligations 
under Article 98 of the ICC Statute if it seeks assistance from State Parties. 
On the other hand, if the operation of Article 103 entails that UNSC resolutions passed 
under Chapter VII take priority over the rules of customary international law, then the ICC 
would not infringe its obligation under Article 98 or customary rules on personal immunity if 
it requests extradition of an official from ICC State Parties. This is equally applicable to States’ 
obligations under the customary international law. Accordingly, the application of the rules of 
personal immunity of non-States Parties’ officials depends on the jurisdictional basis of the 
ICC. Application of personal immunity of officials would be different under Article 98 and 
customary law if the viewpoint that Article 103 of the UNCH supersedes customary rules is 
adopted. 
Finally, there is also State practice that an exception to immunity ratione personae in 
respect of terrorist acts may be emerging. The US and Canada recognise the terrorism 
exception to immunity, which applies to both officials and States.151 In Flatow v the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the Court held that the terrorism exception overrides the common law 
doctrine of the head of State immunity and that the defence of the head of State immunity is 
not available under 28 USC s 1605.152 This section also maintains that, while under current 
customary law there is no exception to personal immunity, and that such an exception 
                                                 
151 Canada: State Immunity Act (n 45) ss 2(a), 2(1) and 6(1)-(2); Canada: Justice for Victims 
of Terrorism Act (n 43); 28 USC 1605a (n 42) s 1605 a(1); 28 USC 1603 - Definitions s 1603 (a)-(b). 
152 Flatow v Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F Supp 1 (DC 1998) 999; Edward Tracy v The 
Iranian Ministry of Information and Security [2014] ONSC, CV-14-10403-00CL 1696: Ontario’s 
Superior Court of Justice upheld a motion to enforce a judgment against Iran and two of its organs in 
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specifically with regard to international crimes may develop in international law. 
3.3. Personal Immunity of High-Ranking Officials Involved in Ongoing 
Commission of International Crimes 
This section considers whether a State which exercises adjudicative and enforcement 
jurisdiction over a high-ranking foreign official for international crimes committed abroad on 
non-nationals infringes its obligations towards the State whose officials have been the subject 
of such proceedings. It has already been contended that for a determination of the rules of 
jurisdiction, the rules of immunity should be considered. For the purposes of adjudicative and 
enforcement jurisdiction, it is assumed that the high-ranking official is present on the territory 
of the forum State and that violations of international crimes have been formally recognised by 
an international body. This section proceeds on the basis that a State has responsibility under 
international law to give effect to the personal immunity of officials under international law, 
even if such actions or omissions amount to violations of international crimes. It is contended 
that a State can, under international law, justify such non-compliance with its international 
obligations in certain factual circumstances on the basis of the plea of ‘necessity’ in 
international law. This section argues that States can reject pleas of personal immunity on the 
basis of the plea of necessity in international law in certain circumstances. 
The defence of necessity is provided in Article 25 of Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts while the ICJ in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 
stated that the conditions of the invocation of necessity as articulated in Article 25 reflect 
customary international law.153 Under Article 25 a State may invoke necessity for the 
commission of a wrongful act, if that act is the only way to safeguard an essential interest 
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against a grave and imminent peril.154 The wrongful act should not ‘seriously impair an 
essential interest or the interests of States towards which the obligation exists, or of the 
international community as a whole’.155 Boed had argued that the concept of necessity should 
reflect a balancing of the interests of the community of States rather than merely weighing the 
specific, inconsistent, interests of the two States.156 This was proposed as a recommendation 
on the basis of the ILC’s proposed Draft Articles in 1997, which did not include the interests 
of the international community within its definition of the plea of necessity.157  
In the Commentary to Article 25, the ILC explained that the plea of necessity could 
arise when there is a grave danger to the essential interests of the State or of the international 
community.158 The ILC explained that the plea of necessity to invoke a commission of a 
wrongful act ‘arises where there is an irreconcilable conflict between an essential interest on 
the one hand and an obligation of the State invoking necessity on the other’.159 The conflicting 
interests could be the interests of the international community on the one hand (protecting the 
non-commission of international crimes) and the interest of the foreign State to have the 
personal immunity of its officials upheld on the other. 
The ILC, on the first condition (safeguarding an essential interest from a grave and 
imminent peril) noted that the ‘extent to which a given interest is “essential” depends on all the 
circumstances, and cannot be prejudged’, but that it ‘extends to particular interests of the State 
and its people, as well as of the international community as a whole’.160 With regards to the 
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definition of “imminent”, the ICJ in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project stated ‘that a “peril” 
appearing in the long term might be held to be imminent as soon as it is established, at the 
relevant point in time, that the realisation of the peril, however far off it might be, is not thereby 
any less certain or inevitable’.161 The ICJ further noted that the ‘word “peril” certainly evokes 
the idea of “risk”: that is precisely what distinguishes “peril” from material damage’.162 The 
interest relied upon must outweigh other considerations, not only from the perspective of the 
State invoking the plea of necessity, ‘but on a reasonable assessment of the competing interests, 
whether these are individual or collective’.163 
The interests of the State which invoke the defence of necessity, would essentially be 
interests of the international community (ie international crimes), and would be against the 
interests of the other State, which also form part of the interests of the international community 
(ie the rules of immunity as part of customary international law representing the interests of 
the international community, which could be based on the accumulation of self-interest of 
States or on the legitimacy of norms). On that basis, a State could consider that a ‘peril’, which 
evokes the idea of risk, would be the likelihood of the commission of certain acts by officials 
of a State if the perpetrators remain unconstrained. Accordingly, based on the ICJ’s 
interpretation, it is sufficient that such risks are foreseeable and are highly probable rather than 
merely a possibility. 
This thesis has already argued that the interests of the community of States include the 
rule of customary international law. It has also been argued that crimes developed in customary 
international law because of their multilateral dimension could be considered as fully 
internalised norms (ie legitimate norms) but that the multilateral factor is not necessary to 
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determine the legitimacy of a norm. Thus, in terms of the values that the rules of immunity and 
international crimes protect, one cannot argue that international crimes trump immunity, as 
international law has not provided a criterion to distinguish rules of customary international 
law on the basis of their degree of internalisation. Article 25(b) entails that the act, upon which 
the plea of necessity relies, should not seriously impair an essential interest. It could be argued 
that the non-recognition of the plea of personal immunity of an official does not seriously 
impair the essential interests of the State whose official is implicated (or the interests of the 
international community), as it is only a temporary measure – the right of a foreign State’s 
official to personal immunity is not disputed.  
The legality of the invocation of the plea of necessity depends on whether the factual 
circumstances of any given case fulfil the criteria of the plea of necessity: there is a grave peril 
with a real and foreseeable risk of materialising which endangers an essential interest but which 
does not seriously impair other essential interests (whether arising out of bilateral obligations 
or obligations erga omnes). The balancing of essential interests should be carried out along 
with other factors (grave peril and imminent threat) on the basis of the factual circumstances 
but taking into account that such a measure is temporary. For example, in relation to the rules 
of the personal immunity of officials, the State invoking the defence of necessity argues merely 
that officials of a foreign State, due to factual circumstances, do not enjoy personal immunity 
on a temporary basis. In other words, ‘in invoking necessity a State does not assert a right in 
defence of its violation of the right of another State, but rather asserts that under the 
circumstances, international law should excuse its conduct’.164  
The case of Caroline could be explained on the basis of the plea of necessity. This case 
arose out of the destruction of a ship called the Caroline, used by Canadian rebels in 1837. 
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British armed forces destroyed the ship in the territory of the US.165 The US Secretary of State 
(Webster), in a letter written to the British Minister in Washington, stated that the ‘doctrine of 
non-intervention by one nation with the affairs of others is liable to be essentially impaired if, 
while Government refrains from interference, interference is still allowed to its subjects, 
individually or in masses’.166 The British Minister in Washington replied to Webster by 
invoking the plea of necessity and noted that the ‘necessity of self-defence and self-
preservation’ had been established as ‘Her Majesty’s subjects in Upper Canada had already 
severely suffered; and they were threatened with still further injury and outrage’.167 The right 
to non-intervention or the respect of the sovereignty of the US could be viewed in light of the 
interests of the British to avoid an imminent peril to their subjects in Upper Canada.  
Other cases where States have invoked the plea of necessity include the conservation 
of the environment and protection of straddling stocks,168 economic hardship,169 and the right 
of military intervention.170 Thus, the interests of the international community invoked may not 
necessarily be those institutionalised in international law. However, the interests of the 
international community in terms of the prevention of international crimes have already been 
institutionalised in customary international law. Thus, temporary detraction from another 
essential interest or community interest, ie the personal immunities of officials, could be 
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justifiable, especially if the official concerned is actively involved in an ongoing violation of 
an international crime. 
In Arrest Warrant, the ICJ held that the arrest warrant issued by Belgian authorities for 
the incumbent foreign minister of the Congo constituted a violation of a legal obligation by 
Belgium towards the Congo.171 Belgium could have, in that case, invoked the defence of 
necessity, arguing for the preservation of the interests of the international community in respect 
of its non-adherence to the rules of immunity if there were still ongoing mass violations of 
human rights in the Congo under the authority of the incumbent foreign minister of the Congo. 
This defence would have been dependent on the evidence of violations of human rights in the 
Congo and the foreseeable risk of such violations in the future, thereby justifying the rebuttal 
of the personal immunity of the incumbent foreign minister of the Congo.  
This is comparable to the Torrey Canyon incident, in which the British authorities 
bombed a Liberian oil tanker which had run aground just outside British territorial waters, in 
order to burn off the remaining oil on board to avoid an exacerbation of the existing oil leak 
into the sea.172 Arguably, the danger of the oil spill did not pose an existential threat to Britain; 
rather, the spill only threatened one of the State’s interests, namely the protection of the marine 
and coastal environment.173 If Belgium in Arrest Warrant could have proved a likely and 
foreseeable peril, Belgium could have, according to the arguments made here, argued the plea 
of necessity on the basis of the protection of the interests of the international community. 
International crimes are part of customary international law (and are erga omnes) and are 
arguably more important than the preservation of the environment, at least from a legal 
perspective, where most international crimes have also achieved the status of peremptory 
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norms.  
The “imminent” criterion in the plea of necessity may not be satisfied if a State cannot 
illustrate an imminent threat to the interests of the international community, but if a peril or 
threat to the interests of the international community is found, a State can refuse pleas of 
immunity, both ratione personae and ratione materiae. For instance, when the forum State has 
evidence that it is highly likely the officials concerned will commit international crimes, this 
claim is stronger when there is an ongoing commission of international crimes, because, as 
noted above, the ICJ has stated that the mere possibility of a peril is not sufficient for a plea 
based on necessity. The British, for instance, justified the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo 
as legal because it was declared a measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian 
catastrophe.174 
4. Procedural vis-à-vis Substantive Rules  
This section considers the conflict of norms between international crimes, some of 
which have gained the status of jus cogens, and the rules of immunity. It considers whether a 
conflict of norms approach is considered a better alternative to explain the interaction between 
the rules of personal immunity, functional immunity and international crimes. It was argued 
that international crimes which create a dual responsibility for States and individuals justify 
rebuking that immunity, as such acts cannot be considered official functions. The rules of 
functional immunity were also differentiated from the rules of attribution relating to State 
responsibility and State immunity. In relation to the personal immunities of States and officials, 
it was shown that a general rule of customary international law has developed, to the effect that 
States and their high-ranking officials enjoy immunity unless an explicit exception to immunity 
in international law has developed, or at least been accepted by the foreign State concerned. 
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This section begins with a brief introduction to the techniques for the resolution of conflict of 
norms, before considering procedural and substantive arguments (including peremptory 
explanations) in relation to the rules of immunity and international crimes. It argues that these 
techniques cannot fully account for the operation of the rules of immunity vis-à-vis 
international crimes.  
International law as a matrix of values not only endeavours ‘to protect individual human 
rights, but also runs on the basis of sovereignty and non-interference principles’,175 which are 
evident from the laws of immunity, human rights, international criminal law and international 
humanitarian law.  
In their Joint Separate Opinion, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal noted that, 
on the one scale, we find the interest of the community of mankind to prevent 
and stop impunity for perpetrators of grave crimes against its members; on the 
other, there is the interest of the community of States to allow them to act freely 
on the inter-State level without unwarranted interference … [Further,] 
international law seeks the accommodation of this value with the fight against 
impunity, and not the triumph of one norm over the other.176  
 
The question here is how this balancing or equilibrium between the rules of 
international law and their rationales should be conducted so as to properly take into account 
both State practice and the principles of international law, such as the duty of non-intervention. 
The ILC has stated that ‘the complexity of modern societies and their proclivity in absorbing 
conflicting objectives’ has led to ‘the emergence of conflicting rules and overlapping legal 
regimes at the international level’. 177 On this basis, the ILC noted that, in order to gain 
coordination at the international level, ‘increasing attention will have to be given to the 
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collision of norms and … methods and techniques for dealing with such collisions’.178  
Michaels and Paulwelyn have asserted that the problem of conflict of norms is 
particularly evident between functional sub-systems or branches of international law - trade 
and environment, finance, human rights, and so on.179 They have argued that the application of 
intra-systemic rules of lex superior, lex posterior, or lex specialis and the related quest for the 
genuine intent of international law’s “unitary lawmaker” have proven to be unsatisfactory.180  
Michaels and Paulwelyn have proposed a functional approach as a solution to the 
conflict of norms in public international law.181 They consider that, in intra-systemic conflicts, 
first, the focus is on balancing laws (eg intellectual property law versus antitrust law); secondly, 
the functional approach aims at coherence; thirdly, a functional approach can lead to mixed or 
compromise solutions.182 However, they suggest that whilst balancing as a conflict rule may 
work well within a system, they posit that it does not work well between sub-systems or 
branches of international law. 183 This is justified on the grounds that, international trade 
tribunals and environmental tribunals may each engage in rational balancing, and in the 
absence of a common, objective standard (available essentially only within a single “system”) 
the ‘value judgments involved in balancing are likely to lead to different results, depending on 
the values or perspectives inherent in the trade system as opposed to the environmental 
system’.184  
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner advocate a somewhat comparable approach, proposing 
that a conflict resolution must be based on developing transnational substantive norms which 
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look beyond the territorial, organisational and legal spheres of one particular regime or 
branch.185 They suggest that substantive norms should be ‘ordre public transnational’ which is 
an orientation towards a global public interest (constitutional rules).186 In spite of the fact that 
the rules of immunity and individual responsibility in respect of international crimes may be 
viewed as separate sets of rules, they have a direct impact on one another’s operations. As they 
are part of the same system (at least judicially), devising a substantive norm such as ‘ordre 
public transnational’ may not be necessary as the interests of the international community can 
be discerned from the rules of customary international law and their underlying justifications.  
Accordingly, balancing as a conflict resolution tool may not necessarily prove to be a 
useful tool in relation to the rules of immunity and individual criminal responsibility. In such 
cases, the offenders will either be tried in the ICC or national tribunals. The ICC has its own 
rules on immunity; thus, it could be considered a self-contained regime, such as international 
trade or environmental tribunals. Prosecutions in national courts on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction, however, raise questions of international law as they may give rise to State 
responsibility in international law for the prosecuting State. It could be argued that the 
developments of the rules of immunity and individual criminal responsibility have, to some 
extent, been independent from each other in international law due to the existence of self-
contained regimes (such as the ICC and other international tribunals set up by the UNSC). 
However, it must be noted that national courts (judgments of national courts are the main 
source of the rules of immunity) when considering a case have to take into account both sets 
of rules in international law. The decisions of national courts indicate that they have considered 
both sets of rules even in the absence of a clear delineation of the two sets of norms in 
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international law, as they are both part of public international law. 
Having said that, there is another dimension to the conflict of norms, specifically with 
regard to international crimes which have gained the status of jus cogens, and rules of immunity 
which have been bifurcated to procedural and substantive rules by some legal authorities. 
Discussions on the interaction between peremptory norms or international crimes and the rules 
of immunity fall within the larger discussion on conflict of norms. Notably the ILC, in its 
discussion on the fragmentation of international law, devoted a section to peremptory norms 
and other rules of international law.187  
It is argued here that the “superior” status of peremptory norms and the bifurcation of 
the rules of immunity to personal and substantive categories cannot provide a sound legal 
justification for the conflicts of international crimes (and peremptory norms) and the rules of 
immunity. The ICJ in Germany v Italy held that the rules of State immunity are procedural in 
nature and cannot be overridden by substantive rules of jus cogens.188 The Court’s decision has 
significantly influenced legal scholars and national and regional courts’ opinions on this 
issue.189 Prior to the judgment of the ICJ, legal authorities were divided on the application of 
peremptory norms to State immunity: whilst most had rejected this proposition,190 some had 
favoured such an approach.191 That said, amongst legal authorities there is still support for the 
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idea that jus cogens could trump the rules of immunity, especially the functional immunity of 
officials when officials commit international crimes which are carried out in a large-scale and 
systematic way.192  
Generally, when national and international courts have granted immunity to States and 
officials, they have done so on the basis that these norms are procedural in nature. Accordingly, 
the arguments of legal authorities in this respect can be summarised as follows. First, 
peremptory norms are also procedural in nature so that they trump the immunity of high-
ranking officials and States193. Secondly, immunity ratione materiae is a substantive rule of 
international law so it is trumped by jus cogens but jus cogens cannot trump personal 
immunities since personal immunities are procedural rules. 194 Thirdly, the immunity ratione 
personae of officials (or States) is jus cogens195 and thus cannot be trumped by jus cogens. In 
the first case, peremptory norms trump both personal and functional immunities, and in the 
latter cases, peremptory norms only trump functional immunities, as both are considered to be 
substantive.196  
There are general issues with propositions based on jus cogens, which were considered 
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in Chapter Two.197 Parlett contends that the trumping argument is contingent on all necessary 
rules for the enforcement of a jus cogens norm also having jus cogens status.198 Alebeek argues 
that deploying the jus cogens argument to trump immunities is problematic because it requires 
sliding from the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of certain conduct to the nature of the rule 
allowing or requiring enforcement of that prohibition in foreign national courts.199  
Moreover, the arguments above are also problematic from the substantive/procedural 
distinction perspective. The ILC in its second report implied that both immunities ratione 
materiae and ratione personae are procedural in nature.200 Most recent judicial authorities seem 
to agree that both immunities ratione personae and ratione materiae are procedural in nature.201 
Thus, arguments that functional immunities are substantive are subject to the criticism of the 
bifurcation of rules of immunity into procedural and substantive norms on no legal basis.  
The aforementioned arguments have not only led to myriad of solutions to the conflict 
between international crimes of jus cogens status and rules of immunity, but have also arguably 
fallen short of explaining why jus cogens cannot trump State immunity. Further, at a minimum, 
such explanations perceive an endpoint for the development of international crimes in this 
regard, not leaving any room for modification of the rules of immunity. In addition, they fall 
short of explaining the interaction between international crimes which have not achieved the 
status of jus cogens and rules of immunity. Moreover, as these explanations are either based 
on a substantive/procedural categorisation of rules of immunity and/or jus cogens status of 
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rules of immunity and international crimes, due to their normative nature they cannot give 
effect to other principles of international law and the relevant State practice. 
More generally, the arguments that revolve around the substantive/procedural 
categorisation of rules of immunity or peremptory norms are subject to the criticism that all 
these norms are part of general international law and are consequently of the same ranking 
(hierarchically or in terms of their legal effects). Although the function of rules of immunity is 
procedural, they are, nonetheless, derived from customary international law. International 
crimes such as torture, genocide, and crimes against humanity have also developed in 
customary international law. On that basis, it could be argued that the procedural-based 
explanation is defective because it incorporates a new hierarchical status among rules of 
international law, or at least changes the interaction between rules of international law on a 
spurious legal justification.  
It is not contended here that violation of peremptory norms or international crimes 
should automatically provide access to international courts when, for example, under their 
statutes, they have no jurisdiction (a procedural rule) or that personal immunity should be 
overridden. This line of reasoning only exposes the inadequacies of a procedural-based 
explanation as a conflict resolution technique between the norms of immunity and international 
crimes or peremptory norms. 
The argument here is that the procedural nature of rules of immunity cannot affect the 
normative arrangements of the rules of international law as both sets of norms have been 
established in customary international law, ie they represent the interests of the international 
community (either on the basis of shared interests or on the legitimacy of the norms). In other 
words, there are three sets of norms which enshrine the interests of the international 
community: personal immunity; functional immunity; and international crimes – some of 
which have reached the status of jus cogens. Chapter Two argued that customary law could 
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give rise to rules which are based on the accumulation of the self-interests of States and rules 
which are also perceived as legitimate. In Chapter Two, it was argued that with regards to 
crimes which give rise to the dual responsibly of the State and individual in customary law, 
due to their multilateral dimension, one could infer that the interests they protect are fully 
internalised norms and perceived as legitimate. It was not argued that the multilateral 
dimension of a rule was a necessary factor for a rule to be recognised as legitimate. On that 
basis, one cannot conclude that rules of immunity are either based on the accumulation of the 
self-interest of States or are norms which are also perceived to be legitimate.  
In a somewhat similar fashion, Orakhelashvili considers that the distinction between 
procedural and substantive norms is not based on consistent conceptual and normative grounds 
and that all ‘international norms derive from the agreement of States or acceptance by the 
international community as a whole, and there are neither established criteria nor a recognised 
agency to split them into such categories’.202 Orakhelashvili considers this distinction as 
“artificial”, which ‘does not reflect the functions international law actually accords to its 
various rules, and is instead a product of political and ideological preference to keep particular 
classes of plaintiffs out of certain jurisdictions’.203 
The procedural status of rules of immunity can only be explained based on the functions 
of these norms as procedural norms for international and national courts. It is argued that the 
procedural status of rules of immunity is not based on sources of international law. In other 
words, the creation of rules of immunity in international law does not bifurcate rules of 
immunity into procedural or substantive rules. Specifically, universal jurisdiction in 
international law is ‘a State’s international capacity or competence under international law to 
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prosecute and punish for commission of a crime’.204 Jurisdiction in municipal law is ‘whether 
a certain executive, legislative or judicial organ is competent in a given case under the 
applicable constitutional or statutory provisions’.205 Accordingly, the operation of universal 
jurisdiction or any other form of jurisdiction depends on the operation of the domestic laws of 
States and, specifically with regard to universal jurisdiction, is dependent upon the 
incorporation of rules of international law in domestic legal systems for most States (excluding 
States which have adopted a monist approach to the operation of international law in their 
domestic legal systems).  
As the chapter on universal jurisdiction illustrated, a State is entitled to exercise 
universal jurisdiction on a subsidiarity basis but its actual operation depends on its 
incorporation into States’ domestic legal instruments. Whether one State has incorporated 
international law rules on universal jurisdiction in its domestic legal system does not define the 
ambit of international law on universal jurisdiction. Thus, jurisdiction, which is a procedural 
rule in a domestic legal system, has a different meaning in relation to the rules of immunity in 
international law. In international law rules of jurisdiction and immunities are all customary 
international law or part of general international law. 
Furthermore, with regard to international courts, their procedural rules are clearly set 
out in their statutes (eg rules of jurisdiction). On that basis, any developments and 
modifications of (procedural) rules of immunity in international law should consider State 
practice (eg legislation or case law) and the interpretations of international courts of these rules, 
rather than the interpretation of an international court on its own procedural rules (eg relating 
to jurisdiction or immunity). In other words, proceedings before international courts which 
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directly engage the rules of that court’s jurisdiction (such as the ICJ206) or the immunity of 
States/officials (eg the ICC, ICTY and ICTR) cannot be taken to represent international law on 
their own. These rules are procedural for these courts but, at the same time, they are part of the 
larger substantive development of rules of international law as customary international law. 
It is thus argued that, to clarify the interaction between the rules of laws of immunity 
in international law and international crimes, the centre of the focus should be on their 
development in customary international law, rather than their function as procedural rules of 
national and international courts. In a similar vein, Orakhelashvili argues that, instead of 
relying on the artificial distinction between procedural and substantive norms in terms of their 
interaction with other rules of international law, there should instead be a focus ‘on the specific 
contexts in which particular rules of international law operate’, ie how States have designed a 
specific norm, what framework it forms part of, what particular function it performs as part of 
the international legal system, and how it relates to other rules.207 From a legal perspective, it 
was contended that that a general rule of customary international law has developed which 
provides that States are not allowed to rebut the personal immunity of officials or States unless 
an explicit exception has been developed in customary international law or is applicable 
because of the operation of an international treaty.  
5. Conclusion 
This chapter argued first that there is a distinction between functional immunity and the 
restrictive immunity of States (Section 2). The recognition of exception to personal immunity 
should not be confused with the discretion courts exercise in determining official from non-
official conduct in respect of functional immunity (Section 2). The practice of national and 
international courts illustrates that the personal immunity of States and officials has been 
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upheld there is an exception to immunity exists in international law (Sections 2 and 3.1). It was 
argued that the practice of national courts in this respect is illustrative of the fact that a general 
rule of customary international law could be said to exist in respect of the personal immunity 
of States and their officials (Sections 2 and 3.1).  
It was argued that the ICC’s Statute revokes the immunities of officials when the 
jurisdiction of the ICC is established, in accordance with the provisions of its Statute (Sections 
2 and 3.1). For that reason, it was proposed that the practice of the ICC and its influence on 
State practice could change the shared understanding of States with respect to international 
crimes committed by officials enjoying personal immunity in the territory of other States. This 
is reinforced by the fact that AU’s attempts to modify Article 27 of the ICC’s Statute was 
unsuccessful, that the majority of States including most African States have waived the 
immunity of their officials under the ICC Statute, and that some States have waived the 
immunities of officials of non-States Parties officials in their domestic legislations intended to 
incorporate the ICC Statute. Furthermore, the operation of Article 98 is different depending on 
the jurisdiction basis of the ICC, in other words, the unavailability of personal immunity in 
cases by the UNSC, is due to the overriding effect of the UNSC Resolutions passed under 
Chapter VII with respect to the rules of immunity. 
This chapter also contends that the substantive and procedural distinction of rules of 
immunity resembles an artificial construct in respect of their interaction as rules of customary 
international law with other rules of international law (Section 4). The function of the rules of 
jurisdiction of international and national courts should not be confused with their status in 
international law as rules of customary law (Section 4). Their creation and the methods of their 
interaction with other rules of international law are based on their status as rules of customary 
law, rather than their substantive or procedural functions (Section 4).  
This alternative explanation on the basis of conflict of norms between international 
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crimes and rules of immunity was considered because there is widespread reliance on the 
arguments based on jus cogens/procedural/substantive as techniques for the resolution of 
conflict of norms among legal authorities in relation to the interaction between the rules of 
immunity and international crimes (Section 4). Putting aside the stance of the legal authorities 
on the issue of the substantive/procedural/jus cogens basis of rules of immunity and 
international crimes, the judgments of national and international courts in relation to the 
personal immunity of States and officials illustrate that personal immunities have always been 
upheld unless an explicit exception exists in international law (Sections 2, 3.1 and 4). Thus, 
reliance upon the substantive/procedural distinction of the rules of immunity is an unnecessary 
factor in determining the availability of immunity of States and their officials (Section 4).  
Accordingly, the proposed criteria in this thesis offer a better explanation in 
determining the immunity of officials and States in respect of international crimes. It was 
argued in Chapter Four that functional immunity of a foreign official can be withheld on the 
basis of individual and State responsibility with respect to international crimes committed 
abroad. The personal immunity of States and officials can only be withheld if an exception to 
the personal immunity of officials and States has developed in customary international law or 
is excepted by other means (eg an international treaty) (Sections 2, 3.1 and 4). This statement 
should be read with the qualification of the defence of necessity in international law with 
respect to foreign officials enjoying personal immunity (Section 3.2).
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Conclusion 
This thesis illustrated that crimes which give rise to the dual responsibility of the State 
and individual could be created in customary international law by adopting a constructivist 
approach to the formation of custom. It was argued that custom could be created by binding 
usus, which is determined through the socialisation process in the social structure of the State 
system. Accordingly, custom could be created when there is a consensus regarding the status 
of an act as binding usus and a rule as custom. On that basis, it identified some crimes which 
give rise to the dual responsibility of the State and individual in customary law. This thesis 
identified international crimes as customary rules which can give rise to erga omnes obligations 
because international crimes represent the interests of the international community that are 
legitimate. It was contended that violations of erga omnes obligations create a right for non-
injured States to exercise universal jurisdiction subject to certain conditions.  
In relation to the rules of jurisdiction, it was contended that States can exercise any 
form of jurisdiction subject to the duty of non-intervention and rules of immunity. This thesis 
also posited that the rules of functional immunity are based on discerning private from official 
conduct, subject to the prohibitive rules of international law. In this context, since functional 
immunity was argued to be for the benefit of States and their officials, it can only be rebutted 
if the prohibitive rules address both States and officials (ie international crimes). In relation to 
personal immunity, it was argued that there is a consensus in the international community 
regarding the existence of a customary rule which prohibits the lifting of the immunity of 
incumbent high-ranking officials unless an explicit exception has been created in international 
law (ie the similarity between the personal immunity of officials and States). 
Specifically, on the basis of the findings of this thesis, it can be proposed that States 
can exercise prescriptive and adjudicative universal jurisdiction (ie investigations and the 
issuance of non-binding arrest warrants) in absentia over officials enjoying functional 
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immunity for violations of international crimes. States can also exercise adjudicative and 
enforcement universal jurisdiction for violations of international crimes if the official enjoying 
functional immunity is present in the territory of the forum State. States can exercise 
prescriptive and adjudicative (investigation part) universal jurisdiction in respect of officials 
enjoying personal immunity. States can also exercise adjudicative and enforcement universal 
jurisdiction if the official enjoying personal immunity is in the territory of the forum State 
based on the plea of necessity in international law in certain factual circumstances. There is a 
strong doctrinal claim, on the basis of the protection of the interests of the international 
community, that universal jurisdiction is also applicable to civil proceedings.  
Having said that, since all these modes of exercise of universal jurisdiction are based 
on the interests of the international community (either through erga omnes obligations or the 
defence of necessity in international law), the procedural legitimacy of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction should be taken into account. The most important factor identified was recognition 
by an international body such as the UNGA or the UNSC of the potential commission of 
international crimes. A State which is acting as a trustee of the international community and is 
exercising universal jurisdiction is not acting to pursue self-interests but rather the interests of 
the international community which are also perceived as legitimate (fully internalised norms, 
ie international crimes). Thus, it is necessary to consider the recognition of the international 
community in respect of the potential commission of the crimes. 
Chapter One argued that the notion of community is intrinsically intertwined with the 
notion of obligations, normative convictions and shared interests among States. By adopting a 
constructivist approach, it was held that, from a legal perspective, the interests of the 
international community are norms that have been internalised by most States (either to the 
second or third-degree) and are also institutionalised in international law. The institutionalised 
norms in international law would be based either on the self-interests of States (second-degree 
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internalisation) or the legitimacy of the norm (third-degree internalisation). This distinction 
between institutionalised rules in international law and the level of internalisation of norms is 
important, as it avoids a misunderstanding that equates the legality of a norm to the end 
spectrum of the level of internalisation of a norm. 
The distinction between rules of international law which have been internalised to the 
third-degree (ie legitimate norms) and those which have internalised to the second-degree 
(based on self-interests), is important from a legitimacy perspective of the rules of international 
law. Legality and legitimacy are related but are not coextensive. In other words, legality does 
not connote to legitimacy and vice versa. Scholars writing on legitimacy have generally 
included the legality of a norm as a factor in determining the legitimacy of a norm, as was 
alluded to in Chapter One. The interests of the international community which are perceived 
as legitimate by some States or by most States, but are not institutionalised in international law, 
could influence the development of international law in line with the normative convictions of 
the norm. 
Chapter One further proposed that rationalist theories fail to account for three 
phenomena in relation to international law. First, they cannot account for compliance with 
international law that is inexplicable, based only on material factors (eg coercion and sanction). 
Secondly, they cannot account for the rules of international law which are not wholly based on 
the self-interests of States. Thirdly, they cannot account for the influence of international law 
(which is part of the social structure of the State system) on States’ actions and interests. The 
rationalists only consider the construction of structure by agents – ie the generation of the social 
structure of the State system by States. This belief cannot naturally take into account the 
influence of international law on States’ interests and actions. 
The idea that States' interests are socially constructed and guide State behaviour on the 
basis of a constructivist idea of the mutual constitution of agent and structure, provides a better 
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alternative to study the creation of rules in international law, as well as a different context by 
which to view how international law relates to States' interests and the interests of the 
international community. Accordingly, accepting that States' actions and interests can be 
influenced by shared understandings in the social structure of the State system illustrates how 
custom creation that is based on State practice could be produced, and how customary rules 
relate to the interests of States and the interests of the international community. 
Chapter Two applied a constructivist approach to custom creation to determine how 
international crimes are formed in customary international law and the link between customary 
rules and the interests of the international community. Custom could be created on the basis of 
binding usus alone when there is a consensus in the international community. The desires or 
beliefs of States could only be portrayed in the form of actions, and distinguishing between 
belief and action creates a circular understanding of opinio juris and State practice, ie by 
inferring one from the other. Both binding usus and individual customary rules are determined 
through the discursive practices prevalent in the international community through consensus.  
It was also contended that, since custom is based on a form of action (whether viewed 
as opinio juris and State practice or State practice alone), it will comprise the interests of the 
international community (whether norms are based on the self-interests of States or are 
perceived as legitimate). The rules of customary international law could be categorised into 
two groups by adopting a constructivist approach: first, the customary rules which have been 
internalised by States only to the second-degree (based on self-interests); and secondly, rules 
which have been fully internalised by States (ie perceived as legitimate). In other words, 
custom alone cannot differentiate between legitimate norms or norms based on the self-
interests of States. 
Actions always succeed the beliefs or desires of States. Opinio juris in this context is 
an attempt to capture the desire of States in relation to the binding status of a norm. Since desire 
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can only be portrayed in the form of action, it is the actions of States which should provide 
guidance on the creation of new customary rules. Chapter Two also considered practical 
problems associated with adopting a distinction between opinio juris and State actions. For 
instance, the fact that States generally do not have a separate organ in charge of synchronising 
State actions in terms of the rules of customary international law, naturally entails that, even 
within a State, different branches of a government may have different views on a particular 
customary rule.  
In this context, the interpretation of State actions and opinio juris would fall into 
subjectivity based on the values of the interpreter, especially if the individual consent of States 
is required rather than a consensus approach, as it could lead to data selection, even among the 
organs of a State. Both the doctrine and practice of the ICJ support the idea that consensus is 
at the core of custom formation. This was argued on the capacity of custom to bind eventually 
even persistent objector State, and the fact that the pedigree of the persistent objector rule itself 
may not be as established as generally believed. This was held to be in line with the ICJ’s 
approach which generally finds the status of a rule as customary international law on the basis 
of a consensus of States, rather than viewing individual State practices.  
This assertion that custom is based on consensus should also be considered in light of 
the fact that some legal scholars have viewed the source of legal obligations in the social 
character of inter-State relations1. Moreover, a constructivist understanding of the social 
structure of the State system also emphasises the consensus aspect of the creation of mutual 
expectations within the State system. The shared understanding on binding usus or other indicia 
which make rules binding, is generated in social settings involving many States and other State 
system-level entities, such as international courts and organisations evolving over a long 
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period. In that respect, it is difficult to see how one State alone can resist the system-level 
culture in the long term.  
Treaties and resolutions of international organisations could be considered as binding 
usus and generally also convey a sense of communal consensus on the status of a rule as 
customary international law. On that basis, Chapter Two argued that international crimes not 
only include so-called “core crimes”, but may also include crimes such as terrorism, hijacking, 
kidnapping and other crimes under the conventions which have received near-unanimous 
recognition by States and establish dual responsibility for States and individuals. The fact that 
there is a consensus in the international community regarding the status of these crimes in 
customary law is also supported by the fact that many States have criminalised these acts in 
their domestic legislation. 
The recognition of crimes based on their status in international law as customary rules 
provides a better alternative than an understanding of international crimes on the basis of non-
legal considerations, such as their gravity or one based on factors such as prosecution in 
international courts. Nonetheless, the gravity of an act and the prosecution of crimes in 
international courts could expedite the process of its institutionalisation in international law 
and internalisation by States which have not internalised these norms. Despite the fact that the 
gravity of an offence may propel actors to internalise a crime more rapidly on the basis of its 
perceived higher legitimacy, this does not affect the legal consequences of that crime vis-à-vis 
other crimes which do not enjoy the same gravity in customary international law.  
It is the status of crimes in international law which defines their legal consequences, 
rather than factors shaping their creation in the social structure of the State system (ie their 
internalisation and their institutionalisation in international law). In spite of the fact that jus 
cogens have a strong claim of high legitimacy (due to their resistance to change) and have 
generally been associated with the interests of the international community, the concept of jus 
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cogens cannot answer some fundamental questions regarding individual responsibility 
affirmatively. This is because the source of jus cogens remains contentious and there is a lack 
of consensus on its content.  
In other words, one cannot be certain which norms are part of jus cogens and, due to 
uncertainty regarding their source and operation outside the realm of treaty law, it cannot be 
predicted how jus cogens could interact with other customary rules, such as the rules of 
immunity. Chapter Two maintained that some customary rules could give rise to obligations 
erga omnes. It was proposed that, because they have a multilateral dimension (which is a 
signature of their internalisation level in the social structure of the State system), international 
crimes could be infringed by a State without causing injury to any other State. Further, since 
they have developed in customary international law, this can give rise to obligations erga 
omnes. On that basis, it was submitted that a breach of an obligation erga omnes results in a 
right of non-recognition of erga omnes violations by States and also creates a right for non-
injured States against the offending State. 
Chapter Three argued that the exercise of jurisdiction according to international law 
should also be subject to prohibitive rules of international law (such as the duty of non-
intervention and rules of immunity). Chapter Three rejected both a prohibitive approach to the 
rules of jurisdiction, which takes into account only rules prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction, 
and a permissive approach to the rules of jurisdiction in international law. The prohibitive rules 
include all prohibitive rules of international law, which in the case of jurisdiction are the duty 
of non-intervention and rules of immunity. The permissive rules of jurisdiction seek to balance 
the interests and competing rights of the States involved and thus inherently seek to give effect 
to the duty of non-intervention in the affairs of other States. The permissive rules are not 
mandatory but, generally, if States do not abide by these permissive rules, they risk infringing 
the duty of non-intervention in the affairs of other States. Broadly speaking, the requirement 
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of the link between the offence or the offender and the forum State – integral in the permissive 
rules of jurisdiction – seeks to prevent a breach of the duty of non-intervention.  
The permissive rules cannot guarantee the non-infringement of prohibitive rules of 
international law. Accepting the permissive approach to the rules of jurisdiction in effect 
situates the rules of jurisdiction in a different category vis-à-vis other rules of customary 
international law. The permissive approach does not provide a sound legal reasoning since 
other actions of States are governed by the general rule, which provides that States are allowed 
to do anything unless prohibited by international law. Moreover, the approach proposed in 
Chapter Three balances the rights of the States involved, rather than emphasising the right of 
the State wishing to exercise jurisdiction, or the right of the State which would be subject to 
the exercise of jurisdiction by that State. 
The right to exercise universal jurisdiction based on erga omnes violations is essentially 
based on the community interests’ rationale. The right arising from erga omnes violations for 
non-injured States - including the right to exercise universal jurisdiction, is not an unrestricted 
right. The conditions on the right of States to exercise universal jurisdiction arising from the 
erga omnes violations can only be grasped by considering the prohibitive rules of international 
law (ie the duty of non-intervention). Erga omnes violations give rise to a conditional exercise 
of universal jurisdiction to avoid the breach of the duty of non-intervention. International 
crimes representing community interests - ie legitimate norms, which give rise to erga omnes 
obligations, can only give rise to a conditional exercise of universal jurisdiction by States. In 
other words, the duty of non-intervention subject to certain conditions on the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction would not be breached due to several factors.  
First, the duty of non-intervention is owed to foreign States, and international crimes 
are prohibited both for States and individuals; that duty cannot be breached if the State is in 
violation of its obligations in that respect. When a State has failed to prevent the commission 
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of the crime and subsequently fails to prosecute the alleged perpetrators, this would inevitably 
weaken its claim regarding a breach of the duty of non-intervention. Secondly, the duty of non-
intervention should be viewed in light of the community interests that the prohibition of 
international crimes protects (ie as legitimate norms). Thirdly, the duty of non-intervention 
should be viewed in the context that most States exercise prescriptive universal jurisdiction in 
respect of most international crimes.  
The first condition which arises from the erga omnes obligations is the fact the State 
with a closer link to the offence or offender not only fails to prevent the crime but also 
subsequently fails to prosecute the offenders. As has been asserted, international crimes give 
rise to erga omnes obligations and international crimes establish dual responsibility for States 
and individuals. The responsibility to prevent the commission of the crime and prosecute the 
offenders was acknowledged to be a condition for the status of a crime in customary law. The 
subsidiarity inherent in obligations erga omnes is supported both by the subsidiarity principle 
and practice of many States (both prescriptive and adjudicative exercise of universal 
jurisdiction).  
The subsidiarity integral to obligations erga omnes prevents a breach of the duty of 
non-intervention. The second condition was that the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States 
should take into account procedural legitimacy factors on the basis that a State is acting as a 
trustee of the international community, protecting the interests of that community. International 
crimes represent the interests of the international community as legitimate rules (ie fully 
internalised in the social structure of the State system). It is on this basis that the recognition 
of the potential commission of a crime by an international organisation or by one of its bodies 
enhances the claim of the prosecuting State and weakens any claim of a breach of the duty of 
non-intervention by the State with the closer link to the offence or the offender.  
It was submitted that the presence of the accused for the purpose of the exercise of the 
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adjudicative and enforcement universal jurisdiction establishes a link between the prosecuting 
State and the accused, and thus prevents the breach of the duty of non-intervention. The 
conditions of subsidiarity and procedural legitimacy and the presence of the offender for the 
purposes of the trial prevent the breach of the duty of non-intervention by the forum State. 
Chapter Three also claimed that, on the basis of community interests (the legitimacy of the 
norms), the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction by States does not breach the duty of non-
intervention. Given that the exercise of adjudicative and enforcement universal jurisdiction in 
criminal proceedings is subject to the presence of the offender in the territory of the forum 
State, civil proceedings (trials) should also be subject to a link between the forum State and the 
offender (eg assets in the forum State or presence in the forum State) for the purpose of the 
trial, in order to prevent breaching the duty of non-intervention.  
This chapter did not propose that the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States does 
not have deficiencies; rather it proposed that if the exercise of universal jurisdiction by States 
in line with the proposed conditions takes place, some of the risks involved in the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction will be reduced. The proposed conditions include the presence of the 
offender in the territory of the forum State for the purpose of adjudicative and enforcement 
jurisdiction, the application of the rules of immunity, recognition of amnesties endorsed by the 
international community and requirement of recognition of the potential commission of crimes 
by international organisations, institutions and bodies therein.  
Chapters Three and Four considered that the existence of universal jurisdiction does 
not automatically lead to revocation of the immunity of officials, and that the absence of 
immunity does not lead to the existence of universal jurisdiction. However, the existence of 
adjudicative and enforcement universal jurisdiction is dependent on the absence of the 
functional immunity of officials. Rules of jurisdiction precede rules of immunity, and for the 
ascertainment of rules of jurisdiction, rules of immunity should also be considered. Both rules 
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of immunity and jurisdiction seek to achieve a balance between the rights of the States 
involved. Another similarity between the rules of jurisdiction and immunity is the prohibition 
of the act in international law as an international crime. While the absence of functional 
immunity in respect of international crimes is solely based on the dual responsibility of the 
crimes, the existence of the right of universal jurisdiction was argued to be also based on the 
erga omnes character of international crimes (ie legitimate norms).  
Chapter Four maintained that functional immunity benefits both the State and its 
officials; thus, if functional immunity is to be rebutted, the act must have been prohibited both 
for the State and the individual, either in international law or the domestic law of the forum 
State if the crime is committed in the latter’s territory. Further, it was posited that rules of 
functional immunity can be determined on the basis of the differentiation between private and 
official acts and the breach of prohibitive rules of international law. For crimes committed in 
the territory of the forum State, the prohibitive rule is the duty of non-intervention, ie when the 
conduct is carried out without the consent of the forum State which is generally prohibited in 
the domestic law of the forum State.  
It was contended that, for acts committed outside the territory of the forum State, such 
acts are not protected by the rules of functional immunity, since international crimes create 
dual responsibility in international law. Arguments which are solely based on individual 
criminal responsibility, or the irrelevance of official capacity, overlook the aspect of functional 
immunity which is of benefit to the States. On the other hand, the argument which considers 
functional immunity for the benefit of the State alone was also rejected, on the basis that it 
assimilates functional immunity with State immunity. Secondly, the practice of national courts 
suggests that the functional immunity of officials is generally considered when a plea of 
immunity is raised by the offender, regardless of the intervention of the home State of the 
offender in the proceeding. This assertion is qualified on the basis that States, as the primary 
 272 
subject of international law, can through international law waive the functional immunity of 
their officials in conventional law or customary law. 
Chapter Four also argued that functional immunity is not necessarily dependent on the 
rules of attribution of State responsibility. Rules of attribution cannot give proper weight to the 
part of the objective of rules of functional immunity which provides protection to officials as 
individuals. This view is also supported in the legal literature, and by State practice indicating 
that crimes committed in the territory of the forum State have not attracted functional immunity 
if those actions had amounted to an infringement of the duty of non-intervention in the affairs 
of the forum State. That is even when the actions had been conducted under the instruction of 
the home State of the official and were essentially attributable to the home State of the official. 
Chapter Four also maintained that reliance on the rules of attribution essentially precludes the 
possible concurrent responsibility of individuals and States, a view which is supported by some 
legal authorities.  
Moreover, rules of attribution are even more problematic in relation to civil 
proceedings, creating the incorrect assumption that, since States cannot be criminally 
responsible, only officials can be held criminally responsible, yet officials enjoy functional 
immunity in civil proceedings. This is based on the incorrect assumption that civil proceedings 
lead to the State being implicated. As indicated in Chapter Four, there is no evidence that States 
have reimbursed their officials for civil proceedings in respect of international crimes or that 
they have a responsibility to do so. It was also proposed that State practice in relation to the 
rules of functional immunity in civil proceedings should be viewed in light of the rules of 
universal jurisdiction. In cases where pleas of functional immunity in civil proceedings have 
been rejected, had the courts considered the issue of jurisdiction prior to the consideration of 
immunity, the claims in question could have been rejected  on the grounds of lack of 
jurisdiction as there was no nexus between the offender of the offence and the forum State (ie 
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the possession of property in the forum State or presence in the territory of the forum State).  
Chapter Five argued that there is a distinction between functional immunity and the 
restrictive immunity of States. The recognition of exceptions to personal immunity of States 
should not be confused with the discretion courts exercise in determining official from non-
official conduct with respect to functional immunity. The practice of national and international 
courts illustrates that the personal immunity of States and officials has been upheld unless an 
exception to immunity exists in international law. The practice of national courts in this respect 
is illustrative of the fact that a general rule of customary international law could be said to exist 
in respect of the personal immunity of States and their officials.  
The ICC’s Statute revokes immunities of officials when the jurisdiction of the ICC is 
established by the provisions of its Statute. For that reason, the practice of the ICC may 
influence the State practice which may, in turn, change the shared understanding of States on 
the availability of personal immunity for officials committing crimes in the territory of other 
States. The absolute immunity of high-ranking officials may change to include an exception 
for crimes – ie crimes under the ICC Statute, committed in the territory of other States. The 
following factors reinforce the assertion that an exception to personal immunity of officials 
may develop in international law. First, the African Union’s attempts to modify Article 27 of 
the ICC’s Statute have been unsuccessful. Secondly, the majority of States including most 
African States have waived the immunity of their officials under the ICC Statute. Finally, some 
States have waived the immunities of officials of non-ICC State Parties in their domestic 
legislations intended to incorporate the ICC Statute.  
Chapter Five also contended that a substantive and procedural distinction of the rules 
of immunity, as rules of customary international law, resembles an artificial construct in respect 
of their interaction with other rules of international law. The operation of the rules of immunity 
in international and national courts should not be confused with their status in international law 
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as rules of customary law. Their creation and the methods of their interaction with other rules 
of international law are based on their status as rules of customary law, rather than their 
substantive or procedural functions. Putting aside the stance of the legal authorities on the issue 
of the substantive/procedural/jus cogens basis of rules of immunity and international crimes, 
the judgments of national and international courts in relation to the personal immunity of States 
and officials illustrate that personal immunities have always been upheld unless an explicit 
exception exists in international law.  
Accordingly, reliance on the substantive/procedural distinction of the rules of immunity 
was challenged in respect of their capacity to determine the availability of immunity of States 
and their officials. While this thesis maintained that international crimes are rules which are 
also perceived as legitimate, it does not conclude that the rules of immunity are based on self-
interests or legitimacy. The status of a rule of customary international law cannot be used to 
differentiate between the level of internalisation of rules; nevertheless, erga omnes obligations 
do contain criteria for identification of some norms perceived as legitimate. On the basis of the 
findings of Chapter Two, it cannot be concluded that the rules of immunity are obligations erga 
omnes. A rule of customary international law does not necessarily entail different legal 
consequences whether the rule is perceived as legitimate by States or as a rule based on the 
self-interests of States.  
Accordingly, the proposed criteria in this thesis offer a better explanation in 
determining the immunity of officials and States in respect of international crimes. The 
functional immunity of a foreign official can be withheld on the basis of the individual and 
State responsibility with respect to international crimes committed abroad. The personal 
immunity of States and officials can only be withheld if an exception to the personal immunity 
of official and States has developed in customary international law or is excepted by other 
means (eg an international treaty). This statement should be read with the qualification of the 
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defence of necessity in international law with respect to foreign officials enjoying personal 
immunity.  
On the basis of the protection of the interests of the international community, States can 
rebuke the personal immunity of officials who are involved in ongoing violations of 
international crime and other potential violations that have been recognised as such by an 
international body such as the UNGA or the UNSC. This withdrawal of the personal immunity 
of officials is based on the assumption that the official concerned enjoys personal immunity in 
respect of the crime concerned (eg outside the framework of the ICC). Such non-recognition 
of personal immunity is not a rejection of the right of the high-ranking official to enjoy personal 
immunity in respect of that crime; rather, it is a temporary withdrawal of the right to enjoy 
personal immunity when there is a likelihood of the commission of international crimes and 
non-recognition of the personal immunity of the official concerned, which could prevent the 
commission of international  crimes. 
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Appendix 
Conventions in Chronological Order: 
1949 Geneva Convention (I) Articles 49 (criminalise, prosecute and prevent), Article 
50 (defines grave breaches), Article 51 (liability of the State) (195 Parties) 
 
1949 Geneva Convention (II) Articles 50 (criminalise, prosecute and prevent), Article 
51 (defines grave breaches), Article 52 (liability of the State) (195 Parties) 
 
1949 Geneva Convention (III) Articles 129 (criminalise, prosecute and prevent), 
Article 130 (defines grave breaches), Article 131 (liability of the State) (195 Parties) 
 
1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Articles 146 (criminalise, prosecute and prevent), 
Article147 (defines grave breaches), Article148 (liability of the State) (195 Parties) 
 
1971 International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Articles 3, 5 (criminalise and punish), 
Article 10 (adopt measures to prevent the commission of the crime), Article 7 (prosecute) 
Articles 5 (2) and 7 (universal jurisdiction; requires the presence of the offenders) (188 
Parties): Article 5 (2) was amended by 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Article 3 (universal jurisdiction; 
requires the presence of the offender) (171 Parties) 
 
1973 Convention on Suppression of Apartheid, Articles 4(a) (prevent and criminalise) 
and Article 4 (b) (prosecute) (108 Parties)  
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1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents 1973, Articles 2(2) and (3) 
(criminalise and punish), Article 7(prosecute), Articles 3(2) and 7 (universal jurisdiction; 
requires the presence of the offender), Article 4 (a) (prevention) (178 Parties) 
 
1977 Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, Article 85 (1) (prevent, criminalise and 
punish because the provisions of the Geneva Conventions mentioned above are made 
applicable to the Protocol) Articles 11 and 85 (2) (expanded the number of grave breaches 
applicable in international armed conflicts) (173 Parties)  
 
1979 Terrorist Bombing Convention, Articles 5,4 and 6 (criminalise and punish) 
Article 15(a) (prevention), Article 8(1) (prosecute), Articles 6(4), 7(2) and 8(1) (universal 
jurisdiction; requires the presence of the offender), Article 3 (states that the Convention does 
not apply where the offence is committed within a single State, the alleged offender and the 
victims are nationals of that State, and the alleged offender is found in the territory of that 
State, and no other State has jurisdiction under Article 6) (168 Parties) 
 
1979 Hostage-Taking Convention, Article 2 and 5 (punish and criminalise), Article 
4(a) (prevention), Article 8(1) (prosecute), Articles 5(2) and 8(1) (universal jurisdiction; 
requires the presence of the offender) (174 Parties) 
 
1985 Torture Convention, Article 2(1) (prevent), Articles 4-5 (criminalise and 
punish), Articles 5(2) and 7(1) (universal jurisdiction; requires the presence of the offender) 
(159 Parties) 
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1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, Articles 5-6 (criminalise and punish) Articles 6(4) and 10 (universal jurisdiction; 
requires the presence of the offender) 13(1)(a) (prevention) (166 Parties) 
 
1999 Financing of Terrorism Convention, Articles 4-7 (criminalise and punish) 
Article 18(1)(a) (prevention), Article 10(1) (prosecute), Articles 4(7) and 10(1) (universal 
jurisdiction; requires the presence of the offender), Article 3 (the Convention shall not apply 
if the offence is committed within a single State and the alleged offender is a national of that 
State and is present in that State, and no other State has jurisdiction under Article 6) (186 
Parties)  
 
2006 Enforced Disappearance Convention, Articles 5, 7(1) and 9 (criminalise and 
punish), Article 11(4) (prosecute), Articles 4, 9(2) and 11(4) (universal jurisdiction; requires 
the presence of the offender) (51 Parties and 95 Signatories) 
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